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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the practice of plea bargaining in national and international 
criminal courts.   Plea bargaining is a controversial practice at the national level and that 
controversy is escalated when dealing with the most serious crimes, such as genocide, that will 
be prosecuted in international criminal courts.  There are arguments both for and against plea 
bargaining in national adversarial systems.  Many of these arguments are also applicable in 
international criminal law and there will be further arguments for and against plea bargaining in 
international criminal courts that do not apply, or apply only to a lesser extent in national 
systems.  A balance has to be struck between an efficient criminal justice system and a criminal 
justice system that achieves its aims of reconciliation, deterrence and punishment for 
perpetrators.   
The practice of plea bargaining has been used at the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the Former Yugoslavia (hereinafter ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
(hereinafter ICTR).  The experiences of these ad hoc tribunals in dealing with the practice must 
be taken into account in coalition with the  theoretical arguments for and against plea bargaining 
to determine a best practice approach to plea bargaining in international criminal law that could 
be implemented at the International Criminal Court (hereinafter ICC) and in international 
criminal forums generally.  Given the resource, time and financial limitations faced by 
international criminal courts plea bargaining is a practice that should be implemented to achieve 
the correct balance between efficiency and justice.  It is acknowledged that the practice of plea 
bargaining is a controversial practice, even more so at the international level and as such there 
must be safeguards in place to ensure the practice is implemented in a credible manner that 
upholds public confidence in the system and achieves the strategic aims of the criminal justice 
system. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
The traditional impression of the criminal justice process in an adversarial system has 
been for an independent prosecutor to prove an accused person guilty.  Until such evidence is 
led, and the accused person proven guilty after a trial, they are considered to be innocent.  If the 
accused person is found guilty either by a judge or jury they are then sentenced, that sentence 
being determined by the judge with reference to legislative guidelines.  Modern adversarial 
criminal justice systems have, however, become dependent on the use of some form of plea 
bargaining in order to carry out their functions.  For example, in the United States alone, 
statistics have indicated that approximately 95% of cases are resolved by use of plea bargaining.1  
Plea bargaining, a practice which attracts much controversy even at the national level, is now 
used in the criminal courts of many jurisdictions worldwide, including, as will be illustrated in 
this thesis, in international criminal forums.   
Plea bargaining has been implemented at the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia (hereinafter ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
(hereinafter ICTR) despite the increased levels of controversy faced when dealing with the most 
serious and grave crimes, such as crimes against humanity and genocide.  It is evident from a 
review of the case law that there is no real consistency in the approach taken by the Trial 
Chamber to plea bargaining in these ad hoc international criminal tribunals.   
With the International Criminal Court (hereinafter ICC) being formed as a permanent 
international criminal court, with a significant and growing caseload, it is necessary to consider 
the theoretical arguments for and against plea bargaining at both national and international levels 
to determine whether plea bargaining is a practice that should be widely implemented in 
international criminal courts.  Many of the principles applicable to plea bargaining will apply at 
both the national and international level.  Precedent from the ICTY and ICTR will be examined 
to consider whether plea bargaining, a practice generally coined from domestic western 
adversarial systems dealing with the demands of an overstretched criminal justice system and a 
significantly wider spectrum of crimes in terms of their severity, should be used when dealing 
with, for example, the gravest crimes against humanity and genocide in an international criminal 
court.   
                                                          
1 Richard L. Lippke, The Ethics of Plea Bargaining, (2011), Oxford at p. 1  
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Drawing on the issues of principle and the examination of the practice of plea bargaining, 
it will be argued in this thesis that plea bargaining is a practice that is necessary to be 
implemented both at the national and international level.  As a result of the practice of plea 
bargaining being particularly controversial at the international level, recommendations will be 
given as to what safeguards and guidelines should be in place for those who engage in the plea 
bargaining process in international criminal courts. 
Chapter 2 will consider the meaning of plea bargaining, how this is defined and the 
theoretical arguments for and against plea bargaining at national levels with some reference to 
the western adversarial systems of North America, England and Wales and Scotland, where the 
practice of plea bargaining is commonly utilised in the criminal courts.  Chapter 3 will examine 
the theoretical arguments for and against plea bargaining in international criminal courts and 
how these arguments differ from those offered in discussions about plea bargaining at the 
national level.  Chapter 4 will look at whether the practice of plea bargaining is permissible at 
the ICTY and if so, the extent to which this practice has been used, the attitude of the Trial 
Chamber to this practice and how this links in with the theoretical arguments outlined in Chapter 
3.  Chapter 5 will consider the same matters as Chapter 4, however with reference to the ICTR.  
Chapter 6 will examine the practice of plea bargaining at the ICC, whether this is and should be 
permitted and will recommend a best practice approach to plea bargaining, with safeguards and 
guidelines for those dealing with the practice.  Chapter 7 will conclude that plea bargaining in 
international criminal courts is permissible and is a necessary evil that should be approached, 
monitored and audited with caution. 
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CHAPTER 2: THE THEORETICAL ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST PLEA 
BARGAINING AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL 
Historically plea agreements were frowned upon in the English and Northern American 
common law systems2 and courtroom trials regarded as ‘the safest test of justice.’3  However, 
even as long ago as 1968 Alschuler has averred that 90 percent of criminal convictions in the 
US were being achieved through guilty pleas as opposed to convictions after trial,4 and ‘[b]ehind 
this statistic lies the widespread practice of plea bargaining.’5  A 1992 survey of the 75 most 
populated counties in the U.S. revealed that 92 percent of all convictions in state courts were as 
a consequence of guilty pleas.6  In Scotland, the Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service 
(COPFS), the prosecuting authority, in the year 2014-2015, have reported that out of a total of 
98,742 cases disposed of in court, 88,788 (just under 90%) were guilty pleas where no evidence 
was led at court.7  There is no statistical data available to confirm what percentage of these cases 
were resolved as a result of a plea bargain or whether the accused person pled guilty as libeled 
on the complaint or indictment against them.  It has been argued that the reason for the 
significant growth of this practice has been as a result of ‘circumstance’ as opposed to ‘choice.’8  
Prior to any substantive discussion on the practice of plea bargaining, it is necessary to consider 
what exactly the term means and how plea bargaining is legally defined.  
2.1 The Definition of ‘Plea Bargaining’ 
The term plea bargaining is one which attracts different meanings worldwide and there 
is no standard universal definition.  A broad and simple definition would be where an accused 
                                                          
2 A.W. Alschuler, The Prosecutor’s Role in Plea Bargaining, The University of Chicago Law Review, (1968) Vol. 
36, No. 1, pp. 50-112 at p. 51 citing, for example, ‘Commonwealth v. Battis, 1 Mass. 95 (1804); United States v. 
Dixon, 1 D.C. (1 Cranch) 414 (1807); F. Pulton, De Pace Regis Et Regni 184 (1615); 2 M. Hale, Pleas of the Crown 
225 (1736); J. Archbold, Pleading and Evidence in Criminal Cases 73-4 (1st Am. ed. 1824)’ 
3 Alschuler Ibid. citing Wight v. Rindskopf, (1877) 43 Wis. 344 at p. 357 
4 Alschuler Ibid. citing D. Newman, Conviction: The Determination of Guilt or Innocence Without Trial (1966) at 
p.3. 
5 Alschuler Ibid. 
6 D.D. Guidorizzi, Should we really ban plea bargaining? The Core Concerns of Plea Bargaining Critics, (1998) 
47 Emory L. J. 753 at p. 753, quoting Bureau of Justice Statistics, Felony Defendants in Large U.S. Counties, 1992 
at p. 29 (‘for felony defendants over a one year period’). 
7COPFS website  
http://www.copfs.gov.uk/images/Documents/Statistics/Statistics%20on%20Case%20Processing%20Last%205%
20Years%202010-15.pdf last accessed 29 September 2015 
8 Alschuler, supra note 2 at p.51 
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person is given an incentive to plead guilty by a promise, or at least a chance, that he will be 
‘rewarded’ in a certain way.9  Black's Law Dictionary offers a definition of plea bargaining that 
refers to the accused person and the prosecutor as working ‘out a mutually satisfactory 
disposition of the case subject to court approval.  It usually involves the accused person pleading 
guilty to a lesser offence or to only one or some of the counts of a multicount indictment in 
return for a lighter sentence than that possible for the graver charge’.10   
Plea bargaining is, however, a practice that is more complex than Black’s definition 
suggests.  For example, as Guidorizzi has pointed out, with reference to this definition, it is true 
that the accused person and the prosecutor work out a ‘mutually satisfactory disposition’, to the 
extent that the bargain must be voluntary and agreed to by both parties however there is no 
guarantee that the final disposal of the case (i.e. the sentence) is something that both parties will 
be mutually satisfied with.11  Guidorizzi has also pointed out that the reference in Black’s 
definition to the disposition being subject to court approval indicates that the practice of Plea 
Bargaining is subject to judicial review, which, as will be discussed later in this chapter, is not 
always the case, particularly at the national level.12 
The three types of plea bargaining used in western adversarial systems are charge, fact 
and sentence bargaining.  In charge bargaining the accused person’s representative will 
negotiate with the prosecutor and an agreement will be reached that the accused person will 
plead guilty to either a less serious charge or a reduced number of charges.  The accused person, 
by pleading guilty, foregoes their right to trial and the right to have the case against them proven 
in exchange for the hope of a lesser sentence than the accused person would have had imposed 
                                                          
9 These ways will be examined in greater depth in the course of this thesis.  See also N. Vamos, ‘Please don’t call 
it “Plea Bargaining’, 2009, CLR, 617 at p. 618 
10 Black’s Law Dictionary  
11 See D.D. Guidorizzi, Should we really “Ban” Plea Bargaining?: The Core Concerns of Plea Bargaining’s Critics, 
(1998) 47 Emory L. J. 753  at p. 755.  As Guidorizzi has pointed out there, the ability of both prosecutors and the 
accused to bargain may be impacted by, for example, concerns that the prosecutor may have about the admissibility 
of evidence, for example.  The accused person may also be faced with overwhelming evidence against them 
meaning that they are in a weak bargaining position in comparison with the prosecutor, who will be in a more 
powerful position.  These matters will be discussed in further detail in the discussion on the arguments for and 
against Plea Bargaining later in this chapter. 
12 Ibid. at p. 756 where Guidorizzi refers to ‘implicit’ plea bargaining where accused persons are faced with a more 
severe sentence if they choose to proceed to trial instead of pleading guilty and in which case there is no negotiation 
to be approved by the court.  In these cases the concession is the likelihood of a less severe sentence for a guilty 
plea (although the legislation/guidelines on sentencing will vary depending on the jurisdiction and judges imposing 
sentences may have a wide discretion even where the accused person pleads guilty).  In addition, as will be 
examined in further detail below, prosecutors can drop or vary charges and depending on the jurisdiction in which 
this occurs, the court is rarely required to approve this. 
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for a more serious charge or for all charges against them.  For example, the accused person 
would plead guilty to culpable homicide (Scotland) or manslaughter (England) instead of 
murder, a negotiation that would take place between prosecutors and the accused person’s 
solicitor.13  Another example of charge bargaining would be if the accused person is charged 
with ten charges, the prosecutor may accept a plea of not guilty to three of those charges and 
guilty to seven of them.   
Fact bargaining refers to the process where prosecutors agree to narrate to the court an 
altered set of circumstances surrounding a particular crime, which is likely to provide mitigating 
circumstances to any sentence imposed.  In sentence bargaining the accused person may offer a 
plea of guilty knowing what sentence will be passed, that there will be a reduction in sentence 
in comparison to what the sentence would have been on tendering the plea or on the basis that 
the prosecutor will recommend a particular sentence to the judge.   
Plea bargaining is, for reasons that will be outlined in the course of this chapter and 
chapter 3, a controversial practice at both national and international levels.  Many of the 
arguments for and against plea bargaining are applicable to the practice both at national and 
international level however, as chapter 3 will outline, there are matters at international level that 
make the practice even more controversial. 
The remainder of this Chapter will list the arguments against and for plea bargaining at 
the national level.  The main arguments against plea bargaining are that plea bargaining exerts 
too much pressure on accused persons to plead and condemns the innocent, that plea bargaining 
violates the human rights of accused persons, that plea bargaining affords too much discretion 
and power to the prosecutor and that plea bargaining results in sentences that do not reflect the 
gravity of the criminal conduct.  The main arguments for plea bargaining are that the criminal 
justice system will operate far more efficiently than if every case had to proceed to trial, meaning 
that efficiency can still achieve justice and save precious time and money.  The accused displays 
remorse in pleading guilty and this is likely to mean a lot to victims and witnesses, who are also 
spared the trauma of having to give evidence in court.  This Chapter will outline and discuss 
these arguments in turn, starting with the arguments against plea bargaining. 
                                                          
13 See S Moody and J Tombs, Prosecution in the Public Interest (1982), chapter 6, ‘The negotiation of guilty pleas,’ 
which contains the only published account of charge bargaining and fact bargaining in Scots law. 
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2.2 The Arguments against Plea Bargaining at the National Level 
2.2.1 Pressure to Plead and Condemnation of the Innocent 
Critics of plea bargaining argue that the practice places too much pressure on accused 
persons to plead guilty, with the result that innocent persons plead guilty to avoid the risk of a 
harsher punishment.14  The widespread use of plea bargaining in the United States, for example, 
is in contrast with earlier precedent which relied upon previous case law on confessions, 
dismissing bargains that provided some kind of incentive to defendants and permitting the 
withdrawal of statements or guilty pleas by the defendants involved.15  Public confidence both 
dictates and requires a system where we can be sure that wrongful convictions emanating from 
guilty pleas are not tolerated and regarded as nothing less than unacceptable.  In 1970 the United 
States Supreme Court supported this position in stating that: 
‘It is critical that the moral force of the criminal law not be diluted by a standard of proof 
[or a procedure for conviction] that leaves people in doubt whether innocent men are 
being condemned. It is also important in our free society that every individual going 
about his ordinary affairs have confidence that his government cannot adjudge him 
guilty of a criminal offense without convincing a proper factfinder of his guilt with 
utmost certainty.’16 
It is correct that we must have confidence that a system is required that prevents 
condemnation of the innocent without the choice of adjudication or opportunity of some kind 
of trial procedure.17  We have the odd scenario under a number of legal systems that confessions 
offered in exchange for some kind of reward are regarded as inadmissible because they may 
provoke an innocent person to plead guilty to a crime that they did not commit whilst plea 
bargaining, which also offers some kind of reward in exchange for a guilty plea, is entirely 
permissible.  It has been stated by Heupel that ‘[t]he justification for this difference is that a 
defendant who pleads guilty expressly admits his guilt in open court, where the voluntariness of 
                                                          
14 For a discussion on this matter see F. Leverick, Sentence Discounting for Guilty Pleas: An Argument for 
Certainty Over Discretion (2014) Crim.L.R Issue 5 338 at p. 340 
15 See A.W. Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and Its History, (1979) 79 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 19-24 at p. 20 
16 In re Winship, (1970) 397 US 358 at p. 364 
17 John H. Langbein, Land Without Plea Bargaining: How the Germans Do It, (1979) 78 Mich. L. Rev. 204.  This 
article is against plea bargaining on the basis that it is condemnation without adjudication.  See also Albert W. 
Alschuler, Straining at Gnats and Swallowing Camels: The Selective Morality of Professor Bibas, (2003) 88 
Cornell L. Rev. 1412 at p. 1417.  This article raises concerns that the innocent are coerced into pleading guilty. 
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the plea may be ensured, and consents to the entering of a judgment of conviction without a 
trial.’18  It is difficult to see any practical distinction, particularly where the outcome of the 
acceptance of guilt would be the same.19   
It is possible, however, to say that when a guilty plea is made in open court the person 
accepting their guilt will have the physical protection of the court, which may differ from a set 
of circumstances where, for example, a confession is induced by the police inflicting physical 
violence on a suspect.  It has been stated that ‘a confession forced from the mind by the flattery 
of hope, or by the torture of fear, comes in so questionable a shape ... that no credit ought to be 
given.’20  However, when a plea agreement is entered between an accused person and the 
prosecutor the accused person is clearly ‘hoping’ that they will receive a more lenient sentence 
and there comes an analogy with the ‘reward’ and subsequent lack of credibility in a bargained 
guilty plea.  The mental fear endured by an accused person facing a longer prison sentence if 
they do not plead guilty is, arguably, in no practical way when considering the outcome different 
to, for example, the type of physical fear or pain that may be inflicted to induce a confession.  
However it should be acknowledged that the fear incurred during physical violence, for example, 
is distinguishable in that the person may genuinely fear for their life and the confession may be 
something that they make under pressure when they do not have the time to think about or reflect 
on the consequences.   
Despite the guilty plea being submitted whilst the accused person is technically under 
the protection of the court, the risk that innocent persons will be induced to plead guilty through 
fear of a harsher sentence is still a real possibility.  Surely acceptance of guilt by the perpetrator 
in the knowledge that they are doing so to have charges against them dropped (charge 
bargaining), a different factual picture presented in court from what their court papers initially 
indicated (fact bargaining) or a more lenient sentence (sentence bargaining) all in exchange for 
not requiring the evidence against them to be tested through a trial procedure,  must be regarded 
as them receiving a ‘reward’ for accepting their guilt (whether they are in fact guilty or not).   It 
is a very fine line distinction however the argument can be made that by the time a guilty plea 
                                                          
18 G. Heupel, Comparing Confessions and Plea Bargains:  United States v Robertson and the Admissibility of a 
Defendants Incriminating Statements, (1980) 60 B.U. L. Rev. 368 at p. 371. 
19 Ibid. 
20 This is taken from the 1783 English case of Rex v Warrickshall, found in L.E. Dervan and V.A. Edkins, The 
Innocent Defendant’s Dilemma: An innovative Empirical Study of Plea Bargaining’s Innocence Problem, (2013) 
103 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 1 at p. 7 with reference to A.W. Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and Its History, (1979) 
79 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 19-24  
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as a result of a bargain is being entered in court, the accused person is under the authority of the 
court and certain safeguards will have been passed by that time, for example, there must be 
sufficient evidence of the crime to bring the accused person to court in the first place. 
An illustration of the dangers that plea bargaining risks innocent persons pleading guilty 
can be seen in the US Supreme Court case of Bordenkircher v Hayes21.  This case also provides 
a good early example of how the plea bargaining process in the US can operate and the attitude 
that the court was starting to take to the practice, in terms of considering plea bargaining as a 
permissible practice.  Hayes, who had two previous felony convictions, was indicted for forgery 
of a cheque for $88.30, an offence punishable by two to ten years imprisonment.  As part of a 
plea negotiations the prosecutor offered to recommend a sentence of five years imprisonment if 
Hayes tendered a guilty plea prior to the trial.  If Hayes had not tendered a plea on the terms 
requested by the Prosecutor, this would have meant that he would be charged under the 
Kentucky Habitual Criminal Act and if convicted he would receive a mandatory life sentence.  
Hayes refused to plead guilty and was convicted following trial.  
Hayes appealed to the Supreme Court on the basis that the prosecutor's actions were 
coercive, retaliatory and fundamentally unfair.  His appeal was refused on the basis that no 
distinction could be drawn between an offer and a coercive ‘threat.’ There had been nothing 
stopping the prosecutor charging Hayes as a habitual offender in the first instance.  The court 
did not dispute that the difference in sentence was as a result of the accused’s right to test the 
evidence against him and stated that ‘the imposition of such difficult choices is the inevitable 
and permissible attribute of any legitimate system which tolerates and encourages the 
negotiation of pleas.’22  For Hayes, in hindsight it seems logical than he plead guilty to a crime 
that he is innocent of rather than face the risk of life imprisonment if convicted after trial.   
Hessick and Saujani have highlighted that there is a risk with plea bargaining that the 
system becomes ‘an assembly line in which defendants are pressured, deprived of due process, 
and regarded as secondary to efficiency.’23  Although there has been discussion of the plea 
                                                          
21 434 US 357 (1978). 
22 At 364. 
23 F. A. Hessick III and Reshma M. Saujani, Plea Bargaining and Convicting the Innocent: the Role of the 
Prosecutor, the Defence Counsel and the Judge, 16 BYU J. Pub. L. 189, 2001-2002 at p. 197.  Although Hessick 
and Saujani are correct to acknowledge the dangers where, essentially the human rights of the person accused of a 
crime are not upheld in order to ensure a system runs quickly and within budgetary requirements, the reasons behind 
any criminal justice system in general must be borne in mind in terms of ensuring that we are not living in an state 
16 
 
bargaining process in cases such as Hayes, plea bargaining has been described as an 
‘unregulated’ industry. 24   The plea bargaining process in the United States, however, for 
example, has some degree of regulation in federal cases whereby ‘the judge who accepts the 
plea must be satisfied that there is a factual basis for it, advise the defendant whether the court 
is bound by the parties' recommendations, decide whether to accept or reject the plea agreement, 
and ensure the proceedings are captured in a verbatim record to facilitate review.’25  The main 
concern however of the courts, as laid down in the case of Brady v United States, is that 
‘[w]aivers of constitutional rights not only must be voluntary but must be knowing, intelligent 
acts done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.’26  
Pleas induced by ‘force, threats or promises’ will not therefore necessarily render the plea 
involuntary and as a result the prosecutor has a broad discretion in terms of the negotiation of 
the plea.27  The promise of a significant reduction in sentence from that which an accused person 
would face after trial does not render a plea involuntary.28   
As a result of the precedent set down by Brady, even the threat of the death penalty 
would not be sufficient to render a guilty plea involuntary.29  It is then open to the innocent 
accused person to voluntarily admit guilt in order to avoid being tried, wrongly convicted and 
then receive a more severe sentence.  If an innocent accused person was therefore threatened 
with the death penalty in a case where the evidence against them was minimal, they will be very 
unlikely to take the risk and essentially gamble with their life.  It is sufficiently unfortunate that 
an innocent person would have to spend part of their life in prison for a crime that they did not 
                                                          
of anarchy, where victims have the right to those who have wronged them being brought to justice and those who 
commit crimes are aware of the consequences of doing so.   
24 See J.H.  Blume & R. K. Helm, The Unexonerated: Factually Innocent Defendants who Plead Guilty, (2014-
2015) 100 Cornell L. Rev. 157  
25 Ibid. at p. 165 
26 Brady v. United States, (1970) 397 U.S. 742 at 748 (1970) cited by Blune and Helm, Ibid. In Brady, the Court 
basically held that the threat of the death penalty could be used to induce a guilty plea as long as the plea was 
knowing and intelligent. 397 U.S. at pp. 747-748.  
27 Blume and Helm, Ibid. at pp. 165-166.  Also, in Bordenkircher v. Hayes, (1978) 434 U.S. 357 at 363, ‘it was 
stated that acceptance of the basic legitimacy of plea bargaining necessarily implies rejection of any notion that a 
guilty plea is involuntary in a constitutional sense simply because it is the end result of the bargaining process. By 
hypothesis, the plea may have been induced by promises of a recommendation of a lenient sentence or a reduction 
of charges, and thus by fear of the possibility of a greater penalty upon conviction after a trial.’ 
28 See Blume and Helm, Ibid. who cite Hayes, 434 U.S. at pp 364-365, and acknowledges that Hayes, in theory, 
rejects ‘the suggestion that prosecutors cannot threaten a lengthy and serious criminal punishment that has not been 
applied, at least occasionally, to similarly situated defendants-meaning that a charge that would not have been 
brought originally could be threatened if a guilty plea was rejected.’ 
29 Blume and Helm, Ibid.  
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commit but a worse scenario would be to lose their life as punishment for a crime they did not 
commit. 
Some legal academics have portrayed a bleak picture of plea bargaining as a procedure 
for conviction that fails to ensure the public confidence in the system that the Supreme Court 
has viewed as so critical.  For example, Professor Ellen Podgor has written in respect of plea 
bargaining in the United States, that ‘[o]ur existing legal system places the risk of going to trial, 
and in some cases even being charged with a crime, so high, that innocence and guilt no longer 
become the real considerations.’30  Academics and commentators have made reference to ‘the 
innocence problem’31 which deals with concerns that a system of plea bargaining permits ‘too 
many’ wrongful convictions.32   
An innocent person being forced to plead guilty through fear of the consequences should 
they decide to ‘run the risk’ of proceeding to test the evidence against them at trial, is nothing 
short of a travesty and extreme miscarriage of justice.33  No credible legal system can in any 
way permit this kind of practice in any organised or systemic manner and any system which 
openly permits wrongful convictions is fundamentally flawed.  The concept of ‘too many’ 
wrongful convictions is concerning in itself because it can never be determined how many 
would be okay.  One wrongful conviction is one too many.   
However, it would be naive to profess that a system could be devised or already exists 
that would ensure in 100 percent of cases that no person is ever going to be wrongfully convicted.  
Some allowances must be made for human error when witnesses give evidence at a trial in terms 
of their reliability and it also has to be accepted that there is the possibility of incredible 
                                                          
30 E. Podgor, White Collar Innocence: Irrelevant in the High Stakes Risk Game (2010), 85 Chicago Kent Law 
Review 77; See also N. Vamos, 2009, Please don’t call it “plea bargaining”, (2009) Crim. L.R. 617; A. Tor, O. 
Gazal-Ayal and S.M. Garcia, Fairness and the willingness to accept plea bargain offers, (2010), Journal of 
Empirical Legal Studies, 7(1), 97-116 
31 R. E. Scott and William J. Stunz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, (1992) 101 Yale L.J. 1909 at 1947, see also S. J. 
Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster,(1992) 101 Yale L.J. 1979 
32 See M. Young, In Defence of Plea Bargaining’s Possible Morality, (2013-2014) 40 Ohio N.U. L. Rev. 251 at p. 
257 
33 See R. Balko, False Confessions, Please Plea Me, Reason Magazine 08/2008, this article highlights a scenario 
where the defendant has felt in such a vulnerable positon that he felt compelled to plead guilty.  In this case, in 
December 2005, James Ochoa was wrongly convicted of a ‘car jacking.’  Ochoa pled guilty and served 16 months 
imprisonment but was cleared of this crime following DNA extraction from hair fibres left in the car matching the 
DNA of another male.  The judge told Ochoa that ‘should he insist on his constitutional right to a jury trial and 
should the jury find him guilty, the court would slap him with the maximum sentence the law allowed: life in 
prison.’  
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witnesses.  Forensic evidence has also evolved over the years but has, in some cases, resulted in 
wrongful convictions as a result interpretation errors by scientists and fingerprint experts, for 
example.34  Experts frequently disagree and often whether a person is convicted boils down to 
which expert’s evidence that the judge or the jury prefer.  All of these factors mean that there 
can never be a system that will ensure in every prosecution without fail that no person is ever 
wrongly convicted.  However, any reliable legal system must ensure that safeguards are in place 
to minimise the risk of wrongful convictions and not encourage them.  In assessing whether plea 
bargaining is a practice that encourages the innocent to plead guilty it is necessary to consider 
whether there is evidence of innocent persons pleading guilty as a result of a plea bargain. 
Young has stated that the question of how many innocent people have felt compelled to 
plead guilty through fear or finding themselves in a more undesirable position if they proceed 
to a trial and are then found guilty has, surprisingly, not formed a significant part of the plea 
bargaining debate.35  In fact, there is evidence that ‘factually innocent’ defendants do plead 
guilty36 and there are a number of documented examples of persons who have pled guilty in 
circumstances where they are innocent as, on balance, they have weighed up the risks and 
decided it would be better to plead guilty than face a significantly harsher sentence.37 
Whilst there is evidence of ‘factually innocent’ persons pleading guilty, there is an 
counter argument to this in that, in terms of the issue of the accused being under pressure to 
plead, the court should always ensure that any plea is voluntary.  Plea bargains are generally 
negotiated through the accused person’s solicitor and the prosecutor and therefore the accused 
                                                          
34 See the website of The Innocence Project at  
http://www.innocenceproject.org/causes-wrongful-conviction/unvalidated-or-improper-forensic-science  
35 M. Young, supra note 32 at p. 257 where he makes reference to the failure of Schulhofer, supra note 31 and 
Alschuler, supra note 2 to address the question of how many wrongful convictions are too many in the context of 
the plea bargaining debate.  Young has also acknowledged the difficulty in quantifying how many wrongful 
convictions are too many where he poses the question of, ‘where some wrongful convictions are inevitable in any 
merely human system of justice, what rate of wrongful conviction is sufficient to constitute per se systemic 
injustice?’  This is an incredibly difficult question to provide any uncontroversial answer to.  There will also be 
scenarios where a person is still convicted, having maintained their innocence and tested the evidence at trial.  The 
truth behind these cases may never come to light.  Perhaps more in depth research and attempts to collate and 
quantity data on wrongful convictions by the governments of countries where the practice is frequently used would 
assist in the discussion on whether innocent persons plead guilty through plea bargains.  
36 Id. See also BL Garrett, Convicting the Innocent: Where Criminal Prosecutions Go Wrong (2011). This book 
examines the first 250 DNA exonerations in the US using the work of the Innocence Project 
(www.innocenceproject.org). 16 of the 250 involved pled guilty at p. 150.  
37 See J Brockman, “An offer you can’t refuse: pleading guilty when innocent” (2010) 56 Criminal Law Quarterly 
116, who provides a number of examples from Canadian practice. 
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person’s representative should also always ensure that the plea is voluntary.  It will always be 
open to the accused person to plead not guilty and test the evidence against them and that will 
be a choice that the accused has. 
In considering the prevention of the innocent pleading guilty it is worthy to note that 
Schulhofer has recommended jury trials as being a safer system ensuring against wrongful 
convictions than the court accepting guilty pleas.38  Realistically, in practical terms, it would 
never be possible to try every person charged with a crime by a jury.  Jury trials take up a more 
significant amount of court time, which means accused persons would have to wait longer for 
their trial, victims would have to wait longer for justice and evidence may be forgotten by 
witnesses by the time they give evidence.  In addition to time and resource implications there 
are also negatives associated with a jury in that there is a risk they may take inaccurate media 
coverage of a crime into account, they may apply their own prejudices towards witnesses, the 
evidence and the accused and they may fail to comprehend instructions that involve applying 
the facts to the law.39 
2.2.2 Plea Bargaining Violates the Human Rights of the Accused 
Whether an accused person is guilty or not, as an accused person they have the right to 
have the prosecution prove the case against them beyond reasonable doubt.  It must be 
considered whether plea bargaining puts too much pressure on the accused person to relinquish 
their rights to have the prosecution prove the case against them beyond reasonable doubt to 
obtain a potential reward.  Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights includes the 
right to, inter alia, in any criminal charge against them, ‘a fair and public hearing within a 
reasonable time by an independent and Impartial Tribunal established by Law.’40  This article 
also includes the pronunciation that ‘[e]veryone charged with a criminal offence shall be 
presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law,’41 and the right to ‘examine or have 
examined’ witnesses.42  When an accused person exchanges these rights for the promise of a 
                                                          
38 Schulhofer, supra note 31 at pp. 1983-84 
39 A thorough analysis of the fairness of jury trials is outwith the scope of this thesis however for an in depth 
analysis of the fairness of jury trials see, C. Thomas, Are Juries Fair?, Ministry of Justice Research Series 1/10, 
February 2010 https://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/publications/research-and-analysis/moj-research/are-juries-
fair-research.pdf last accessed 10 December 2015 
40 Article 6(1), European Convention on Human Rights (hereinafter ECHR) 
41 Article 6(2), ECHR 
42 Article 6(3)(d) ECHR 
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more lenient sentence, for example, there must be safeguards in place to ensure that the accused 
person is not under undue pressure to forego their rights. 
A case which illustrates the human rights concerns associated with putting too much 
pressure on accused persons to plead guilty is the extradition case of McKinnon v United States 
of America.43  In this case, the practice of plea bargaining by US prosecutors was explored by 
the UK courts.  Between 2001 and 2002 McKinnon allegedly hacked into 97 US Government 
and military computers from his home in England.  He deleted data, resulting in significant 
disruption to US Army and Navy networks. He also threatened further disruption.  He made 
admissions during the course of a police interview.  The US authorities sought his extradition.  
McKinnon challenged his extradition and appealed to the House of Lords.  The only issue left 
for determination by the House of Lords was whether the extradition proceedings should be 
abandoned as a result of the US prosecutors having engaged in earlier plea negotiations. 
McKinnon had been offered a plea bargain deal that would mean he would be likely to 
receive a three or four year prison sentence if he consented to his extradition and agreed to a set 
of facts that had been presented by US prosecutors.  If McKinnon refused to accept this plea 
bargain he was told he could expect a sentence of eight to ten years imprisonment for charges 
and facts that prosecutors would frame in the most serious way possible.  McKinnon argued that 
the significant difference in relation to what he was being offered to forego what he had a lawful 
right to resulted in unlawful pressure.  The court concluded that ‘[i]n one sense all discounts for 
pleas of guilty could be said to subject the defendant to pressure, and the greater the discount 
the greater the pressure. But the discount would have to be very substantially more generous 
than anything promised here (as to the way the case would be put and the likely outcome) before 
it constituted unlawful pressure such as to vitiate the process (of extradition). So too would the 
predicted consequences of non-cooperation need to go significantly beyond what could properly 
be regarded as the defendant's just desserts on conviction for that to constitute unlawful 
pressure.’44   
It is clear from this that for the court to find that what is offered in a plea negotiation 
would amount to unlawful pressure to forego legal rights is a very high threshold.  However it’s 
not clear from this decision what exactly would have amounted to unlawful pressure, it is not 
                                                          
43 2008 UKHL 59 
44 Id. at para 38. 
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clear how ‘generous’ the prosecutor’s offer would have to be, albeit this is something that would 
be difficult to quantify and would be required to considered on a case specific basis.  It is also 
noteworthy that the court did not reject the notion that a plea bargain could amount to unlawful 
pressure to relinquish your rights to have the prosecution prove the case against you.  By 
implication, this suggests that the prosecutor’s power in conducting plea bargains can be subject 
to some form of judicial review.  Notwithstanding this, the high threshold places the Prosecutor 
in a position of power to conduct their negotiations with an accused person who is, for example, 
facing losing their liberty for a significant period of time and to that extent in a reasonably 
vulnerable negotiating position. 
The undue pressure on the accused to plead argument and the argument that plea 
bargaining violates the accused person’s human rights by causing them to relinquish their right 
to have the prosecution prove the case against them are two arguments that are clearly linked.  
There is a risk that by offering incentives to plead guilty that innocent persons may relinquish 
their right to have the prosecution prove the case against them.  There are, however, safeguards 
to reduce this risk through the accused’s access to a solicitor and the overseeing of the legal 
process by the judiciary.  These parties in the legal process will also play a key role in monitoring 
the actions of the prosecutor in the plea bargaining process. 
2.2.3 Plea Bargaining gives too much Discretion and Power to the Prosecutor 
The prosecutor’s power and discretion are topics that have amassed much controversy 
in the plea bargaining debate.  The role played by the prosecutor in utilising plea negotiations 
has placed the prosecutor and their motivations under the spotlight.  In entering into any plea 
bargains or agreements, prosecutors have a number of factors to take into consideration, 
including the nature of the charges, the accused’s criminal record, the available evidence,45 the 
quality of that evidence and the impact on the victim, both of the crime and consequences of 
                                                          
45 A.W. Alschuler, The Prosecutor’s Role in Plea Bargaining, supra note 2 at pp. 59-60 has made reference to his 
interviewing of a number of prosecutors and stated, ‘[o]ccasionally I encountered prosecutors who were defensive 
about the guilty-plea system and who seemed unwilling to say anything that might lead to criticism. Even these 
prosecutors, however, were quick to note that the state of the evidence was a major consideration in bargaining. 
"Half a loaf is better than none" was their philosophy. It apparently never occurred to them that the role they had 
assumed of "protecting society" as vigorously as possible might be criticized.’  It must however be stated, that 
although the prosecutor can and should come across as robust in terms of their protection of society, they must 
draw on their experience and what they can be realistic about in terms of the outcome of the trial.  It does not 
protect society for the accused person to walk free entirely.  
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accepting a plea to less charges or a less serious charge.46  All these factors can assist the 
prosecutor in terms of determining what negotiations they should be entering into and what they 
are best to accept, weighing up the likelihood of conviction after trial.  In addition to the external 
factors that the prosecutor is required to take into account they also tend to approach their role 
with a number of different hats on.  
 Alschuler has described the prosecutor, in negotiating plea agreements as undertaking 
a number of different roles including that of ‘administrator,’ ‘advocate,’ ‘judge’ and 
‘legislator.’47  In the Prosecutor’s role as administrator, they have resources and efficiency, in 
terms of disposing cases to free up resources to prosecute the next, in mind.48  With their 
advocate hat on the prosecutor may be keen to ‘win’ cases in order to secure a vast number of 
convictions per case that they decide to initiate proceedings for and ensure the maximum 
sentences are imposed.49  They may see this as enhancing their own reputation and ensuring 
public confidence in them in enforcing justice.  Part of this should be the inclusion of what the 
victim in a crime may think of the plea and what they want.   
 Although the prosecutor has a different role from the judge in any case, part of the 
prosecutor’s role is to be a judge, particularly when determining what to do with cases.50  For 
example the prosecutor may choose, in deciding on an appropriate plea to accept, to take into 
account the personal circumstances of the accused person51 i.e. their living conditions, mental 
health and family difficulties they have faced etc.  They also may take into account external 
factors, such as the time an accused person has already spent in custody for a particular crime.  
If the prosecutor decides to discreetly take on the role of legislator they may, for example, 
choose to drop charges because they believe the penalty is too harsh for the criminal conduct.52  
                                                          
46 See F.A. Hessick III and R.M. Saujani, Plea Bargaining and Convicting the Innocent: the Role of the Prosecutor, 
the Defense Counsel and the Judge (2001-2002) 16 BYU J. Pub. L. 189 at p.189 
47 A.W. Alschuler, supra note 2 at pp. 52-53 
48 Ibid. and at p. 55 Alschuler has quoted a Manhattan Prosecutor stating, ‘Our office keeps eight court- rooms 
extremely busy trying five per cent of the cases. If even ten per cent of the cases ended in a trial, the system would 
break down. We can't afford to think very much about anything else.’ 
49 Alschuler, supra note 2 at p. 53 and at p. 59 Alschuler has quoted a Chicago prosecutor stating, "When we have 
a weak case for any reason, we'll reduce to almost anything rather than lose." 
50 Alschuler Ibid. 
51 Alschuler Ibid. at p. 53 
52 Alschuler Ibid. 
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It may be considered that the prosecutor is, in circumstances where they decide to take on the 
role of legislator, going beyond their remit. 
Many argue that the prosecutor, regardless of the ‘hat’ that they decide to wear, is in a 
position of overwhelming power with the ability to drop a case or accept any bargain that pleases 
them and as such can hold the fate of the accused person in their hands.  It has been argued that 
the downside for the accused is that they have to deal with the prosecutor and cannot ‘shop’ for 
a better deal.53  However, this is not entirely accurate because, in practice, where individual 
prosecutors have their own discretion in cases some may develop a reputation for being more 
‘soft’ than others and may be targeted by an accused persons defence counsel.  This may 
encourage a practice of prosecutor shopping.  The prosecutor is, however, in the unfortunate 
position of being unable to ‘shop’ for a more reasonable accused person or defence counsel (as 
it is most likely that the prosecutor will actually negotiate with the accused person’s counsel). 
Prior to Human Rights legislation and advances in legislation on disclosure by the 
prosecutor of their case to the defence, the Prosecutor could then have been regarded as being 
in a much stronger position than the defence.  The prosecutor knew exactly what evidence they 
had and could make an informed decision about the likelihood of the accused person being 
convicted in deciding where to set the bar in a plea negotiation.  The disclosure obligations 
imposed on the Prosecutor places the accused person and their Counsel on a significantly more 
level playing field in terms of the negotiation process.  
Although laws on disclosure in many Western jurisdictions have striven to ensure that 
the defence have equality of arms in preparing their defence, some are still of the view that the 
defence will not have the same resources and information available to them as the prosecution.54  
If however the defence have disclosure of the evidence against them then they are in a position 
to analyse the likelihood of conviction after trial vs accepting guilt as part of a negotiated plea.  
The defence will also have access to information that the prosecutor does not have access to.  
For example defence counsel will be able to examine the accused’s defence by interviewing the 
accused himself and will be able to investigate this in full with the information from the 
prosecution.  The prosecution will not necessarily have full information in relation to the 
                                                          
53 J.F. Reinganum, Plea Bargaining and Prosecutorial Discretion, The American Economic Review,Vol. 78, No. 4 
(1988), pp. 713-728 at p. 713 
54 Id. at p. 713 
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accused’s defence and they have the high burden of proving the case beyond reasonable doubt.  
Disclosure ensures that the prosecutor cannot present any exaggerated view of the evidence or 
promote chances of likelihood of conviction beyond what they are, in the negotiation process, 
in order to secure a guilty plea.  In any case it would be misconduct and inappropriate for the 
prosecutor to misrepresent the evidence and similarly they should not be engaging in the plea 
bargaining process with a view to securing any personal benefit.    
Plea bargaining has been described by those who object to the morality of the practice 
as a ‘tool for corruption.’55  In considering whether plea bargaining can be considered such a 
tool it is necessary to consider how much discretion prosecutors have in determining plea 
bargains and how their discretion can be monitored to prevent corruption.  There must also be a 
process in place to investigate any allegations of suspicious plea bargaining by prosecutors.  In 
some jurisdictions guidelines have been put in place for prosecutors in order to assist them with 
how they should be exercising their discretion, for example, under the Code for Crown 
Prosecutors in England and Wales, in order to proceed with charges, there requires to be a 
‘realistic prospect of conviction’.56 
Of significance to the plea bargaining debate, the Code also states ‘Crown Prosecutors 
should never go ahead with more charges than are necessary just to encourage a defendant to 
plead guilty to a few.  In the same way, they should never go ahead with a more serious charge 
just to encourage a defendant to plead guilty to a less serious one.’57  This Code also states, 
‘Crown Prosecutors should only accept the defendant's plea if they think the court is able to pass 
a sentence that matches the seriousness of the offending, particularly where there are 
aggravating features. Crown Prosecutors must never accept a guilty plea just because it is 
convenient’.58  These guidelines are in place to ensure that prosecutors do not take advantage of 
their discretion and to ensure that the plea is only accepted if the sentence can reflect the gravity 
of the conduct.  This seeks to ensure that prosecutors do not have free reign to decide on any 
plea that pleases them.  However, it is unclear whether the actions of Crown prosecutors, for 
                                                          
55 A.W. Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and Its History, (1979) 79 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 19-24 at p. 24.  Alschuler has 
advised that there is documentary evidence to suggest that in 1914 an attorney in New York had developed a 
common practice of standing ‘out on the street in front of the Night Court’ and would ‘dicker away sentences in 
this form: $300 for ten days, $200 for twenty days, $150 for thirty days.’ 
56 See the CPS Code for Crown Prosecutors in England and Wales 
https://www.cps.gov.uk/publications/code_for_crown_prosecutors/  last accessed 10 December 2015 
57 Ibid. 
58 Ibid. 
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example are monitored in order to ensure compliance with the Code.  If there is no monitoring 
process, there is no way of knowing that the decisions by prosecutors are being checked and no 
way of ensuring then that corruption is being prevented. 
Prosecutors should base their decisions on what the charges should be and what charges 
should be acceptable based on evidence that has been gathered, usually by the police or other 
investigators working for public authorities.  It should not be the position that prosecutors are 
proceeding with crimes where they do not have sufficient evidence to prove that the person is 
guilty.  They may take into account the weight of particular evidence and the volume of evidence 
in considering the ‘risk’ posed of running a case to trial and the likelihood of conviction.  In 
reality, the situation where they would be bargaining with an accused in circumstances where it 
is clear that that person is not guilty is incredibly remote.  At least, in most well developed 
criminal legal systems, it would be considered highly unethical and unprofessional for 
prosecutors to accept pleas of convenience.   
If it becomes clear during the course of an investigation by the prosecutor that an accused 
person is in fact innocent, they should not then proceed to negotiate with the accused and they 
should discontinue proceedings against that person.  If it is clear that an accused person is 
innocent the prosecutor should not be engaging in any plea negotiation with them, just to see if 
they can secure a conviction in the case.  This is highly unethical and immoral.  Hessick and 
Saujani have professed that the prosecutor offers the same plea to the guilty or the innocent 
irrespective of whether they are actually guilty or not.59  This is an odd proposition to make 
given that the Prosecutor will, certainly in the vast majority of jurisdictions in the world, have 
no direct contact with those that they have accused of crimes and should never be at the stage 
where they are negotiating with someone who they know is innocent.   
Hessick and Saujani have also maintained that the prosecutor is in a ‘precarious position’ 
because of his ‘lack of information’ and go as far as saying that the prosecutor ‘prosecutes those 
who may be innocent because the prosecutor recognises his ignorance: he cannot let the guilty 
escape, and must depend on the system to indicate the innocent.’60  They also cite Scott and 
                                                          
59 Hessick and Saujani, supra note 23 at p. 198 with reference to R. E. Scott and William J. Stunz, Supra note 31 
60 Hessick and Saujani Ibid. Where they also make reference to the United States Supreme Court decision of North 
Carolina v Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970), where it was stated at p. 37, ‘[h]ere the State had a strong case of first-
degree murder against Alford.  Whether he realized or disbelieved his guilt, he insisted on his plea because in his 
view he had absolutely nothing to gain by a trial and much to gain by pleading. Because of the overwhelming 
26 
 
Stuntz61 in averring that prosecutors are more likely to be carrying out plea bargains with the 
innocent as ‘the prosecutor perceives innocence as a lack of evidence.’62  This completely 
ignores the fact that prosecutors are already working under the constraints of the law and that 
to, for example, indict an accused person there must be sufficient evidence to justify doing so.   
The ‘innocence as lack of evidence’ theory assumes that persons accused of crimes are 
plucked from society with an insufficient basis for police and prosecutors doing so.  Scott and 
Stuntz also aver that the prosecutor’s target is to ‘maximise net sentences over the population 
of defendants,’ as the prosecutor will incur ‘losses’ as a result of the innocent being acquitted 
because if the prosecutor had bargained with the same innocent party and secured a conviction 
and sentence, albeit a lesser one than they would have endured following a conviction after trial, 
then they would have achieved their target of ensuring maximum punishment/sentences in 
respect of whom they prosecute.63  Again Scott and Stuntz make assumptions about the role and 
aims of the Prosecutor without sufficient justification for this.  They paint a bleak picture of the 
prosecutor as an egotistical conviction seeking, sentence hungry target machine with the 
function of securing the harshest sentence possible regardless of truth, guilt and service of the 
real public interest in securing justice.64 
As outlined previously, there is a school of thought that the innocent accused person 
accepts the negotiated plea as the lesser of two evils.65  The defence, who represent their clients’ 
interests, will have more information as to their client’s guilt or innocence than the prosecutor 
does.  The defence are under an obligation to review the evidence that the prosecution have and 
analyse that with information provided to them by the accused person and any defence 
                                                          
evidence against him, a trial was precisely what neither Alford nor his attorney desired. Confronted with the choice 
between a trial for first-degree murder, on the one hand, and a plea of guilty to second-degree murder, on the other, 
Alford quite reasonably chose the latter and thereby limited the maximum penalty to a 30-year term.’  In this case 
the Supreme Court apparently ‘condoned’ the concept of an innocent person weighing up their risks and prospects 
in entering a plea agreement and ultimately doing so in order to get a better deal than face the risk of being convicted 
and face a more harsh punishment.  However, it was acknowledged that the judge was required to ‘scrutinise the 
evidence closely to find ‘a strong factual basis’ to support the defendant’s plea’.   
61 Scott and Stuntz, supra note 31 at p. 1948 
62 Hessick and Saujani, supra note 23 at p. 199 
63 Scott and Stuntz, supra note 31 at pp. 1947-1948 
64 See also Schulhofer, supra note 31 at p. 1983 where he has stated that ‘[t]his paradoxical conception of loss 
reveals one way that ‘efficiency’ and the ‘innocence problem’ are mis-specified in the Scott-Stuntz model. 
Litigating cases against innocents is indeed inefficient (if avoidable), but inability to impose punishment on 
innocents is not a loss for prosecutors or anyone else.’ 
65 Hessick and Saujani, supra note 23 at p. 201 
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witnesses.66  They are in a strong position to analyse whether, weighing up both the prosecution 
and defence evidence, their client is likely to be convicted.  They must ensure that their client 
fully understands the plea, the proceedings and the consequences of pleading guilty.67  It is their 
responsibility to ensure that any plea bargain entered is fully informed, in terms of their client 
consenting to the plea bargain. 
The accused person’s defence counsel are therefore in a position where they should be 
levelling the playing field between the power of the prosecutor and the accused.  An accused 
person will place faith and dependence in the expert advice given to them by their defence 
counsel and as a result it is important that this is subject to some form of review as well as being 
able to review the actions of the prosecutor.68  There are concerns that the interests of the clients 
and the interests of their defence solicitors or counsel may be variable and this may have an 
impact on the advice given on whether the accused person should plead guilty or not.  The 
defence counsel may have a greater desire for their client to plead guilty for financial reasons.  
Taking a case to trial may not be financially lucrative in terms of the fee that they receive and 
the preparation work that they will require to do in proceeding to trial.69   
Defence solicitors and counsel may also have relationships with, for example, 
prosecutors and court officials and that may contribute to how quickly and efficiently they wish 
to resolve cases, in order to keep acquaintances ‘on side.’70  For the defence counsel there is 
always a risk with running a trial that their client will be convicted and face harsher punishment.  
This may cause the accused person’s defence counsel anxiety that could lead to them 
encouraging their client to plead guilty.  This anxiety can, however, occur on both sides if, for 
example, the prosecutor has a case where the evidence is very thin that they are not keen to run 
to trial, the accused persons defence Counsel has power to the extent that they will be 
                                                          
66 For example, The American Bar Association standards warn defence attorneys that ‘[u]nder no circumstances 
should a lawyer recommend to a defendant acceptance of a plea unless a full investigation and study of the case 
has been completed, including an analysis of controlling law and the evidence likely to be introduced at trial.’ 
Standards For Criminal Justice, Standard 4-6.1(b). Standard 4-4.1 also states that ‘[t]he duty to investigate exists 
regardless of the accused's admissions or statements to the lawyer of facts constituting guilt or the accused's stated 
desire to plead guilty.  Taken from Hessick III and Saujani, Supra note 23 at p. 218 
67 Hessick III and Saujani, supra note 23 at p. 201 
68 Ibid. at p. 207 
69 Ibid. at p. 208-209 
70 Ibid. 
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highlighting all the difficulties with the prosecution case and may, on this basis, pressure the 
prosecutor into accepting a plea that they are not particularly comfortable with.   
There is also a moral dilemma faced by the defence counsel in considering whether to 
run a defence at trial as many are aware that their clients are ‘factually’ guilty.71  In any case, 
the accused person’s defence counsel should minimise the power imbalance between the 
accused person and the prosecutor by being able to point out flaws in the evidence and stress to 
the prosecutor that by running the case to trial there is always the possibility that the accused 
person may be acquitted.  The prosecutor will have the dilemma of deciding whether to accept 
a plea and walk away with a conviction and punishment of some sort or face the risk of a guilty 
person being acquitted entirely.  
In sum, there is a risk that plea bargaining affords too much discretion to the prosecutor 
and this may be used inappropriately.  However, this is unlikely to happen as the prosecutor is 
unlikely to be corrupt or unprofessional, at least in the well-developed legal systems that the 
UK and US have, for example.  The laws on disclosure and defence counsel are there to level 
the playing field, and often stress the risk to the prosecutor that they also face in taking a case 
to trial, in order to secure a ‘better deal’ for the accused person.  This does however mean that 
there is a risk inherent in the plea bargaining process that the punishment imposed may not be 
truly reflective of the seriousness of the criminal conduct. 
2.2.4 Plea Bargaining results in Sentences that fail to recognise the Gravity of the 
Criminal Conduct 
It has been stated that the decision on sentencing can be regarded as ‘the symbolic 
keystone of the criminal justice system.’72  Punishment for a crime in the form of the sentence 
imposed is something that will be at the forefront of the accused person’s mind in determining 
what they should do in relation to charges that they are facing.  They will want to know what 
‘incentives’ or ‘deals’ will be available should they choose to relinquish their right to a trial and 
plead guilty, whether via sentence, charge or fact bargaining.  The practice of sentence 
                                                          
71 See Alan Dershowitz, The Best Defence at 118 (1982); see also Andre A. Borgeas, Note, Necessary Adherence 
to Model Rule 1.2(b): Attorneys do not Endorse the Acts or Views of Their Clients by Virtue of Representation, 
13 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 761,771 (2000), taken from F.A. Hessick III and R.M. Saujani, Supra note 23 at p. 211 
72 A. Blumstein, J. Cohen, S. Martin and M. Tonry (eds.). (1983). Research on sentencing: The search for reform 
(Vols. 1-2) (National Academy Press, Washington, DC, 1983), at p. 1. 
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discounting involves the judge imposing a more lenient sentence for the accused pleading guilty, 
which is used as an incentive for pleading guilty.73  The discount in sentence may be as a result 
of an early plea.  Alternatively the accused person may indirectly receive a more lenient sentence 
than they would have done as a result of pleading to a less serious charge, a smaller number of 
charges or as a result of a factual narrative presented to the court that is less grave than the facts 
that would be presented at trial, for example. 
Alschuler has criticised the practice of plea bargaining by stating that it, 
[M]akes a substantial part of an offender's sentence depend, not upon what he did or his 
personal characteristics, but upon a tactical decision irrelevant to any proper objective 
of criminal proceedings. In contested cases, it substitutes a regime of split-the-difference 
for a judicial determination of guilt or innocence and elevates a concept of partial guilt 
above the requirement that criminal responsibility be established beyond a reasonable 
doubt.74   
This quote overgeneralises and makes unfounded assumptions about what is involved in 
the practice of plea bargaining.  Alschuler assumes that, the judiciary, in issuing sentences that 
have resulted from some form of  plea bargaining do not take into account the conduct or 
characteristics of the accused, which may be only marginally different following a plea bargain, 
or not different at all if the plea has involved a charge bargain that does not change the factual 
narrative. These matters must still be taken into account for the judge to sentence the accused at 
all and guidelines for sentencing are often in place for judges at the national level.   
In considering whether plea bargaining results in sentences that fail to recognise the 
severity of criminal conduct, it is of assistance in the national context to consider the practice of 
sentence discounting for guilty pleas in the jurisdictions of Scotland and England where the plea 
bargaining is frequently practiced.  For example, in Scotland, sentence discounting is governed 
by Section 196(1) and 196(1A) of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 (hereinafter the 
1995 Act).  This section states: 
                                                          
73 F. Leverick, Sentence Discounting for Guilty Pleas: A Question of Guidelines, 2004 Edinburgh Law Review, 
Vol. 16 at pp. 233-238 at p. 233 
74 A. W. Alschuler, Implementing the Criminal Defendant's Right to Trial: Alternatives to the Plea Bargaining 
System, (1983) 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 931 at 932 
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(1) In determining what sentence to pass on, or what other disposal or order to make in 
relation to, an offender who has pled guilty to an offence, a court shall take into 
account— 
(a) the stage in the proceedings for the offence at which the offender indicated 
his intention to plead guilty, and 
(b) the circumstances in which that indication was given. 
(1A)In passing sentence on an offender referred to in subsection (1) above, the court 
shall— 
(a) state whether, having taken account of the matters mentioned in paragraphs 
(a) and (b) of that subsection, the sentence imposed in respect of the offence is 
different from that which the court would otherwise have imposed; and 
(b) if it is not, state reasons why it is not.  
The statute therefore very clearly sets down that it is possible to offer sentence discounts for 
guilty pleas.  The undertone of the legislation suggests that discounts should be offered for guilty 
pleas as the legislation specifically states that, in circumstances where no sentence discount is 
given for an early plea, the court must state reasons why the sentence is not discounted.  The 
legislation however falls silent on the question of the amount of discount to be given by the 
court.  This has then fallen to the judiciary to establish.   
 
In the case of Spence v HM Advocate75 the court sought to establish guidance for the 
judiciary to supplement Section 196 and stated that ‘[t]he extent of the discount will be on a 
sliding scale ranging at its greatest from one third, or in exceptional circumstances possibly 
more, to nil . . .’76  However, the Scottish courts have relatively recently recanted from the 
guidance set down in Spence.  In Gemmell v HM Advocate,77 the Lord justice-Clerk said that 
‘the court's discretion to allow a discount should be exercised sparingly and only for convincing 
reasons,’78 and ‘the broad principle that, in general, the discount will be the greater the earlier 
                                                          
75 Spence v HMA [2007] HCJAC 64: 2008 JC 174 
76 Ibid. at para. 14 
77 [2011] HCJAC 129 
78 Ibid. at para. 77 
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the plea is probably a sufficient statement of guidance for most purposes.’79  In Murray v HM 
Advocate, the court ruled that there should be ‘no mandatory sliding scale’ and was of the view 
that any discount ‘was reserved to the discretion of the sentencer in every case.’80  The particular 
judge, Lord Gill, who delivered the opinion in Murray seemed to be in favour of such an 
approach in order to instil public confidence in the justice system and ensure that large discounts 
are imposed only for those who deserve such a discount.81   
 
It may be difficult to distinguish, for the judge who takes a plea from an accused person, 
between who ‘deserves’ to receive the reward of a discounted sentence for an early plea and 
who does not.  Clearly a plea in mitigation following an accused person’s guilty plea will 
provide the court with a background, in terms of the accused person’s personal circumstances, 
difficulties that they have faced in life, information on health problems for the accused person 
and difficulties with family members.  The wider discretion afforded to the judiciary by the 
decision in Murray leads to uncertainty that could deter an accused person from pleading guilty 
or entering any kind of plea bargain with the prosecutor.  In Scotland, no process exists of 
sentence bargaining between the accused person and the Prosecutor.  The prosecutor has no 
locus in determining the sentence to be imposed by the court, so despite engaging in a fact or 
charge bargain with the prosecutor, there will be real uncertainty on the part of the accused 
person as to whether they will achieve the ‘incentive’ they hope for in entering a guilty plea.   
 
In contrast, the discount guidance for England and Wales is in line with the previous 
approach in Scotland and sets down that discounts given should range from one third to one 
tenth, depending on the stage in proceedings of the guilty plea.82  The Coroners and Justice Act 
2009 states that the Court must ‘follow’ any relevant guidelines ‘unless the court is satisfied that 
it would be contrary to the interests of justice to do so.’83  In the case of R v Caley and others84 
the court confirmed the sentencing guidelines by confirming that sentencing is determined on a 
                                                          
79 Ibid. at para. 78 
80 Murray v HM Advocate [2013] HCJAC 3 at para. 24 
81 See F. Leverick, supra note 14 at p. 342, citing Gemmell v HM Advocate [2011] HCJAC 129 at para. 74 
82 See Sentencing Guidelines Council, Reduction in Sentence for a Guilty Plea: Definitive Guideline (2007) (the 
Definitive Guideline) at p. 5  
https://www.sentencingcouncil.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/Reduction_in_Sentence_for_a_Guilty_Plea_-
Revised_20071.pdf last accessed 10 December 2015 
83 Coroners and Justice Act 2009, Section 125(1) 
84 [2012] EWCA Crim 2821; 2012 WL 6728543 
32 
 
‘sliding scale depending on when the plea of guilty was indicated.  The largest reduction is of 
about one third, and is to be accorded, under the well-established practice and the SGC 
Guideline, to defendants who indicate their plea of guilty at the ‘first reasonable opportunity.’85 
Thereafter the proportionate reduction diminishes.  A plea of guilty at the door of the trial court 
will still attract some reduction, but it is likely to be of the order of one tenth.’86  In considering 
whether a sentence discount means that the moral gravity of the crime is not accurately reflected, 
this material from Scotland and England and Wales sets out how much of a discount is likely to 
be given.  Given the uncertainty of the new approach in Scotland, for example, it cannot 
necessarily follow that a judge will issue a sentence after a plea bargain where the moral gravity 
of the crime is not accurately reflected. 
 Critics of the plea bargaining process take issue with the accused receiving a sentence 
that is not reflective of the full gravity of their conduct.  This argument assumes that the proper 
sentence imposed is the sentence given after trial and the case against the accused person proved 
beyond reasonable doubt.  They assume that the sentence imposed after a guilty plea with a 
discount is therefore a lenient sentence.  Deterrence is a key factor that the judiciary must take 
into account in issuing sentences as accused persons cannot be seen to, essentially, ‘get off’ with 
crimes.87  In addition, where accused persons are not adequately punished there is a real issue 
that the criminal justice system may be failing to protect the public and as a result public 
confidence in the criminal justice system is lost. 88   This matter is less significant in 
circumstances where a guilty plea to a minor offence, reduces a sentence that is a fine from £150 
to £100 however, the more serious the crime, the more controversial the practice and as such 
this issue will be discussed further in chapter 3 below.   
If, however, the evidence does not quite stand up at trial then a guilty person would walk 
free without punishment at all.  If plea bargaining in all forms were to be abolished from a 
criminal justice system, the system will become less efficient and this could also create 
loopholes for those wishing to evade justice.  For example, cases may time bar as it may be 
impossible to fix trials for cases within statutory timescales with the result that the Prosecutor 
                                                          
85 Ibid. at para 8 
86 This clearly gives more clarity than the newer approach in Scotland, which could deter accused persons from 
entering pleas as a result of the uncertainty.   
87 D.D Guidorizzi, supra note 6 at p. 771 
88 See Gemmell v HM Advocate supra note 81 at para. 76 and F. Leverick, Sentence Discounting for Guilty Pleas: 
An Argument for Certainty Over Discretion (2014) Crim.L.R Issue 5 338 at p. 341 
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would then have to select which crimes to prosecute.  The human rights of accused persons may 
also be violated as they are entitled to a ‘fair and public hearing within a reasonable time.’89  
Plea bargaining assists in ensuring that only a minority of cases actually proceed to trial, 
meaning that the accused persons who wish to have the prosecutor prove the case against them 
beyond reasonable doubt are far more likely to have a fair and public hearing within a reasonable 
time.  In addition, one of the main advantages of plea bargaining for victims and witnesses is 
quick resolution of their cases and closure for them.  The following section will consider the 
arguments for plea bargaining at the national level in greater detail.   
 
  
                                                          
89 Article 6(1), ECHR 
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Chapter 2.3 The Arguments for Plea Bargaining at National Level 
There are a number of arguments for permitting plea bargaining at the national level.90  
If an accused person pleads guilty this results in efficiency for the court system and saves 
resources in the prosecutor’s office in order that those preparing the cases can focus on the cases 
that will be trials.  The accused also has the incentive of a promise or likelihood that he will 
receive a more lenient punishment.  There is a strong argument that the accused pleading guilty 
indicates his remorse and that can mean a lot to victims.  Guilty pleas avoid witnesses being 
inconvenienced by being required to come to court and give evidence, a daunting process for 
anyone.  The matter being resolved more quickly is also of benefit to the accused and victims 
as they will not have the criminal proceedings hanging over them for a significant period of time.   
 2.3.1 Efficiency can still Achieve Justice: Saving Precious Time and Money 
The US Supreme Court as long ago as 1971 has given a degree of backing to the 
necessity to ensure administration of justice in an efficient manner in stating: 
‘The disposition of criminal charges by agreement between the prosecutor and the 
accused, sometimes loosely called ‘plea bargaining,’ is an essential component of the 
administration of justice. Properly administered, it is to be encouraged.  If every criminal 
charge were subjected to a full-scale trial, the States and the Federal Government would 
need to multiply by many times the number of judges and court facilities.’91 
The inconvenience of jury trials, for example, must be highlighted.  Members of the public will 
be called from their daily lives to participate as jurors, it is their duty to do so, regardless of their 
will.  The state will require to pay any loss of earnings and expenses for their travel, for example.  
This is all clearly in addition to the salaries, legal fees and cost of running courtrooms.  The 
expenses of witnesses will also have to be paid, in addition to the personal inconvenience of 
them having to attend court.   
It is clear that in the domestic context it is far more expensive for a trial to proceed than 
for a guilty plea to be dealt with by the court.  For example the CPS has quoted that for an early 
                                                          
90 F Leverick, supra note 14 at pp. 339-340 
91 Santabello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971), taken from J. Kavanagh, Plea Bargaining: The Prosecutor’s 
Perspective 6 Police L.Q. 5 1976-1977 at p. 8  
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plea in the Crown Court the cost to the CPS alone, as of 2009, was on average, £670, a plea 
following committal for trial was, on average, £1500 and a trial was, on average £3500.92  For 
COPFS in Scotland, in the year 2003-2004, the cost of a high court plea under Section 76 of the 
Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 (which would be the earliest opportunity for the 
accused person to plead guilty) was £2611, a plea at a preliminary diet was £12,203, a plea at a 
trial diet was £13,339 and a plea at a trial diet where evidence has been led was £14,985.93  At 
Sheriff and Jury level a Section 76 plea was £1876, a plea at a first/preliminary diet was £6933, 
a plea at a trial diet was £7341 and a plea at a trial diet where evidence was led was £9176.94  At 
Sheriff summary level a plea at a pleading diet was £163, a plea at an intermediate diet was 
£367, a plea at a trial diet was £449 and a plea at the trial diet after evidence was led was £653.95 
In addition to the costs incurred by the prosecuting authority the costs to the court service 
must also be taken into account.  For example, in Scotland, a study conducted of cases in 
2003/2004 found that, on average, in the High Court a plea at a hearing under section 76 
aforementioned was £324, a plea at preliminary hearing was £324 and a plea at trial diet was 
£324.96  However the cost of a case concluded at trial, where evidence was led before a judge 
and a jury was £13,879 (including juror/reporting costs).97  At Sheriff solemn level a plea at a 
first diet was £117, a plea at a first diet/section 76 diet with one adjournment for reports was 
£156, a plea at trial diet with one adjournment for reports was £195 and the cost of a case 
concluded at trial after evidence was led before a Sheriff and a Jury was £6,368 (with one 
adjournment for reports).98  At Sheriff summary level (where the Sheriff is the judge and there 
is no jury) a plea at pleading diet was £78, a plea at a first diet/continued first diet with one 
adjournment for reports was £117, a plea at intermediate diet with one adjournment for reports 
was £156 and a plea at trial diet with one adjournment for reports was £234.  The cost of a case 
concluded at summary trial level where evidence was led and case adjourned once for reports 
was £1,463.99 
                                                          
92 These figures have been extracted from the website of the Crown Prosecution Service and were the rates as of 1 
September 2009 http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/a_to_c/costs/annex_1_-_scales_of_cost/ last accessed 11 December 
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93  Scottish Executive, Costs, Sentencing Profiles and the Scottish Criminal Justice System (2005) at p. 8 
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These figures give an illustration of how the cost to both the prosecuting authority and 
the court service is far more significant if the accused proceeds to trial instead of entering a 
guilty plea.  It is worthy of note that in any trial procedure there is always scope for a guilty 
person to be acquitted either during the trial or after trial.  If this occurs then a lot of money will 
have been spent on the process for the accused merely to be acquitted.  It would be more 
effective use of the resources of the prosecuting authority and the court service to focus on the 
real contentious cases that will be proceeding to trial and resolve as many cases as possible 
through pleas.  Where prosecution and court resources are not used effectively and too many 
cases are taken to trial the prosecution service may not have the resources to prosecute the most 
serious and complex cases to the standard required.  If guilty pleas and plea bargaining were to 
be abolished it is inevitable that delays would occur between the amount of time between a 
person being charged with a crime by the police and their trial.  This will be highly undesirable 
for the accused who may have, for example, disciplinary proceedings in relation to their 
employment hanging over them pending the outcome of criminal proceedings. 
For an accused person, it is obvious that the main benefit to them of engaging in a plea 
bargain is the incentive of some kind of reward for relinquishing their right to trial.  This may 
suit the accused person because they can have proceedings against them concluded more quickly 
and it is likely they will obtain a more lenient sentence.  Plea bargaining also benefits the accused 
person’s solicitors/counsel as they are able to resolve cases quickly and then focus their time 
and resources, which, just like the prosecutor, will be limited, on cases where they believe, for 
example, that the innocent accused has a significant chance of acquittal.100  In high profile cases 
adverse publicity against the accused person is something that they are likely to want to avoid 
and by pleading guilty the accused person may avoid, for example, daily updates in the media 
about their trial.  It is also of real significance to the aims of the criminal justice system as a 
whole that a guilty plea may indicate remorse by the accused for their actions and as such can 
contribute toward their rehabilitation and achieving justice for victims. 
 
 
                                                          
100 Alschuler, The Defence Attorney’s Role in Plea Bargaining, (1975) 84 Yale L. 1179 at  pp. 1206-1256 and 
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2.3.2 Remorse, Acceptance and Justice for Victims 
If an accused person in pleading guilty is showing remorse for their actions and this has 
benefits to the criminal justice system and victims overall then the showing of remorse by the 
accused is an advantage of plea bargaining as a result of this practice encouraging more guilty 
pleas.  Bibas and Bierschbach have argued that the significance of an apology should be given 
more weight in the criminal justice system and that this is a factor that prosecutors should take 
into account in determining how best to proceed with cases.101  Presumably then remorse and 
apology could be factored into the plea bargaining process, to the extent that the prosecutor, in 
determining where the bar is set in a plea negotiation, would take into account the attitude of 
the accused and whether he is apologetic towards the victim.102   
However, in considering the advantages of plea bargaining specifically, remorse is 
something that can also be shown through a guilty plea that has not been the subject of any 
negotiation.103  It may be argued that the bargaining and reward inherent in plea bargaining does 
not sit comfortably with remorse as the fact that an accused person has pled guilty does not 
necessarily indicate remorse, particularly where there is an incentive involved.104  The accused 
person may be pleading guilty through a plea bargain to achieve a more lenient sentence alone 
and may not in fact be sorry.105  Even if the accused person is sorry it is not clear why it should 
follow that the court should treat them more leniently as, for example, there is nothing 
necessarily to suggest that being sorry serves any deterrent effect.106   
However the victims views on whether remorse has been shown through a guilty plea 
and the impact of that plea and any remorse shown on them in coming to terms with a crime, 
even if this has been as a result of a negotiation, are of significance.  Even if the accused does 
achieve a more lenient sentence through a plea bargain it cannot be assumed that he had only 
pled guilty for the incentive.  It is entirely still possible that the accused person wishes to show 
                                                          
101 S Bibas & R.A. Bierschbach, Integrating Remorse and Apology into Criminal Procedure, (2004) 114 YALE L.J. 
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remorse and avoid putting the victim through reliving the crime in giving evidence against them 
by pleading guilty. 
2.3.3 Victims and Witnesses are spared the trauma of having to give Evidence 
One of the main advantages of plea bargaining is that victims and witnesses are spared 
the trauma in having to face the accused and give evidence in court against them.107  The more 
serious the crime, often the more anxious that victims and witnesses will be about giving 
evidence.  Victims in cases, involving crimes of a serious sexual nature, for example will be 
anxious that during the course of giving evidence that they will feel that they are on trial and 
they have the additional anxiety that they will have to go through the ordeal of giving evidence 
without any guarantee of a conviction.  In fact, if the accused person is acquitted after the victim 
has given evidence this can be damaging from the perspective that the victim may feel 
humiliated and that they have not been believed.   
The benefit of witnesses not having to give evidence is less apparent in cases where, for 
example the witnesses involved are professional or police witnesses.  It also must be borne in 
mind that some victims want their day in court to have their voices heard and face the person 
who has caused them suffering.  The reality is that their day in court may be disappointing in 
circumstances where they do not get to tell their full story or face brutal cross examination.   
There is clearly a risk inherent in any trial that the accused person will successfully test 
the prosecution evidence, be acquitted and walk free.  If there are weak aspects of the evidence 
in respect of certain crimes then rather than put victims and witnesses through the trauma of 
giving evidence, for that evidence not to be believed or accepted, a risk assessment by the 
prosecutor may be to accept a plea to the crimes where the evidence is strong.108  Some victims 
are filled with fear and dread of the court process and would prefer that responsibility is taken 
from them into the hands of prosecutors.  This also eliminates the risk of retribution that they 
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108 See R. Henham, Punishment and Process in International Criminal Trials (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005), at pp. 
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may suffer for giving evidence.109 Cases will also be dealt with more quickly where there is a 
plea resulting in more efficient justice for victims and the criminal justice process as a whole. 
2.4 Summary of Chapter 2 
It is clear from the arguments outlined that plea bargaining at the national level is a 
controversial practice, with opinions on the practice often splitting legal academics and 
practitioners.  Whilst engaging in plea bargains has downsides in that the accused, including 
innocent accused persons, may be pressured into relinquishing their rights by pleading guilty, 
there are some safeguards in place to ensure that the plea is voluntary, for example the accused’s 
solicitor being there to represent their interests and having access to the evidence that the 
prosecutor has through disclosure to ensure that the accused person is getting a ‘fair deal.’  This 
will also keep the prosecutor’s power in check.    
Given the high volumes of cases resolved by way of guilty pleas and plea bargains 
outlined earlier in this chapter it is clear that both in terms of time and resources, that the criminal 
justice systems discussed, that are heavily reliant on the prosecutor and defence engaging in 
plea bargaining, would grind to a halt.  The amount of time it would take for accused persons to 
be brought to trial would be likely to violate their human rights in terms of a right to a trial 
within a reasonable time.  Whilst there is an argument that plea bargaining results in sentences 
that do not account for the full gravity of the criminal conduct, a balance has to be struck in 
ensuring that the accused persons are punished, that the criminal justice system runs smoothly 
and that justice is achieved for victims, whilst avoiding distressing and lengthy court 
proceedings.  It is necessary to achieve a balance between efficiency and justice and as long as 
this can be done the arguments for plea bargaining outshine those against.  However, when 
dealing with the most serious of international crimes, such as crimes against humanity and 
genocide, both the arguments for and against plea bargaining are elevated to a more 
controversial level.   
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CHAPTER 3: THE THEORETICAL ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST 
PLEA BARGAINING AT THE INTERNATIONAL LEVEL 
Theoretically many of the arguments that apply for and against plea bargaining at the 
national level apply equally at the international level.  There are, however, further distinct 
elements when dealing with international plea bargaining that may elevate some of the 
arguments for and against the practice.  As demonstrated in the course of Chapter 2, when 
negotiating plea agreements prosecutors have not only the evidence of guilt but also efficiency, 
budgets and resources in mind.   It is clear that ‘bargaining’ when justice is involved attracts 
much controversy even when dealing with minor offences.  Plea bargaining sits even less 
comfortably with impartial international justice, particularly when dealing with the gravest of 
international crimes.110  The following chapter will consider how the aforementioned arguments 
for and against plea bargaining apply at the international level and will also consider any 
arguments for and against plea bargaining that exist in isolation at the international level. 
3.1 The Arguments against Plea Bargaining in International Courts 
3.1.1 Pressure to Plead and Condemnation of the Innocent: The International Context 
The pressure to plead and condemnation of the innocent arguments against plea 
bargaining outlined previously in the context of domestic law are applicable in the international 
criminal law context and are even more compelling given the serious nature of crimes being 
dealt with at the international level and the likelihood of lengthy prison sentences following 
conviction for serious international crimes.  On the one hand the accused person may feel under 
even more pressure given the serious nature of the crimes being dealt with.  A conviction for a 
charge of genocide, is undoubtedly going to attract a very lengthy sentence.  When faced with 
a very lengthy sentence and even very lengthy trial process that could take years, the accused 
person may see any opportunity for a more lenient sentence as their least risky option, regardless 
of their guilt or innocence.  On the other hand it must be considered whether genuinely factually 
innocent accused persons at the international level are going to be likely to plead guilty to such 
serious crimes as crimes against humanity and genocide that will inevitably attract a very 
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lengthy custodial sentence.  This is less of a concern at national level where more minor crimes 
are being bargained over, where the reduction in sentence is less significant and in some cases 
may only amount to a lesser financial penalty.   
The stakes and sentences are higher in an international forum.  On the one hand this may 
mean that the international accused will feel under pressure to plead to avoid spending the 
remainder of their life in prison, or, given the likelihood that they will still receive a lengthy 
prison sentence they may feel that they might as well run the case to trial in the hope of an 
acquittal.  The evidence against the accused person will undoubtedly be a very significant part 
of the considerations of the accused person in deciding whether to engage in a plea bargain or 
not.  The international accused person may wish to engage in a plea bargain to ensure that the 
full truth of their criminal conduct does not come out in evidence during the course of a trial, 
with the consequence of a more severe punishment.   
As will be discussed further below, it has not been unheard of that accused persons at 
the ICTY have pled guilty to obtain a more lenient sentence and still maintained their innocence.  
This indicates that the too much pressure to plead and condemnation of the innocent arguments 
are still live issues in the international context.  However, as will be discussed further in Chapters 
4, 5 and 6 below, there are a number of checks required by the Statutes of the international courts 
discussed below, to be conducted by the Trial Chambers which ensure that the likelihood of a 
truly innocent person reaching the stage in international proceedings where they have the 
opportunity to plead guilty and have this plea accepted is very slim. 
3.1.2 Plea Bargaining results in Sentences that fail to recognise the Gravity of the 
Criminal Conduct: The International Context 
Chapter 2 set out in the domestic context the argument that plea bargaining runs the risk 
that the sentence imposed does not reflect the moral gravity of the crime, which might lead to a 
loss of public protection and of public confidence in the criminal justice system.  This argument 
has even greater force in the international context, where some have argued that plea bargaining 
is inappropriate for serious international crimes such as genocide and other crimes against 
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Humanity.111  Some have argued that a lesser sentence following a plea bargaining in the 
international criminal law context does not fit the moral gravity of the crime. 112  On the other 
hand some have argued that it is simply morally wrong and distasteful to ‘bargain’ over such 
serious crimes.113 
In addressing the concerns of those who argue that leniency or ‘a reward’ should not be 
given when dealing with sentencing for such grave crimes, it is noteworthy that maximum 
sentence in an international criminal court that any person can obtain is to spend the rest of their 
life in prison.  Multiple life sentences are nothing more than an acknowledgement of the severity 
of the crimes committed.  As is often the case in the international criminal courts/tribunals, those 
being tried for crimes against humanity, genocide and war crimes involving mass fatalities 
should expect to receive a lengthy prison sentence whether their actions have resulted in the 
death of 100 or 100,000 persons.  The perpetrator only has one life and often, by the time they 
are tried in the international criminal courts, they have a limited number of years to live.  The 
lengthy process involved in international criminal courts has meant that some perpetrators have 
died before the communities who they have wronged have witnessed any justice.114  Subjecting 
victims to a lengthy justice process just because that feels morally correct for the sake of the 
perpetrator receiving, for example an 18 year sentence rather than a 16 year sentence should be 
regarded in the bigger picture as unnecessary. 
The rewarding of guilty pleas with a more lenient sentence may cause outcry in the 
communities that have suffered as a result of mass atrocities.  This may be detrimental for 
reconciliation, which is often cited as one of the main arguments for plea bargaining.  This 
argument will be revisited in chapters 4 and 5 below where consideration will be given to the 
sentences and ‘rewards’ that have been handed down at the ICTY and ICTY following guilty 
pleas.  Another reason for these communities being unhappy with guilty pleas is that they may 
not feel that the full truth and picture of their suffering has been accurately recorded. 
                                                          
111 See W. Pizzi, Overcoming Logistical and Structural Barriers to Fair Trials at International Tribunals, (2006) 2 
International Commentary on Evidence, Issue 1, Article 4; J. De Hemptinne, The Creation of Investigating 
Chambers at the ICC, (2007) 5 Journal of International Criminal Justice 402-418 
112 See D. Radosavljevic, Restorative Justice under the ICC Penalty Regime, 2008 L.P.I.C.T. 7(2), 235-255 
113 See Julian A. Cook, Plea Bargaining at the Hague, 30 YALE J. INT'L L. 473 at p. 476 (2005) 
114 See, for example, ICTY case of Prosecutor v Slobodan Milosevic case no. IT-02-54 
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3.1.3 Plea Bargaining can result in the failure of the court to Realise the Full Truth 
and Distorts the Historical Record 
There is also a further argument against plea bargaining that can be made specifically in 
the international context, which is that plea bargaining might distort the accuracy of the 
historical record.  It is important that any criminal court has, as part of its remit, an aim of 
establishing what the truth is in terms of whether or not a crime has been committed.  It has been 
stated that ‘it is only the truth that can cleanse the ethnic and religious hatreds and begin the 
healing Process…’115  Pursuing and establishing the truth is therefore particularly important in 
the context of dealing with international criminal courts where whole communities have 
suffered as a result of ethnic and religious hatreds.  A significant reason for the formation of the 
ad hoc international criminal tribunals, ICTY and the ICTR was, in addition to the punishment 
of those responsible for the gravest of crimes, to discover the truth.  If we know the truth about 
what has happened and caused a mass atrocity, for example, then we can take steps to deter and 
prevent this happening again in the future. 
However, it must be considered whether a criminal prosecution and trial can and should 
ever be the mechanism for establishing the truth and a creating a thorough accurate historical 
record.  If it cannot and should not, then one of the main arguments against plea bargaining in 
an international criminal court is inherently weak.  There are inevitable limitations involved in 
using an international criminal court to establish an accurate historical record.  Historians are 
generally those responsible for studying and collating events in the past.116  Lawyers do not tend 
to be trained or qualified in recounting historical matters, nor is it common practice for historians 
to provide expert testimony.117  The jurisdiction of the ad hoc international tribunals has been 
restricted to certain periods of time and geographical areas, meaning that a full picture of the 
conflict outwith the time periods and locations, or the whole truth, is not something that is 
realistically achievable in any case at those tribunals.118   
                                                          
115 U.S. Representative Mrs Albright statement 25 May 1993 UN SCOR, 4 8 h session, 3217 meeting UN Doc. 
S/PV3217, taken from R.E. Rauxloh, History: The Historical Record in International Criminal Law and Plea 
Bargaining (2010) ICLR 10 pp. 737-770 at p. 737 
116 Richard J. Evans, 'History, Memory, and the Law: The Historian as Expert Witness' 41/3 History and Theory 
(2002) pp. 326-345, taken from R. E. Rauxloh, Ibid. at p. 742 
117 Ibid. 
118 Rauxloh, Ibid. at p. 742, however she acknowledges that the ICC covers a wider jurisdiction (after 1 July 2002).  
The jurisdiction and significance in association with plea bargaining will be examined further in chapter 6 below 
in the context of the International Criminal Court. 
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Resource implications at the ICTR and ICTY, for example, mean that Prosecutors are 
only in a position to select the most senior level officials to prosecute.  A full picture of the 
crimes committed and the perpetrators is never going to be possible from the perspective of the 
international tribunals, where only a minority, albeit the most influential, of perpetrators will be 
prosecuted.  However, the importance of bringing the most influential and senior perpetrators 
responsible for the most serious violations of international humanitarian law to justice cannot 
be underestimated and clearly contributes to building some historical record of conflicts.   
As a result of the selective nature of the prosecutions, examination has been conducted 
as to whether truth commissions are in a better position to paint a more comprehensive picture 
of the conflicts than the tribunals that have been commissioned to deal with the prosecution of 
those responsible for such conflicts.119  However, truth commissions are not likely to be able to 
obtain the same formality and evidence to the standard that an international court could achieve.  
In order to establish the elements required for genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity, 
for example ‘the presence of an international or non-international armed conflict, a widespread 
or systematic attack directed against any civilian population or intent to destroy part of a group,’ 
there must be evidence led by the prosecutor in the trial that will paint a ‘widespread’ picture of 
the circumstances giving rise to the crimes on the indictment as opposed to just the conduct of 
the individuals on trial.120  Rauxloh has pointed out that ‘the fact-finding of an individual case 
might very well include evidence of the larger context of the conflict including the operation of 
the regime and general policies, co-operation between different agencies, the role of the media, 
the involvement of army and police etc.’121  
 However, Rauxloh has also acknowledged that there may be limitations in terms of what 
evidence can be led in the course of a criminal trial where, for example, evidence is deemed to 
be inadmissible.122  She also pointed out that, unlike in most common law adversarial systems, 
the Rome Statute of the ICC, for example, makes no reference to the exclusion of hearsay 
evidence.123  Hearsay evidence in itself can however be dangerous if being relied upon to create 
an accurate historical record.124  Where evidence comes from a secondary source the court has 
                                                          
119 R.E. Rauxloh, Ibid. at p. 743 
120 Ibid. 
121 Ibid. 
122 Ibid, 
123  Ibid. at p. 744 with reference to W. Schabas, International Criminal Court (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge 2007), 3rd ed. At p. 294 
124 Ibid. 
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less of an ability test the evidence than where the primary witness has also given evidence and 
the defence has had the opportunity to test the primary evidence through cross examination. 
If the Office of the Prosecutor is able to resolve more cases by way of a negotiated plea 
then it will free up more resources to prosecute more cases and the ability to deal with more 
cases may in fact be a welcome contribution in support of the uncovering the truth.  Plea 
bargaining in itself does not necessarily distort the historical record.  There is clearly a balancing 
of interests to be conducted and it should be borne in mind that there are different types of plea 
negotiations.  It is possible that an accurate factual picture/historical record can still be presented 
to the court in cases of charge bargaining.  Petrig has however opposed the use of even charge 
bargaining in the international criminal law forum by stating: 
‘...even in cases where the factual basis underlying the conduct charged is not reduced 
by a plea agreement, the importance of the legal qualification of this conduct should not 
be underestimated.  Not only might the stigma attached to genocide (the crime of crime) 
be greater compared to a conviction for war crimes or crimes against humanity, but 
dropping the genocide charge might also erroneously be perceived as an admission by 
the Prosecutor that this crime did not take place and, hence, ultimately facilitate 
denial.’125 
In this quotation, Petrig makes a fair point that, in terms of the historical record, even if 
prosecutor still narrates a full factual picture to the court there is still a possibility that the gravity 
of what has happened may be downplayed by the prosecutor’s acceptance of a plea of not guilty 
to genocide.  It is however important to remember that the prosecutor’s remit is to prosecute the 
person charged with the crimes that they are dealing with before the court.  It does not 
necessarily follow that the historical record will be distorted as the court is dealing with legal 
concepts and because the prosecutor decides to accept particular charges against a particular 
accused person, this does not necessarily mean acceptance that a genocide did not happen.  What 
it means is that the evidence may not have been strong enough for the prosecutor to feel 
                                                          
125 See Anna Petrig, Negotiated Justice and the Goals of International Criminal Tribunals: With a Focus on the 
Plea-Bargaining of the ICTY and the Legal Framework of The ICC, (2008) 8 Chi.-Kent J. Int'l & Comp. L.1, 6 at 
p. 15.  Petrig also argues that negotiating out a genocide charge cannot be reconciled with the underlying purpose 
of the Genocide convention.  Many commentators have also dismissed plea bargaining on the basis that you cannot 
negotiate international justice for financial reasons.  See also Michael P. Scharf, Trading Justice for Efficiency, 
Plea-Bargaining and International Tribunals, (2004) 2 J. Int’l Crim. Just. 1070 at pp.1073-74  
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compelled to proceed with a case to the trial stage when they can avoid that risk in negotiating 
a plea where the same factual picture will be presented to the court.  If the prosecutor has, 
however engaged in a charge bargain, this may mean that a more lenient sentence is passed, 
despite the same facts being presented to the court. 
This section has covered three of the main arguments against plea bargaining in the 
international criminal law context.  Although there is still a risk that innocent persons will plead 
guilty, this is minimal given that it is unlikely that truly factually innocent persons would plead 
guilty to such serious crimes.  It is highly unlikely that the case would even get to the stage in 
international law where the accused can plead guilty if there was not sufficient evidence pointing 
to their guilt.  Although the innocent pleading guilty argument is not the strongest in the 
international criminal law context, there is merit in the arguments that plea bargaining may lead 
to sentences that do not reflect the gravity of the crime and can distort the historical record.  
These arguments do have even more weight internationally as a result of how serious the crimes 
are and the high expectations to create a record of what has happened associated with 
international criminal courts, these arguments have to be balanced against the arguments for 
plea bargaining, which will be considered in the following section. 
3.2 The Arguments for Plea Bargaining in International Courts 
   3.2.1 Efficiency can still Achieve International Justice: Saving Precious Time and Money  
As outlined in Chapter 2, financial savings and time efficiency are two of the main 
justifications for and advantages of using the plea bargaining process at the national level.  This 
applies similarly as a justification for the practice of plea bargaining in international criminal 
law.  The ad hoc tribunals of the ICTY and ICTR and the International Criminal Court are 
certainly not immune to the financial and resource restraints encountered at the national level.  
In addition to the cost of the lengthy court process when trials are being conducted, there is also 
a very lengthy and expensive investigation going on in the background.  The scale of an 
investigation in an international criminal court is so great it cannot be compared to domestic 
investigations.   
In an international criminal investigation there will be financial hurdles, human resource 
implications, geographical implications and reliance on the cooperation of States parties.  These 
are all factors that would contribute significantly to the slowing down of any investigation.  Pati 
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has outlined some of the significant additional ‘obstacles’ faced by the international criminal 
Prosecutor, in comparison with prosecutors at a domestic level, in that they require ‘to 
investigate mass crimes involving numerous victims and potential witnesses, crimes that span a 
number of years, sometimes long before the court was established, and crimes that occurred in 
places far away from the Courts' locations, and for reasons based on historical facts and cultural 
differences that are unfamiliar to most of the Courts' actors. Pressure increases with the notoriety 
of the players. Concerns also increase for equal access to justice, as well as ending impunity.’126   
When all these ‘obstacles’ are taken into account, it is clear that plea bargains will be a 
more convenient solution than going down an expensive trial process for the prosecutor.  The 
prosecutor will then be able to focus on prosecuting a more significant number of perpetrators 
and consequently will be in a stronger position to build a more widespread historical record.  In 
addition, if an accused person pleads guilty and their plea is in line with the evidence that the 
prosecutor holds there is less dubiety over whether the facts presented to the court are accurate.  
Matters at trial can often boil down to one person’s account against the others.  Admission of 
guilt by the perpetrator gives an insight into what was happening in their mind. 
3.2.2 Remorse/Reconciliation, Acceptance and Restorative Justice for Victims 
Chapter 2 discussed the argument that a plea agreement gives the opportunity for the 
accused person to express acceptance of responsibility and remorse to the victim.  This argument 
has even more force in the international context where the crimes involves are so much more 
serious.  Jorgensen has stated ‘[a]n acknowledgement of guilt is arguably more significant for 
reconciliation than a finding of guilt’127 and ‘it may be stated tentatively that the guilty plea has 
come of age, which represents a triumph for pragmatism.’128  Given the scale of the atrocities 
that international courts or tribunals will encounter, fostering restorative justice and 
reconciliation are very important factors in international criminal law.  However, there is a 
danger that accused persons then throw this back in the faces of those who they have wronged 
                                                          
126 R. Pati, supra. note 109 at p. 288 
127 N.H.B Jorgensen, The Genocide Acquittal in the Sikirica Case Before the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the Former Yugoslavia and the Coming of Age of the Guilty Plea, (2002), LJIL at p. 406; See also B.N. McGonigle, 
Two for the price of one: attempts by the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts in Cambodia to combine retributive 
and restorative Justice Principles, 2009 L.J.I.L. 127 
128 Ibid at p. 407, Jorgensen also acknowledged that there is a requirement for clarity and consistency in the 
sentences handed down at international level. 
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by admitting that they only pled guilty as part of a plea negotiation to attract a lenient 
sentence.129  This can do more harm for reconciliation than if the case had to be proved against 
them in a trial. 
Many have questioned whether a Court is really best placed to foster reconciliation when 
mass atrocities have occurred, particularly where this has been as a result of ‘negotiated’ justice 
in the form of a plea agreement.  It is difficult, if not impossible, to fully ensure that the rights 
of victims and witnesses in international forums and the full communities that have been 
destroyed by mass atrocities are met and to ensure that they will feel fully that they have had 
justice restored by any sentence.130  It will be even more difficult to ensure that victims of mass 
atrocities feel that justice is restored by a sentence that has been imposed as a result of an 
incentivized plea agreement. 131   The interests of the victims, witnesses and communities 
involved are generally going to be at odds with the interests of accused persons, whose main 
concern is likely to be obtaining the most lenient sentence possible.  There may be scenarios 
where the accused persons are remorseful and wish to receive a sentence that will satisfy the 
communities wronged that justice has been done.  If a plea is submitted with an apology it is 
more likely to foster reconciliation than victims and witnesses being subjected to an adversarial 
trial procedure.   
3.2.3 Victims and Witnesses are spared the trauma of having to give Evidence in 
International Criminal Courts 
In Chapter 2, the advantages of plea bargaining for victims and witnesses were discussed.  
These advantages apply to an even greater extent in the international context.  The Office of the 
Prosecutor of the ICTY confirmed, in January 2010, that its estimate of the ‘wartime death toll’ 
as a result of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, between 1992 and 1995 totalled 104,732 
                                                          
129 Chapter 4 provides an example of this happening in the discussion of the ICTY case of Prosecutor v Plavšić  
Case No-IT-00-30&40/I-S 
130 R. Henman has argued that the incorporation of restorative justice principles into an international forum would 
require a review on the rules on evidence and basis for sentencing, in Towards Restorative Sentencing in 
International Criminal Trials, Int. C.L.L. 2009, 9(5), 809-832; see also R. Hodzik, Living the legacy of mass 
atrocities: victims’ perspectives on war crimes tribunals, 2010 J.I.C.J. 114 
131 See R. Henham, supra. note 110 at p. 214 and See M. Findlay and R. Henham, Transforming International 
Criminal Justice: retributive and restorative justice in the trial process (Cullompton: Willan Publishing, 2005). 
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persons, 59.8% of which consisted of military personnel and 40.2% civilians.132  Although there 
have been varying estimates of the death toll as a result of the Rwandan Genocide between 7 
April 1994 to mid-July 1994, the ICTR has estimated the death toll to be between 800,000 to 
1,000,000 persons.133   Ewald has stated, ‘international criminal justice is one of the most 
powerful instruments for officially ‘identifying’ LSV [large scale victimization], and for 
prompting the collective memory of mass suffering.’134  Given the large scale death toll resulting 
from the wars and genocide that international criminal courts and the ad hoc tribunals have to 
address there is, and quite rightfully should be, huge expectations for justice from the victims 
and witnesses who have suffered.   
Clearly those who have lost their lives as a consequence of these wars will not be able 
to provide evidence at the trial about what happened to them or give any opinion on whether 
plea bargaining still achieves justice for them.  However, in considering who should be 
considered a victim of the crimes that fall under the jurisdiction of the ICTY, ICTR, ICC and 
any other international criminal law forums, this has to be considered in a wider context.  
Victims should be interpreted widely to include not only those who have been murdered, 
physically assaulted and sexuality assaulted, but also the families, friends and communities of 
those who lost their lives or suffered as a consequence of the wars that fall within the mandate 
of the relevant international criminal law forum.   
Victims and witnesses at the international level may be required to travel to a foreign 
country and give evidence, reliving horrific and traumatic events in front of those responsible 
for such atrocities.  They may also face brutal cross examination, a factor which may cause 
significant anxiety for victims and witnesses.  If cases can be resolved by guilty pleas and plea 
bargains, then victims and witnesses will be spared the traumatic experience of giving evidence 
before the tribunal.  Often victims and witnesses fear reprisals from those who they give 
evidence against.  They may feel protected whilst they are giving evidence but worry about the 
                                                          
132 C. Garbett, The Legal Representation of the Civilian and Military Casualties of Contemporary Conflicts: 
Unlawful Victimisation, its Victims and their Visibility at the ICTY, The International Journal of Human Rights, 
(2012) Vol. 16, No. 7, 1059–1077 at p. 1059 
133 See website of the United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
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134 Uwe Ewald, ‘Large-Scale Victimisation and the Jurisprudence of the ICTY – Victimological Issues’, in Large-
Scale Victimisation as a Potential Source of Terrorist Activities: Importance of Regaining Security in Post-Conflict 
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consequences when the return to their own country.  For these witnesses a plea bargain takes 
responsibility out of their hands and into the hand of the prosecuting authorities.     
On the other hand, as in the domestic context, victims and witnesses may wish to have 
their voices heard and give evidence against those who have wronged them.  But just as is the 
case in the domestic context, this may not happen at trial in the way that the witness hopes. For 
example, an elderly witness from Kosovo, Sadik Janiuzi, who had travelled to The Hague to 
give evidence before the ICTY in the trial of Slobodan Milosevic explicitly expressed his 
surprise at not being given the opportunity to speak up about the full events of what he had 
witnessed.135 He came to the court prepared to give evidence about the murder of in excess of 
100 men in his village, or so he thought.136  At the conclusion of his evidence he clearly felt 
compelled to state, ‘[y]ou haven’t asked about what I went through at the Izbica massacre.’137   
In order to ‘expedite’ the trial the judges restricted the prosecutor to asking a limited 
number of questions and read summaries of the statements of Mr Janiuzi into the written 
record.’138  Having only told part of his story, Milosevic was permitted to cross examine Mr 
Janiuzi.139  Mr Janiuzi, had no rights to tell his full story as he had anticipated.  Victims and 
witnesses will therefore only be able to give whatever evidence the prosecutor decides to lead 
or whatever the judges permit, even in circumstances where the witnesses have wished to tell 
their full story.  If witnesses feel short changed after going through the trauma of giving evidence, 
this is a worse scenario than if a guilty plea had been accepted through a plea bargain.  At least 
then the witness would have had the benefit of not having to give evidence and face traumatic 
cross examination. 
The victims and witnesses are the most important persons in the international criminal 
law process.  The ICTY have acknowledged on their website that: 
‘[t]he success of trials held before the Tribunal depends greatly on the willingness of 
witnesses to come to the Tribunal to testify. Witnesses help to establish the facts of 
crimes with which the accused are charged, thus contributing to the process which 
                                                          
135 N. Paterson, Silencing Victims in International Criminal Courts: Neglecting a Solemn Obligation, (2003) 4 Geo. 
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establishes the responsibility of the accused and creates a historical record of what 
happened during the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia.140 
In order to examine whether guilty pleas through plea bargains/agreements in 
international criminal law serve to achieve justice for victims and witnesses it is helpful to 
consider what rights, if any, they have to participate in the plea bargaining process.  The only 
reference to Victims and witnesses in the Statute of the ICTY is Article 22, which specifies that 
there should be provision in the rules of Procedure and Evidence of the ICTY ‘for the protection 
of victims and witnesses. Such protection measures shall include, but shall not be limited to, the 
conduct of in camera proceedings and the protection of the victim’s identity’.141  Rule 75 of the 
ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence outlines the measures for protection that are available 
for witnesses.142  Although some provision is therefore made for the protection of victims and 
witnesses, both the ICTY Statute and Rules of Procedure and Evidence are silent in terms of 
what rights, if any, are to be afforded to victims and witnesses in relation to their participation 
in proceedings.143  A very similar provision to Article 22 is present in Article 21 of the ICTR 
Statute144 and in relation to the ICTR Rules of Procedure and Evidence, there is also no mention 
of the rights of victims and witnesses.145  It has been argued that, until relatively recently ‘the 
                                                          
140 See the Website of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, http://www.icty.org/sid/158 
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141  Article 22, Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious 
Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991 
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142 Rule 75, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible 
for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the former Yugoslavia 
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145 Rules of Procedure and Evidence, International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible 
for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of 
Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations Committed in the Territory of 
Neighbouring States, between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994  U.N. Doc. ITR/3/REV.1 (1995) (hereinafter 
ICTR Rules of Procedure and Evidence) Rule 69 Provides for the Protection of Victims and Witnesses; Rule 75 
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rights and interests’ of victims and witnesses in international criminal courts had been 
‘overlooked.’146 
It is clear, from the silence of both the statutes of the ICTR and ICTY and their rules of 
procedure and evidence that victims and witnesses have no right to have a say in the Plea 
Agreement process.  Advocates of victims’ rights have, however, argued for them to play a 
meaningful role in the plea bargaining process.147  Certainly in relation to the ICTY and ICTR, 
although the Prosecutor may decide to take into account the views of the victim in determining 
an appropriate plea agreement, they are not under any obligation to do so.  It is incredibly 
difficult at international level, when dealing with large scale massacres for example, for the 
Prosecutor even to be in a position to take into account the views of witnesses about how they 
feel about giving evidence and to take into account the views of the families of the deceased if 
a not guilty plea is being accepted in relation to the murder or killing of their loved one.   
Unfortunately the prosecutors are dealing with the murder of thousands.  The views of 
victims, witnesses, families of deceased persons may vary in terms of their attitude to a Plea 
Agreement that involves potentially thousands of victims and witnesses and this may be very 
difficult for the Prosecutor to reconcile.148  However, it is necessary to recall that although 
sparing the witnesses the trauma of having to give evidence is often cited as an argument for 
plea bargaining, both nationally and internationally, there are some victims and witnesses who 
do not want to be spared the opportunity of their day in court and their active participation in 
proceedings, even if that is just to be asked their view on a particular plea offer.  If the prosecutor 
is aware of what is going on in the mind of the victim they will be better able to assess what 
plea is appropriate.  Guilty pleas in the international law context have often been cited argued 
as a good way of obtaining an insight into the mind of the perpetrator.   
3.2.4 An Insight into the Mind of the Perpetrators 
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It has been stated that plea agreements can provide an invaluable insight into the truth 
by providing the views of the perpetrators.149  Gaining an insight into the mind of the perpetrator 
is of significance in dealing with crimes against humanity and of more importance than, in 
general, most crimes dealt with by national courts.  What better insight can there be in examining 
the reasons behind the mass atrocities being dealt with by war crimes tribunals as a measure for 
preventing similar events occurring in the future than to look into the mind of the perpetrator.  
Often, when accused persons in international criminal law forums plead guilty they issue guilty 
plea statements that will provide some kind of explanation as to why they committed the crime 
that they did.150  However, what must be borne in mind is that these tribunals are dealing with 
those who have committed the gravest of crimes, therefore it must be questioned whether their 
credibility really be something that can be relied upon in going some way to creating a historical 
record and understanding the real reasons behind their motives.  This matter will be examined 
further in Chapter 4 below with reference to precedent at the ICTY. 
3.3 Chapter 3 Summary 
This chapter has considered the arguments against and for plea bargaining in the 
international criminal law context.  In sum, the main arguments against international plea 
bargaining are that that the innocent may feel undue pressure to plead guilty, that plea bargaining 
results in sentences that fail to recognise the gravity of the criminal conduct and that historical 
record will be distorted.  The latter 2 arguments have to be given some strength and credibility 
however these are, on balance, outweighed by the arguments for international plea bargaining 
that efficiency can still achieve justice, that plea bargaining fosters remorse,  reconciliation and 
provides for an insight into the mind of the perpetrator that can go some way to preventing 
further atrocities in the future.  Additionally, international plea bargaining also prevents 
witnesses from having to travel to another country and re-live traumatic events in their evidence.   
Justice, morality and the interests of those who have been wronged may not be at the 
forefront of the minds of those who are in international criminal courts with growing workloads, 
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financial restraints, resource issues and pressure to have cases concluded.  For those prosecuting 
these crimes a plea agreement will be an attractive option as they have a guaranteed conviction 
and can move on to preparing their next case.  Realistically, due to the scale of the mass atrocities 
being prosecuted at the international level, it will not be possible to satisfy every single victim 
who has suffered as a result of crimes that fall under the jurisdiction of international criminal 
law.  Full satisfaction with the outcome of international criminal law for communities who have 
suffered so significantly is a very high burden to meet and achieving restorative justice for such 
mass atrocities is no easy task for the prosecutor.   As Pati has said, ‘[m]ending the wounds of 
such conflicts will last longer than the life of a set of Prosecutions.’151 
Although there has been opposition from academic commentators to plea bargaining, 
particularly where genocide is involved, it is not possible to ignore the financial costs, resource 
limitations and geographical issues of conducting criminal investigations and trials at the 
international level.  Human lifespans mean that there is only so much time to try those accused 
of international crimes.  Plea bargaining ensures that convictions happen expeditiously and this 
frees up resources to ensure that as many perpetrators as possible are investigated and 
prosecuted.  The more investigations and prosecutions instigated then the more widespread of a 
historical record can be built.  Those who argue that plea bargaining is not an acceptable practice 
in crimes as serious as those being dealt with by the international criminal courts or tribunals, 
mainly because it is a practice that promotes discounts and inconsistent and ‘lenient’ sentences, 
fail to take into account that there will at least be a conviction that will mean a lot to victims and 
witnesses.   
The worst scenario is where a person is acquitted after trial or where there is insufficient 
resources to even get the investigation off the ground in the first instance.  Surely the latter 
position cannot be preferable to victims in pursuit of justice.  This chapter has confirmed that 
plea bargaining is a practice that should be implemented in international criminal law.  Chapters 
4 and 5 will examine whether the practice of plea bargaining is permissible at the ICTY and 
ICTR and, if so, the approach that prosecutors, the defence and Trial Chambers have taken to 
the practice. 
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CHAPTER 4: THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER 
YUGOSLAVIA AND PLEA BARGAINING 
4.1 Establishment of the ICTY and its Procedures and Practices for Guilty Pleas 
The ICTY is an Ad hoc international criminal tribunal composed to facilitate the 
prosecution of those responsible for perpetrating serious violations of International 
Humanitarian Law in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1 January 1991.  In 1991 War 
ensued in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia as a result of many of the constituent 
republics seeking independence.  The ICTY was formed in pursuance of UN Security Council 
Resolution 827 of 25 May 1993152 in terms of Chapter VII of the UN Charter when the UN 
determined that the situation threatened international peace and security.  The crimes over which 
the ICTY has jurisdiction are outlined in Articles 2-5 of the Statute of the tribunal.153  The onus 
rests with the prosecutor to investigate allegations of the crimes outlined in Articles 2-5 and 
bring prosecutions before the tribunal.154 The prosecutor has wide powers in relation to the 
investigation of crimes including the power to question suspects, witnesses and victims, to 
collect evidence and to conduct on-site investigations.155  In executing these powers it is open 
to the prosecutor to seek the assistance of the authorities of any state, who are under a general 
obligation to co-operate.156 
If, during the course of their investigation the prosecutor concludes that there is a prima 
facie case they will prepare an indictment containing a concise statement of the facts relevant to 
the case and the crime or crimes with which the accused is charged under the statute.157  This 
will be sent to a trial judge for confirmation.158  The judge of the Trial Chamber will review the 
indictment and if satisfied that a prima facie case has been established by the Prosecutor, she/he 
shall confirm the indictment.159  Upon confirmation of an indictment, the judge may, at the 
request of the Prosecutor, issue such orders and warrants for the arrest, detention, surrender or 
transfer of persons and any other orders as may be required for the conduct of the trial.160   
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The prosecutor also possesses the authority to amend the indictment in the following 
circumstances: 
(i) At any time prior to its confirmation; 
(ii) Thereafter with leave of the judge who has confirmed the indictment; or 
(iii) After the commencement of the presentation of the evidence only with the leave 
of the Trial Chamber hearing the case.161 
At the ICTY, there must already have been sufficient evidence to indict the accused 
person at the time where the court has confirmed the indictment.  It is of significance that the 
prosecutor can amend the indictment before confirmation.  This may allow for the indictment 
to be amended by the prosecutor before it is placed before the Trial Chamber if there are early 
discussions between the prosecutor and the defence about a guilty plea.  This could have a 
bearing on the charges that the prosecutor drafts in the first place to be confirmed by the Trial 
Chamber. 
Over the course of the initial years of the ICTY plea bargaining did not feature on the 
agenda of the prosecutors and was generally viewed as ‘unnecessary’ due to the small number 
of accused persons actually being tried in the early years. 162   It has been suggested that 
prosecutors originating from jurisdictions with a civil law system felt uncomfortable negotiating 
with defendants when dealing with such grave crimes and viewed such negotiation as being 
‘inappropriate’.163  However an increasing case load and pressure on prosecutors to clear the 
backlog led to a shift in attitude toward plea bargaining at the ICTY.164 
The ICTY Statute is silent on the matter of guilty pleas other than with reference to the 
entering of a plea in Article 20(3), where it is stated, ‘The Trial Chamber shall read the 
indictment, satisfy itself that the rights of the accused are respected, confirm that the accused 
understands the indictment and instruct the accused to enter a plea.  The Trial Chamber shall 
then set the date for trial.’  One interpretation of the silence of the ICTY Statute on guilty pleas 
could be that those drafting the Statute failed to envisage and provide for the situation where an 
accused person accepts their guilt, particularly in circumstances where they are facing the most 
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serious of crimes, for example, genocide.  There is, as such, no reference to plea bargaining or 
negotiations in the ICTY Statute.  In determining whether this silence was deliberate on the part 
of the legislators, in terms of them taking the view that plea negotiations or bargaining is not a 
suitable practice in International Criminal courts, a statement on 11 February 1994 by the 
ICTY’s first President, Antonio Cassese is noteworthy where he states: 
‘[W]e always have to keep in mind that this tribunal is not a municipal criminal court 
but one that is charged with trying persons accused of the gravest possible of all crimes.  
The persons appearing before us will be charged with genocide, torture, murder, sexual 
assault, wanton destruction, persecution and other inhumane acts. After due reflection, 
we have decided that no one should be immune from prosecution for crimes such as 
these, no matter how useful their testimony may otherwise be.’165 
It is not clear however whether Cassese was referring to the fact that immunity for 
prosecution for these crimes entirely should never be granted or whether he is referring to the 
fact that charges for such crimes should not be dropped in exchange for less serious crimes.  In 
any case this statement does give an indication of great reluctance to drop any charges involving 
crimes of the nature listed by Cassese.  As the following section will indicate, guilty pleas and 
plea bargaining did subsequently happen in the cases being dealt with by the ICTY. 
4.2 Chronological analysis of significant cases involving Guilty Pleas and Plea 
Bargaining at the ICTY 
Although the ICTY Statute does not detail the requirements of entering a guilty plea, in 
1997, Rule 62 bis of the Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence was enacted and provides 
the perquisites that must be fulfilled for a conviction to be entered following a plea of guilty.166  
Rule 62 bis provides: 
If an accused pleads guilty in accordance with Rule 62 (vi), or requests to change his or 
her plea to guilty and the Trial Chamber is satisfied that: 
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(i) the guilty plea has been made voluntarily; 
(ii) the guilty plea is informed;  
(iii) the guilty plea is not equivocal; and 
(iv) there is a sufficient factual basis for the crime and the accused’s participation in 
it, either on the basis of independence indicia or on lack of any material 
disagreement between the parties about the facts of the case, the trial Chamber 
may enter a finding of guilt and instruct the Registrar to set a date for the sentence 
hearing. 
4.2.1 Rule 62bis cases 
This rule clarifies the permissibility of accused persons entering guilty pleas before the 
ICTY, albeit providing that the aforementioned criterion are fulfilled. Drazen Erdemović167 
tendered the first guilty plea before the ICTY on 31 May 1996 (prior to the enactment of Rule 
62bis).  This initial plea was not the product of a plea negotiation, but this did set a precedent 
that guilty pleas were permissible at the ICTY.  In Erdemović’s case, he provided the Office of 
the Prosecutor (OTP) with invaluable information that greatly assisted them in their 
investigations and pursuit of the truth. In the Erdemović judgment the judges stated that 
‘discovering the truth is a cornerstone of the rule of law and a fundamental step on the way to 
reconciliation: for it is the truth that cleanses the ethnic and religious hatreds and begins the 
healing process.’168  The Prosecutor maintained that his co-operation ‘was and continues to be 
voluntary and unconditional’ and that no ‘promise had been given by his Office to the accused 
in exchange for his co-operation’.169    
Erdemović pled guilty to murder as a crime against humanity and was sentenced to 10 
years imprisonment.  The Trial Chamber affirmed, in respect of his plea to murder as a crime 
against humanity, that any guilty plea must be ‘voluntary’ when it stated, that: 
‘It follows from the above that the guilty plea must be voluntary, that is to say not 
obtained by threats, inducements or promises. A guilty plea implies that the accused 
relinquishes his right to a proper trial, namely to proceedings in which he is presumed 
                                                          
167 Case no. IT-96-22-T 
168 Erdemović Ibid. at para. 21 
169 Erdemović Ibid. at para. 99 
59 
 
innocent until his guilt is proved beyond a reasonable doubt and in which he would be 
entitled to examination and cross-examination of witnesses as well as all the judicial 
safeguards laid down in Article 21 of the Statute.[170]  Therefore, such a waiver of a 
fundamental right must of necessity be free and voluntary’.171 
This is an interesting case as the prosecution expressly said that no promise had been 
given in exchange for co-operation and the Trial Chamber seem to have chosen similar 
terminology to that used by the US courts when they had initially examined the constitutionality 
of plea bargaining.  The court was not dealing with a plea bargain in Erdemović however their 
statement leaves it unclear whether they would take the same approach as the US court i.e. that 
pleas must not be induced by force, threats or promises, except the types of promises involved 
in a plea agreement.  Erdemović subsequently appealed against the sentencing judgment against 
him on the basis that his guilty plea was, essentially, invalid.172  The Appeals Chamber held that 
his plea was not informed and remitted the case to another Trial Chamber where Erdemović was 
to be given the opportunity to re-plead.173  In giving their judgment, the Appeals Chamber laid 
down three pre-requisites as a safeguard before a guilty plea can be accepted: 
1.  It is necessary that a plea is voluntary and as such must be made by an accused who 
is ‘mentally fit to understand the consequences of pleading guilty and who is not 
affected by any threats, inducements or promises;’174 
2. That a plea is informed, meaning that the accused will ‘understand the nature of the 
charges against him and the consequences of pleading guilty to them.  The accused 
must know to what he is pleading guilty;’175 and 
3. The plea must be unequivocal, hence ‘it must not be accompanied by words 
amounting to a defence contradicting an admission of criminal responsibility.’176 
When the case went back before the Trial Chamber Erdemović changed his plea to guilty 
to murder as a violation of the laws and customs of war.177  Interestingly, this was as a result of 
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a plea agreement.  In that case reference is made to the terms of the plea agreement where it is 
stated, inter alia, that ‘[t]he accused’s plea was based on his guilt and his acknowledgement of 
full responsibility for the actions with which he is charged;’ and ‘[t]he parties agreed on the 
factual basis of the allegations against the accused and, in particular the fact that there was 
duress.’178  The plea agreement also recommended that seven years imprisonment would be an 
appropriate sentence considering the mitigating circumstances.179 The Prosecutor agreed not to 
proceed with the alternative count of a crime against humanity.180  The Trial Chamber in this 
judgement acknowledged that this was the first case where a plea agreement had been presented 
to the ICTY and stated: 
‘Plea bargain agreements are common in certain jurisdictions of the world.  There is no 
provision for such agreements in the Statute and Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the 
International Tribunal . . . The parties themselves acknowledge that the plea agreement 
has no binding effect on this Chamber . . . Whilst in no way bound by this agreement, 
the Trial Chamber has taken it into careful consideration in determining the sentence to 
be imposed upon the accused.’181 
Erdemović was sentenced to five years imprisonment.182  This case demonstrates a real 
willingness on the part of the judges to take into account plea agreements and in fact the sentence 
imposed was two years less than what the prosecutor had recommended.  This sentence could 
have been to encourage other accused persons to co-operate and could be said that that this 
showed that there may be a real incentive to plead in terms of the sentence issued.  However, it 
is noteworthy that the sentence ultimately imposed for a different charge than the one Erdemović 
had initially pled to was halved following the case involving the plea agreement.  Victims of the 
crimes involved may certainly have felt that justice was not carried out following the plea 
agreement in this case.  Opponents of plea bargaining in international criminal law would be 
likely to argue that this plea bargain resulted in a sentence that did not reflect the gravity of the 
criminal conduct.  Murder as a violation of the laws and customs of war and a sentence of only 
5 years imprisonment could be considered lenient.   
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Following the initial guilty plea in Erdemović, the second plea to be tendered at the ICTY 
was on 29 October 1998 (this time following Rule 62 bis) in the case of the Prosecutor v 
Jelisi.183  The prosecution did not enter into any form of plea agreement in respect of this case 
and in fact made clear to the defendant that they would be recommending life imprisonment 
irrespective of his guilty plea.  Notwithstanding the indications by the OTP, Jelisi still decided 
to plead guilty in the hope that his sentence would be reduced.  Jelisi pleaded guilty to 31 out 
of the 32 charges on the indictment against him.  The only charge to which he pled not guilty 
was a genocide charge.  The Trial Chamber acquitted him of that charge on the basis of 
insufficient evidence.  Jelisi was ultimately sentenced to 40 years imprisonment.   
As was acknowledged by the Trial Chamber, that although they ‘considered the 
accused’s guilty plea out of principle’,184 this appears to have been given no or limited weight 
in handing down a sentence of such length.  This sentence could potentially have deterred other 
accused persons from pleading guilty on the basis that, if they are going to receive such a lengthy 
sentence, they might as well run the case to trial.  The Trial Chamber in Jelisi were perhaps 
making clear that guilty pleas can still result in sentences that reflect the full moral gravity of 
the conduct of the accused.  In reality, as the following case of Todorović illustrates, the Jelisi 
sentence did not deter other accused persons from pleading guilty.  This may have been as a 
result of the increasing willingness of the OTP to enter into plea agreements. 
The next guilty plea at the ICTY arising from the practice of plea bargaining following 
Erdemović happened in the case of Stevan Todorović.185  Todorović was the third case to resolve 
by way of guilty plea at the ICTY.  Todorović received a significant discount in sentence 
however suspicious factors surrounding his arrest may have played a key role in negotiations 
between Todorović and prosecutors.  This case may support the theory of critics of plea 
bargaining that too much power and discretion is given to the prosecutor.  During the course of 
the Bosnian conflict Todorović was appointed as Police Chief of Bosanki Samac and was 
charged with, between the period of April 1992 and December 1993, ‘persecutions on political, 
racial and religious grounds, deportation, murder, inhumane acts, rape and torture (crimes 
against humanity); unlawful deportation or transfer, willful killing, willfully causing great 
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suffering and torture or inhuman treatment (grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions); and 
murder, cruel treatment, humiliating and degrading treatment and torture (violations of the laws 
or customs of war).’186 
The legality of his arrest was brought into question when Todorović alleged that he was 
abducted and handed over to stabilization forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina.187  Part of the plea 
agreement was that all pending motions and challenges to the legality of the arrest would be 
dropped.188  It is clear that the OTP was keen to avoid having any damaging and embarrassing 
information surrounding Todovoric’s arrest being released.  Prosecutors accepted a plea to one 
of the 27 charges on the indictment, namely persecution.189  Prosecutors were keen at the 
sentencing hearing to point out that had Todorović been convicted after trial their estimate was 
that his sentence would have been a period of imprisonment of fifteen to twenty years or more.  
Todorović’s defence team and prosecutors agreed to recommend a sentence ranging between 
five to twelve years.190  Todorović was ultimately sentenced to 10 years imprisonment, with the 
Trial Chamber again affirming that they are not bound by the terms of any plea agreement 
between the prosecution and defence. 
This sentence, in line with the recommendations in the plea agreement, was potentially 
a message for the future and promotion of an incentive to plead guilty for future accused persons.  
The length of the sentence recommended of between 5 and 12 years is still a significant custodial 
sentence and therefore it would be unlikely that an accused person who is truly innocent is going 
to accept guilt to avoid a more substantial sentence.  It is also important to note that the judges 
noticed that Todorović had shown remorse for his actions and treated this as mitigating 
circumstances.191  This is a perhaps an acknowledgement that guilty pleas and remorse can help 
to achieve reconciliation in relation to the atrocities that Todorović has pled guilty to.  It must 
be said though that this is speculation as there is no actual evidence to suggest that Todorović’s 
plea has had a positive reconciliatory impact in the communities affected by his conduct.  More 
research needs to be undertaken to examine the actual impact of remorse and reconciliation on 
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victims and communities following guilty pleas to determine whether the theories are supported 
by evidence.   
Another case which demonstrates that the ICTY Trial Chamber was beginning to 
indicate that there would be sentencing ‘rewards’ for guilty pleas is Prosecutor v Dusko Sikirica, 
Damir Dosen and Dragon Kolundzija.192  In this case all three were accused of failing to take 
reasonable steps to prevent atrocities whilst in control of the Keratem Camp. The allegations 
went so far as to accuse them of active involvement in such atrocities.  All three pled guilty 
despite the trial having reached the stage where the OTP had closed their case.  There was no 
plea agreement between the OTP and the accused persons and no agreement to give evidence 
against the co-accused.   
Of significance, the Trial Chamber still considered ‘that the primary factor to be 
considered in mitigation of Dusko Sikirica’s sentence is his decision to enter a guilty plea, 
although it will also take into account his expression of remorse.’193  Even in circumstances 
where the OTP have led the evidence and witnesses had already been inconvenienced, the Trial 
Chamber was still willing to issue a more lenient sentence, viewing a guilty plea as being an 
indication of remorse and mitigating factor.  It is clear from these cases that plea bargaining and 
guilty pleas were becoming a recognised practice at the ICTY and this was solidified in a 
revision of the ICTY rules of procedure and evidence.   
4.2.2 Post Rule 62ter cases 
By December 2001, the aforementioned six accused persons at the ICTY had either pled 
guilty or had engaged in the practice of plea bargaining with the prosecution.  As a consequence 
of the emerging practice of plea bargaining, Rule 62 ter was added to the Tribunal’s Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence in December 2001.  Rule 62 ter provides that: 
(A) The Prosecutor and the Defence may agree that, upon the accused entering a plea of 
guilty to the indictment or to one or more counts of the indictment, the Prosecutor shall 
do one or more of the following before the Trial Chamber:  
(i) apply to amend the indictment accordingly;  
                                                          
192 Prosecutor v Sikirica Case No. IT-95-8 
193 Ibid. at para. 148 
64 
 
(ii) submit that a specific sentence or sentencing range is appropriate;  
(iii) not oppose a request by the accused for a particular sentence or sentencing 
range.  
(B) The Trial Chamber shall not be bound by any agreement specified in paragraph A. 
(C) If a plea agreement has been reached by the parties, the Trial Chamber shall require 
the disclosure of the agreement in open session or, on a showing of good cause, in closed 
session, at the time the accused pleads guilty in accordance with Rule 62(vi), or requests 
to change his or her plea to guilty. 
Enactment of this rule shows a real indication of support for the practice of plea 
bargaining and the approach taken in this rule mirrors the precedent set in the aforementioned 
three cases, namely an acceptance of plea bargaining with a retention by the Trial Chamber of 
their powers to the extent that any plea agreement is not binding on them.   
The following case of Prosecutor v Biljana Plavšić provides an illustration of one of the 
first cases where there was a plea agreement since the enactment of the aforementioned Rule.  
This is also a case where one of the most significant fears of both proponents and critics of pleas 
was ultimately realised.  Plavšić, co-President of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, was a key player in the Bosnian Serbs’ ethnic cleansing campaign and had 
‘disregarded reports of widespread ethnic cleansing and publicly rationalised and justified it’.194  
Initially the indictment contained charges alleging ‘genocide, complicity in genocide and the 
following crimes against humanity; namely persecutions, extermination and killing, deportation 
and inhumane acts’.195  Plavšić stated, in September 2002, in support of her motion to change 
her plea of not guilty: 
‘To achieve any reconciliation or lasting peace in BH, serious violations of humanitarian 
law during the war must be acknowledged by those who bear responsibility – regardless 
of their ethnic group.  This acknowledgement is an essential first step’.196 
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Plavšić pled guilty in October 2002 to persecution as a crime against humanity and the 
remainder of the charges against her were dismissed.197  The prosecution had submitted that an 
appropriate sentence would be one of not less than 15 years imprisonment and not more than 15 
years imprisonment.  She was sentenced to 11 years imprisonment.198   
The prosecution had deemed Plavšić’s guilty plea as ‘an unprecedented contribution to 
the establishment of truth and a significant effort toward the advancement of reconciliation’.199  
The Trial Chamber seems to have given weight to the testimony of Dr Alex Boraine who 
provided evidence in support of her guilty plea.200  His position was that the remorse shown by 
Plavšić was instrumental in the process of reconciliation.  The Trial Chamber seemed to agree 
with this approach and stated ‘that acknowledgement and full disclosure of serious crimes are 
very important when establishing the truth in relation to such crimes.  This, together with 
acceptance of responsibility for the committed wrongs will promote reconciliation . . . the guilty 
plea of Mrs Plavšić  and her acknowledgement of responsibility, particularly in the light of her 
former position as President of Republike Srpska, should promote reconciliation in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and the region as whole.’201  The Trial Chamber also made clear that they would 
‘give significant weight to the plea of guilty by the accused, as well as her accompanying 
expressed remorse and positive impact on the reconciliatory process as a mitigating factor’.202 
This seems, to some extent, to be at odds with former Trial Attorney at the ICTY, Minna 
Schrag’s position that in the course of Dr Boraine’s testimony the judge repeatedly questioned 
him as to whether there was any ‘concrete’ or ‘statistical evidence’ to provide authority for the 
proposition that ‘acknowledgement of guilt and responsibility is the first step towards 
reconciliation’ and he could not provide any such evidence.203  What is meant by ‘significant 
weight to the plea of guilty’ remains unclear as there was no indication of what Plavšić’s 
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sentence would have been had she not entered a guilty plea.204  Given that Plavšić was 72 years 
of age at the time of sentencing, it may have been that a forty year sentence of imprisonment 
would have been ineffective in view of average human life expectancy. 
The statement of Plavšić referred to previously indicated that she assumed responsibility 
for her actions and during the course of that statement she invited others to ‘examine themselves 
and their own conduct’.205  For perpetrators to stand up, make a formal statement expressing 
remorse and accepting the wrongfulness of their actions, there is a real recognition to the victims 
and families of victims that what they did was wrong and they now accept that they are going 
to have to undergo the consequences and punishment that follows.  However it may also be 
argued that the victims deserve such recognition and acknowledgement without the inevitable 
consequence that the perpetrator issuing the statement expects something in return for such an 
admission. 206   Caution must be taken where there may be a manipulative motive behind 
statements such as Plavšić’s that could be aimed toward attracting a lenient sentence, without 
any true underlying feelings of remorse. 
Despite Plavšić’s acceptance of responsibility, victims were horrified that genocide 
charges against her were dropped and at the lenient sentence imposed. 207   Any hopes for 
Plavšić’s statement further contributing to the reconciliation process were crushed when, 
following her release in 2009, Plavšić recanted on her confession.  She told a Swedish magazine 
that her guilty plea was a ‘ploy’ to have the genocide charges against her dropped and apparently 
stated that she had ‘sacrificed herself,’ had ‘done nothing wrong’ and said ‘I pleaded guilty to 
crimes against humanity so I could bargain for the other charges.  If I hadn’t, the trial would 
have lasted three, three and a half years.  Considering my age, that wasn’t an option.’208  If 
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Plavšić is truly innocent then this statement clearly validates concerns that critics of plea 
bargaining have that the process condemns the innocent and puts too much pressure on them to 
plead.  However, this is clearly just Plavšić’s position and not the position of the OTP who 
indicted her and the Trial Chamber who accepted her plea, who were clearly satisfied with the 
evidence and facts presented to them in support of Plavšić’s guilty plea.   
Plavšić’s case illustrates clearly that one of the stated advantages of plea agreements, 
that they allow the accused to acknowledge their guilt, does not always transpire in practice.  
Had the OTP been required to prove the charges against her, Plavšić would not have been in a 
position to continue to deny her guilt or if she did victims would have had some comfort in 
knowing that she had been tried and found guilty.  Her comments only assist in painting a bleak 
picture in the quest of the ICTY to achieve reconciliation and an accurate historical record.  
Where accused persons, such as Plavšić, play the system of plea bargaining in order to ensure 
that they attract a more lenient sentence, with more favourable conditions, this makes a mockery 
of the work of international criminal courts in achieving reconciliation and places a question 
mark over the historical record held by the tribunal. 
A different type of statement submitted with a guilty plea is that of Darko Mrđa, a former 
member of the special Serbian police in Bosnia who stated, ‘in the beginning of the 1990s, things 
changed abruptly.  Radio, television, press, everything was full of threats against Serbs and 
against Muslims, depending on whose media it was … Believing that we were faced with the 
same threat as Jasenovac in the past, I responded to the mobilization ….Your Honours, I hope 
you will believe me.  I did not commit this because I wanted to commit this or I enjoyed this. I 
did not hate these people I did it because I was ordered to do so.’209   
This statement demonstrates the vulnerable position that the perpetrator is in at the time 
a statement like this is made, where the accused person is essentially begging for leniency.  
Caution must be taken when examining the veracity of such a statement by the Trial Chamber 
as there is always the possibility that the accused person is manipulating how they really feel to 
achieve a more lenient sentence.  Plavšić’s statement accepted responsibility however Mrđa’s 
basically said that he was made to do it.  This has a less remorseful undertone to it and may not 
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go as far in fostering reconciliation to a statement that actually indicates responsibility and 
remorse.  In any case, statements by accused persons must be treated with caution.  
In contrast to the aforementioned cases which generally indicated only support and 
acceptance of guilty pleas by the ICTY, the following case is an example of the ICTY Judiciary 
sending a message that they are still keen to maintain their authority post Rule 62 ter.  This case 
indicated both acceptance of and ‘discomfort’ with the practice of plea bargaining.210  In the 
Prosecutor v Momir Nikolić,211 Nikolić was a military officer who had played a key role in the 
executions at Srebrenica.  He was appointed as the Assistant Commander and Chief of Security 
and Intelligence of the Bratunac Brigade of the VRS in November 1992, and held this position 
until the cessation of the war.212  The original indictment charged Nikolić with six counts namely, 
genocide, extermination as a crime against humanity, murder as a crime against humanity, 
murder as a violation of the laws or customs of war and persecutions on political, racial and 
religious grounds, as a crime against humanity.213 
At a hearing on the consideration of a plea agreement the Trial Chamber accepted a 
guilty plea to persecutions, a crime against Humanity on the basis that the OTP would move to 
dismiss the remainder of the charges.214  On 8 May 2003 all remaining charges were dismissed.  
As part of the plea agreement Nikolić agreed to ‘co-operate with and to provide truthful and 
complete information to the Office of the Prosecutor whenever requested’, including meeting 
with the Prosecution whenever necessary, testifying truthfully in the trial of his former co-
accused under the same indictment, and ‘in any other trial, hearings or other proceedings before 
the Tribunal as requested by the Prosecution’.215  This is a rather significant demand on Nikolić 
and it is likely he would expect a degree of leniency in return, whether he was entitled to leniency 
is, however, another matter.   
The prosecution agreed to, inter alia, recommend a sentence of 15 to 20 years 
imprisonment and that Nikolić’s time already spent in custody be recognised.216  If OTP’s 
reasoning behind this agreement was to further their investigations by obtaining information 
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from Nikolić, they must remember that they are dealing with a person who has admitted to a 
crime against humanity.  Nikolić may not be their most credible witness to rely on in other cases.  
There is a strong possibility that the accused person will say what the OTP want to her for their 
own interests in being treated as leniently as possible. 
The Trial Chamber in Momir Nikolić discussed whether plea bargaining is appropriate 
in cases involving serious violations of international humanitarian law.  They acknowledged 
that the aim of the ICTY was to achieve justice by punishing those responsible for serious crimes, 
acknowledge the victims who have suffered at their hands, to prevent further atrocities, to restore 
and maintain peace and to build an accurate historical record. 217   The Trial Chamber 
acknowledged both the arguments for and against plea bargaining at the international level.218  
This is a welcome discussion in the judgement as it shows that the ICTY judiciary were aware 
of the academic and theoretical arguments for and against plea bargaining and were actively 
taking these into account in practice. 
In relation to the arguments against plea bargaining they noted the factual record with a 
guilty plea may not be as detailed as it would have been if evidence had been led219 and that 
where factual allegations are removed there will be a question mark over whether they were 
unfounded or simply a bargaining tool. 220  This is a valid point as it is unlikely that the OTP 
would publish sensitive information about their reason for accepting pleas and discussions with 
the defence where they are not required to do so.  The Trial Chamber also stated that a confirmed 
genocide charge should not be ‘simply bargained away’.221  This was a clear indication to the 
OTP that in conducting plea negotiations they would have to have a basis that could justify why 
they were willing to ‘drop’ such serious crimes.  Given the serious nature of, for example, 
genocide, being able to properly justify the decision to withdraw such a charge is not too onerous 
an expectation on the OTP.    
It was noted that the tribunal has a responsibility to ensure that all are treated equally 
before the law and, for example, an accused person who has committed more serious crimes 
should not be treated more leniently simply because they are more valuable to the OTP in terms 
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of the information that they can assist them with.222  This is another noteworthy point raised by 
the tribunal and acknowledgement of this point may have served as a reminder to prosecutors 
that they have to ensure that they are not too quick to bargain with those who seem to hold a lot 
of valuable information.  If those persons are seen to be treated more leniently a situation could 
arise where other accused persons provide false information to the OTP in the hope of some sort 
of reward.  
The Trial Chamber noted that, in contrast with the ‘endless’ caseload of national criminal 
justice systems that the Tribunal has a fixed mandate and saving time and resources should not 
be the main reason for promoting guilty pleas through plea agreements.223  This is an interesting 
point as it is true that the ICTY has a fixed mandate, however such tribunals are notorious for 
taking longer to wind down than the initially thought.  It is significant that this sentencing 
judgement was given in December 2003.  Had the judges known that the ICTY would still be 
carrying out their mandate in 2016, they may not have been so quick to mention this point.  It is 
also worthy of note that not all courts dealing with grave violations of international criminal law 
will have a fixed mandate.  For example, the ICC, which will be discussed in Chapter 6 below, 
does not have a fixed mandate. 
The Trial Chamber also acknowledged some of the arguments for guilty pleas.  For 
example, the accused person is found guilty and punished, which is fulfilling a ‘fundamental 
purpose’ of the Tribunal.224  Acknowledgement was also given to the fact that the accused 
person could not deny that they were guilty.225  Though, again, had the judges been able to see 
into the future and hear Plavšić recant on her confession, they may have been less likely to make 
the assertion that the accused person who has pled guilty could not deny that they were guilty.  
Weight was also given to the benefits to the prosecutor of using information from the 
accused/their guilty plea in securing evidence against ‘high ranking accused’.226  Although the 
OTP see this as a positive factor, for the reasons outlined previously, this must be treated with 
caution.   
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The Trial Chamber also said that guilty pleas can contribute to peace and reconciliation 
in the former Yugoslavia, particularly where remorse is shown. 227   This matter has been 
discussed previously in this thesis and is one of the main arguments for plea bargaining in 
international criminal law.  It is also of note that the Trial Chamber mentioned that the 
Prosecution may consider calling witnesses to testify at the sentencing hearing in order to give 
a more complete or detailed picture of the events in question.228  This is distinct from the practice 
at sentencing diets in the national systems discussed earlier in this thesis.  The Trial Chamber 
have highlighted a very important point here as the fact that witnesses may be able to still give 
their evidence in court may mean that despite the guilty plea they still have their day in court to 
confront the accused.  This is often cited as one of the counter arguments to the advantage that 
plea bargaining spares victims the trauma of having to give evidence.  Although, in practice it 
is unlikely that the OTP or the Trial Chamber would wish to hear significant volumes of 
evidence from witnesses at the sentencing hearing when the matters are accepted by the accused 
and narrated to the court by the OTP. 
Overall in Momir Nikolić the Trial Chamber made clear that there was ‘no doubt that 
plea agreements are permissible under the Statute and Rules of the Tribunal’229 and ‘that, on 
balance, guilty pleas pursuant to plea agreements may further the work – and the mandate – of 
the Tribunal’.230  The Trial Chamber, however, issued a warning to the OTP in stating that ‘in 
cases where charges are withdrawn, extreme caution must be urged’ and ‘any negotiations on a 
charge of genocide or crimes against humanity must be carefully considered and be entered into 
for good cause’.231  This was a reminder to the OTP not to get too carried away with what they 
are bargaining for, ensuring that the OTP were aware that their discretion was being monitored. 
Nikolić is an example of a case where the practice of charge bargaining was carried out 
whilst ensuring that the same factual picture was presented to the court as would have been 
presented if the accused had pled guilty to all the charges on the indictment.  It seems that it is 
on this basis that the Trial Chamber were content to accept the guilty plea.  This is presumably 
because the historical record of what factually occurred would remain intact and the Trial 
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Chamber noted that, ‘the factual basis upon which the remaining charge of persecutions is based 
can be found to reflect the totality of Momir Nikolić’s criminal conduct.’232 
The Momir Nikolić decision indicates that the Trial Chamber view important tasks of 
the ICTY to be fact finding and discovering the truth.   Plea agreements, where the bargain has 
not been as a result in a variation of the available evidence, but rather as a result of policy in 
searching for a more efficient and resource friendly way in which to run court proceedings, it 
seems would be unlikely to be expressly authorised by the Trial Chamber.  The Trial Chamber 
also reiterated in Nikolić that whilst the prosecution and defence have the autonomy to enter into 
plea agreements, the Trial Chamber retains the ultimate authority over both the process and the 
proceedings.233  Despite the prosecutor’s recommendation of 15 to 20 years imprisonment in 
Momir Nikolić, the Trial Chamber sentenced him to 27 years, stating that ‘the testimony of 
Momir Nikolić was evasive [ . . . ] and an indication that his willingness to co-operate does not 
translate into being fully forthcoming in relation to all the events, given his position and 
knowledge’.234  Perhaps this was to send a message to the OTP and the defence that justice could 
not be bargained for and, given the gravity of the crimes being dealt with by the tribunal, a 
lengthy custodial sentence is likely to follow, particularly where the accused person is not 
forthcoming with the full truth. 
The Trial Chamber in the case of Momir Nikolić was also at pains to identify a distinction 
between the types of plea agreements being conducted at the ICTY and plea bargaining at 
national level.235  They drew this distinction mainly based on sentencing by drawing an analogy 
with the national prosecutor accepting a plea of guilty to manslaughter when the accused person 
has been indicted for murder.236  They distinguished this scenario by emphasising that where 
this occurred the actions of the Prosecutor would undoubtedly have an impact on the sentence 
imposed, given that the sentence imposed for manslaughter in, certainly at least most 
jurisdictions, will be less than that for murder.237  They stated that this obligation to impose a 
lower sentence is not applicable in the case of the tribunal, who have discretion to impose their 
own sentencing based on the criminal conduct of the perpetrator.238  The Trial Chamber appear 
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to be indicating that they have wide sentencing discretion regardless of what charges the 
prosecutor wishes to drop. 
It is noteworthy however that that Momir Nikolić’s former co-accused, Obrenovic had 
received a prosecutorial recommendation of fifteen to twenty years and was sentenced to 17 
years on 10 December 2003.239  Further, Momir Nikolić appealed his sentence and in 2006 had 
his sentence reduced, by the Appeal Chamber, to 20 years (which would have been in line with 
the Prosecutor’s original 15 to 20 year recommendation).240  Credit was also given for his time 
served, as had originally been recommended by the Prosecutor.  Perhaps, the Appeal Chamber 
were beginning to note a reduction in the guilty plea rate at the ICTY and the consequences of 
this on a temporary ad hoc tribunal. 
The case of Prosecutor v Dragan Nikolić is also a case that is perhaps representative of 
a shift in attitude of the ICTY Trial Chamber to the prosecutor’s recommendations in plea 
agreements.  Dragan Nikolić was a Serbian commander of the Susica camp in Eastern Bosnia 
and Herzegovina between June and September 1992, a notorious camp where rape, murder and 
assaults were rife.  Dragan Nikolić entered into a plea agreement with prosecutors and accepted 
individual criminal responsibility for the murder of nine men, the facilitation of multiple rapes 
and sexual assaults and the torture of five men.  Prosecutors agreed to recommend a sentence of 
15 years imprisonment, however Nikolić was sentenced to 23 years with the Trial Chamber 
stating that the ‘brutality, the number of crimes committed and the underlying intention to 
humiliate and degrade would render a sentence such as [the prosecution] recommendation 
unjust.’241  However the Trial Chamber made an effort to salvage the prosecutors’ plight in 
obtaining pleas in the future by declaring that the sentence would have been life but for 
mitigating factors, including the guilty plea.242 
 Another post Rule 67 ter case where the Trial Chamber did not sentence in line with the 
prosecutor’s recommendation is Prosecutor v Milan Babić.  Babić was charged on indictment 
with persecution, murder, cruel treatment, wanton destruction of villages or devastation not 
justified by military necessity and destruction or wilful damage to institutions dedicated to 
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education or religion, between August 1991 and February 1992.243  On 27 January 2004, as part 
of a plea agreement Babić pled guilty to persecution on political, racial and religious grounds, a 
crime against humanity punishable under Article 5(h) and 7(1) of the Statute of the Tribunal, 
for participating as a co-perpetrator in a JCE.244   
As part of the plea agreement the Prosecutor recommended a maximum 11 year sentence 
of imprisonment however the Trial Chamber sentenced Babić to 13 years imprisonment finding 
that ‘the recommendation made by the Prosecution of a sentence of imprisonment of no more 
than 11 years would not do justice in view of the applicable sentencing principles and the gravity 
of Babić’s crime taking account of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances.’245  Again the 
Trial Chamber are expressing their disagreement with the sentence recommendation of the 
prosecutor.  It may have been that the prosecutor, under pressure to complete their mandate and 
with growing caseloads felt compelled to recommend more lenient sentences in order to secure 
a plea and avoid the drain on their resources of a lengthy trial process. 
Writing in 2006, Combs noted that since 2003 there had been a marked decrease in the 
number of guilty pleas at the ICTY.  Combs has argued the reasons for this are threefold. 246  
The first reason is that there had been wide criticism by Victims’ Rights groups and 
commentators on sentences being too lenient given the gravity of the crimes committed.247  The 
second reason was that in March 2004 the ICTY’s Chief of Prosecutions, Michael Johnson 
departed from his post at the ICTY.248  He had been a strong advocate of plea bargaining and 
the acceptance of this at the ICTY.249  Thirdly, and more significantly, as a result of the limited 
weight (if any) given by the Trial Chamber in the cases of Momir Nikolić, Dragan Nikolić and 
Milan Babić, to the recommendations of the Prosecutor.250 
Where the Trial Chamber does not sentence consistently with the recommendations of 
the prosecutor, this will send out a message to the defence that it may not be worth entering a 
plea agreement.  Combs’ point has been borne out that, in the last 10 years there have been very 
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few plea agreements entered into at the ICTY.  To date, 20 plea agreements have been reached 
at the ICTY.251  There are ongoing proceedings for 12 accused persons and proceedings have 
been concluded for 149 accused.252  80 persons have been sentenced, 18 acquitted, 13 referred 
to a national jurisdiction, 36 have had their indictments withdrawn or are deceased and 2 are 
due to have a re-trial conducted by the Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunals.253  A 
quarter of persons sentenced therefore pled guilty through a plea agreement.  This is by no means 
near the proportion of cases resolved at the national level, however given that the court is dealing 
with the most serious of crimes, this is still a reasonable number of guilty pleas.  It is clear that 
had these cases taken a year to prosecute at trial, which is a very conservative estimate of time 
that the trial would take, that the ICTY would have been under huge pressure to have all of these 
cases concluded.  The amount of time that victims will have been required to wait for justice 
would also have been significantly longer.  As the case law of the ICTY has illustrated, the 
crime that the accused persons generally wish to have bargained out is the crime of genocide, a 
crime so serious it has been described as the ‘crime of crimes.’254  
4.3 Conclusion to Chapter 4 
This Chapter has confirmed that plea bargaining is a practice that has been implemented 
at the ICTY and has led to some sentence reductions as a result.  However, as the cases of Momir 
Nikolić, Dragan Nikolić and Milan Babić have illustrated the ICTY Trial Chamber has not 
always been willing to sentence in line with the prosecutors recommendations in a plea 
agreement.  The ICTY cases that have resolved by plea agreement have meant that justice has 
been achieved in an efficient manner, with victims having seen a significant number of 
perpetrators sentenced.  Rules 62bis and 62ter demonstrate an acceptance of plea bargaining 
whilst ensuring that the safeguards contained within the rules are followed.  In addition the 
ICTY Trial Chamber has shown a real willingness to uphold plea agreements, particularly where 
they do not distort the factual historical record.  This demonstrates that plea bargaining, in an 
international criminal law forum, cautiously monitored to ensure appropriate sentences are still 
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imposed, can achieve efficiency, justice and go some way to building an accurate historical 
record. 
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CHAPTER 5: THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA AND 
PLEA BARGAINING 
5.1 Establishment of the ICTR and Plea Bargaining at the ICTR 
The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda was established with the mandate for 
the prosecution of persons responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of 
International Humanitarian Law Committed in the territory of Rwanda and for Rwandan 
Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other such Violations Committed in the Territory of 
Neighbouring States, between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994.  As with the ICTY, the 
ICTR is an ad hoc International Criminal Tribunal set up under Chapter VII of the UN Charter 
pursuant to Security Council Resolution 955 (1994).255  The prosecutor is responsible for the 
prosecution and investigation of crimes under the jurisdiction of the ICTY.256  The rules used 
by the ICTY have been adapted accordingly for use by the ICTR, for example, the rules in 
relation to the initiation of proceedings and amendment of the indictment mirror those outlined 
previously in relation to the ICTY.257 
Following the example of the ICTY, the ICTR also amended its rules of procedure to 
allow for the practice of plea bargaining to legitimately take place.  Modelled on Rule 62 bis of 
the ICTY rules of procedure and evidence, Rule 62(B) of the ICTR rules of procedure and 
evidence provides that the Trial Chamber shall satisfy itself that the guilty plea:  
(i) is made freely and voluntarily;  
(ii) is an informed plea;  
(iii) is unequivocal; and  
(iv) is based on sufficient facts for the crime and accused’s participation in it, either 
on the basis of objective indicia or of lack of any material disagreement between 
the parties about the facts of the case. 
 Rule 62 bis of the ICTR Rules of procedure and evidence deals with the Plea Agreement 
procedure and is modelled on Rule 62 ter of the rules of procedure and evidence of the ICTY. 
It states: 
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(A) The Prosecutor and the Defence may agree that, upon the accused entering a plea of 
guilty to the indictment or to one or more counts of the indictment, the Prosecutor shall 
do one or more of the following before the Trial Chamber: 
(i) apply to amend the indictment accordingly; 
(ii) submit that a specific sentence or sentencing range is appropriate; 
(iii) not oppose a request by the accused for a particular sentence or sentencing range; 
(B) The Trial Chamber shall not be bound by any agreement specified in paragraph (A). 
(C) If a plea agreement has been reached by the parties, the Trial Chamber shall require the 
disclosure of the agreement in open session or, on a showing of good cause, in closed 
session, at the time the accused pleads guilty in accordance with Rule 62(A)(v), or 
requests to change his or her plea to guilty. 
Despite the aforementioned provision for plea agreements, this practice has not been 
utilised at the ICTR to the extent it was at the ICTY.  This could be as a result of differences in 
the nature of the crimes dealt with by the tribunals, for example the majority of cases at the 
ICTR include genocide charges, potentially leading to a greater discomfort amongst prosecutors 
and the judiciary in entering and upholding plea agreements.  Nevertheless, there have been 
cases involving plea agreements at the ICTR and these will be outlined in chronological order. 
5.2 Significant cases involving Plea Agreements at the ICTR in Chronological 
Order 
In the case of Jean Kambanda, the OTP entered a plea agreement with the defence.  This 
first plea agreement at the ICTY may however have set a precedent destroying any incentive for 
defendants to plead guilty.  The former Prime Minister Jean-Paul Kambanda, 258 at the earliest 
available opportunity and first appearance on 1 May 1998, pled guilty to all the crimes to which 
he was charged, namely one count of genocide, one count of conspiracy to commit genocide, 
one count of direct and public incitement to commit genocide, one count of complicity in 
genocide, one count of crimes against humanity (murder) and one count of crimes against 
humanity (extermination).259   
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Kambanda assisted the Prosecution from the outset260 and gave 90 hours of evidence 
that was described as ‘invaluable information’261 in the demise of other leaders.  This assistance 
stemmed from a written plea agreement between Kambanda and the Prosecutor providing that 
‘no agreements, understandings or promises have been made between the parties with respect 
to sentence which, it is acknowledged, is at the discretion of the Trial Chamber.’ 262  
Notwithstanding this agreement it seems that Kambanda anticipated a far more lenient sentence 
than the sentence he received, particularly as his Counsel provided submissions to the Chamber 
seeking only 2 years imprisonment.263  This is in stark contrast with the life sentence passed 
down to him by the Trial Chamber, which was in line with the recommendation by the 
prosecutor.264  The Court accepted that there were advantages of a guilty plea however it stated 
that these were not proportionate when taking account of the circumstances, namely 
‘(i) the crimes for which Jean Kambanda is responsible carry an intrinsic gravity, and 
their widespread, precocious and systematic character is particularly shocking to the 
human conscience;  
(ii) Jean Kambanda committed the crimes knowingly and with premeditation; and 
(iii) moreover, Jean Kambanda, as Prime Minister of Rwanda was entrusted with the 
duty and authority to protect the population and he abused this trust’.265 
The Trial Chamber in Kambanda, in sentencing him to life imprisonment, could have 
deterred further accused persons from entering pleas on the basis that they feel they might as 
well run the case to trial.  If they take the chance of proceeding to trial there is a hope of acquittal 
if the outcome of a guilty plea anyway is going be life imprisonment anyway.  However, there 
are factors associated with the Kambanda case specifically that may have meant that the Trial 
Chamber simply had no choice but to issue any sentence other than life imprisonment.  It could 
be that in Kambanda, the accused’s very high profile position meant that a message of deterrence 
had to be sent out that no one is exempt from punishment, particularly where such serious crimes 
as genocide and crimes against humanity are involved.  If the Prime Minister of Rwanda escaped 
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justice with only a very lenient sentence this could have a negative impact on deterrence and 
reconciliation.  Such a prominent figure being treated with leniency is not going to sit well with 
the communities who have suffered as a result of such grave crimes.  If those communities feel 
that justice has been realised they may feel more able to put the mass atrocities behind them 
peacefully.  It is also significant in considering the sentence that Kambanda pled to a variety of 
charges, including the crime of genocide.   
The court in Kambanda was dealing with the most serious crimes committed by a very 
prominent figure.  It is difficult to see how they had any alternative than to issue a life sentence. 
If there was ever going to be a case where a life sentence is appropriate then Kambanda is it.  
Although it was clear that Kambanda had cooperated with the prosecution, this was not 
sufficient for him to be ‘rewarded’ in relation to any sentence discount.  The prosecutor had 
recommended life imprisonment and had not given any promises about the sentence in the plea 
agreement.  Perhaps this was an indication from the prosecutor that although they are willing to 
enter plea agreements there are some cases where the magnitude of the crime means that no 
accused person should be rewarded, regardless of their guilty plea.  The recommendation by the 
defence that Kambanda’s prison sentence should not exceed two years is not necessarily 
consistent with remorse and acceptance of the gravity of his crimes.  Although Kambanda 
illustrates the initial reluctance of the trial Chamber to embrace the practice of plea bargaining 
the subsequent cases of Serushago, Ruggiu, Bisengimana and Rutaganira, examined in further 
detail below, demonstrate a different approach to plea agreements and sentencing.   
The next plea to be tendered before the ICTR was on 14 December 1998 in the case of 
Prosecutor v Omar Serushago.266  Serushago was not on the radar of the Rwandan authorities 
when seeking out war criminals, however he came forward to ICTR Prosecutors in April 1997.  
He was a low-level leader in command of a group called the Interahamwe, (the Hutu lead militia) 
who provided significant information that led to the arrest of a number of high level ICTR 
defendants including Kambanda and Ruggiu (discussed below).  The initial indictment 
contained charges of genocide, murder, torture, extermination and rape.   
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Serushago entered into a Plea Agreement with the OTP and pled guilty to all charges 
except rape, which was withdrawn by prosecutors.  However, in contrast with the majority of 
plea agreements at the ICTY there was no promise by the prosecution and the plea agreement 
stipulated that the sentencing ‘is at the entire discretion of the Trial Chamber’. 267   The 
Prosecution did however acknowledge to the Trial Chamber that Serushago had provided 
‘valuable information’ and they acknowledged his significant co-operation (as they had done in 
Kambanda) in recommending a sentence of 25 years imprisonment.  This was the first time at 
the ICTY that the Prosecutor had made a recommendation of anything less than life. 268  
Ultimately the Trial Chamber imposed a sentence of 15 years imprisonment.269  This case 
illustrated, following Kambanda that there was hope for a ‘reward’ of leniency for accused 
persons who tender a plea before the Trial Chamber.   This should have set a precedent that a 
guilty plea and co-operation have a real possibility of attracting a more lenient sentence.  A 
similar approach was taken by the Trial Chamber in sentencing in the next plea at the ICTR in 
the case of the Prosecutor v Georges Ruggiu. 
Georges Ruggiu is a Belgian citizen who developed an interest in Rwandan politics.  He 
developed a professional relationship with Rwandan President Habyarimana and became 
involved in political debates in Rwanda.  He moved to Rwanda in 1993 where he commenced 
employment as a journalist and broadcaster for Radio Television Libre des Mille Collines 
(RTLM).  In the course of the Spring of 1994 Ruggiu and a number of other broadcasters from 
RTLM aired broadcasts inciting the murder of the Tutsi population.270  Ruggiu initially pled not 
guilty however then alleged that as a result of ‘reflection’ he realised his ‘moral responsibility’ 
to accept responsibility in pleading guilty to ‘direct and public incitement to commit 
genocide.’271   
The was no undertaking in the Prosecutor’s plea agreement in respect of what sentence 
recommendation would be made however the Prosecutor ultimately recommended a sentence 
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of 20 years imprisonment.  This was the most lenient sentence that ICTR Prosecutors had 
recommended and they expressly stated that had the accused proceeded to trial the sentence 
recommendation would have been life imprisonment.272   
Prosecutors were clearly sending a message that there is a potential reward of a 
recommendation of a more lenient sentence for accused persons who pled guilty.  The Trial 
Chamber went on to praise Ruggui by effectively thanking him for ‘sparing the Tribunal a 
lengthy investigation and trial’273 and for ‘acknowledging his mistakes.’274  Despite the 20 year 
recommendation by Prosecutors Ruggui was sentenced to only 12 years imprisonment.  
Interestingly, this was described by the ICTR Chief of Prosecutions as ‘a good gesture for other 
accused who would wish to plead guilty and accept responsibility for their crimes’.275  In making 
this statement he was clearly promoting plea agreements as being a permissible and desirable 
practice at the ICTR.  The Ruggui case provides an acknowledgement of some of the theoretical 
advantages to plea bargaining, as Trial Chamber thanked the accused for effectively saving court 
time and resources and for showing remorse in accepting responsibility.  The support to plea 
agreements by the OTP and Trial Chamber continued in the following case of the Prosecutor v 
Rutaganira.   
Between 1980 and 1994 Vincent Rutaganira was ‘conseiller’ of the Mubuga sector, 
Gishyita Commune, Kibuye Prefecture.  The charges against Rutaganira stemmed from a 
church massacre of Tutsi persons.  Between 4000 and 5000 Tutsi persons were murdered during 
a 3 day massacre in 1994.  Rutaganira was alleged to have, whilst acting along with others, 
ordered the attack on the church and had actively taken part in the murders.  Rutaganira was 
charged on the indictment with genocide, extermination as a crime against humanity, murder as 
a crime against humanity and   inhumane acts as a crime against humanity. 
In February 2002 Rutaganira voluntarily surrendered himself after having been at large 
since 1996 when he was originally indicted.  In his plea agreement he denied ordering the attack 
on the Church and denied active participation in the murders.  He admitted his awareness of 
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Tutsi civilians having gathered in the Church, that he was aware that assailants were gathering 
near the church before the attack took place, and that ‘despite the fact that he was conseiller of 
Mubuga secteur he failed to protect the Tutsi who had sought refuge.’276  Rutaganira pled guilty 
on 8 December 2004 to aiding and abetting extermination as a crime against humanity, on the 
basis of his omissions to act.  The Prosecutor asked the court that he be acquitted in respect of 
the other charges because there was insufficient evidence for them.  The trial chamber agreed 
to do this. 
As part of the plea agreement Prosecutors had agreed to recommend between six and eight 
years imprisonment.  Rutaganira was ultimately sentenced to six years imprisonment, the 
shortest sentence ever handed down by the ICTR.  It is of assistance that the OTP asked for the 
accused to be acquitted on the other charges specifically due to there being insufficient evidence 
as this avoided one of the concerns that the ICTY in the Nikolić judgement referred to previously, 
about lack of clarity as to whether the events had actually happened or were just a bargaining 
tool.  However, in the following case, the Trial Chamber refused to acquit the accused on the 
charges that the prosecutor had moved to withdraw and dismiss on the basis that the prosecution 
had failed to justify their motion.   
The case of the Prosecutor v Bisengimana is represents an example of charge bargaining 
where the full factual picture can be said to have been amended as a result of the plea bargain 
that the accused ultimately pled guilty to.  The original indictment comprised of thirteen charges 
of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes.  Not only was Bisengimana accused of 
being personally responsible in the commission of this criminal conduct but also was responsible 
for encouraging the participation of others.  As part of a plea negotiation a further indictment 
was prepared with five charges, however the charges were still a representation of the full factual 
picture of Bisengimana’s criminal conduct.  Further plea negotiations led to the Prosecutor 
agreeing to accept guilty pleas to two out of the five charges and the prosecutor would agree to 
seek acquittals for the other three charges, which included crimes as serious as genocide and 
rape.  On 7 December 2005, the accused pled guilty to counts of murder and extermination as 
crimes against humanity.  The Chamber granted the Prosecution motion for withdrawal and 
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dismissal of the remaining counts but denied the Prosecution request for acquittal on these 
counts because the Prosecution had failed to justify its motion on this point.277 
The Prosecutor also agreed to recommend a sentence of between twelve and fourteen 
years in addition to supporting Bisengimana’s request that he be permitted to serve his sentence 
in a European prison.  The withdrawal and dismissal of the genocide charge sparked outrage in 
Rwanda, with the Rwandan government insisting that the only circumstances in which genocide 
charges should be dropped are when ‘it would be difficult to prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
the role that the particular accused person played in the preparation of the genocide’.278  The 
Chamber sentenced Bisengimana to 15 years imprisonment.279  It is likely that had Bisengimana 
not entered this plea negotiation and had been found guilty of genocide, that such a crime after 
trial would have attracted a sentence of  life imprisonment.  The Trial Chamber did not comply 
with the sentence recommendations by the prosecutor however the difference was only that of 
one year.  It is significant that in the course of the sentencing judgement the Trial Chamber did 
not discuss the totality of the criminal conduct by the accused.  One of the three charges 
bargained out, for example, was for the crime of rape.   
When the Trial Chamber were considering the factual picture in sentencing there was no 
mention of the accused having been involved in the crime of rape.  It is not clear whether the 
charges were bargained away to secure a conviction or whether there were evidential difficulties 
in proceeding with them.  This lack of clarity may not be beneficial in terms of fostering 
reconciliation as victims may feel that the accused is ‘getting off’ with something.  Albeit this 
has to be balanced with the remorse that might be implied by a guilty plea and the avoidance of 
witnesses being inconvenienced to give evidence.  The Trial Chamber still allowed the plea to 
be entered and thereby appears to be taking a more relaxed approach to plea bargaining than the 
Trial Chamber of the ICTY.  Despite this approach only a very limited number of cases at the 
ICTR resolved by way of a plea.  
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To date 93 individuals have been indicted to the ICTR. 280   61 persons have been 
sentenced, 14 have been acquitted, 10 referred to national jurisdictions for trial, three accused 
persons have died during or prior to trial, three fugitives have been referred to the MICT 
(mechanism for international criminal tribunals) and two indictments were withdrawn before 
trial.281  The last trial judgment issued by the ICTR was on 20 December 2012.282  The only 
remaining work at the Tribunal is with the Appeals Chamber.283  The majority of the work of 
the tribunal had been concluded by 2005 and of the 61 accused persons sentenced the total 
number of these cases resolved by plea agreement is only eight.284  This is only 13%, which is 
a stark reduction in comparison with the guilty plea rate mentioned previously at the national 
level.  The ICTY has had more significant success with plea agreements, with the percentage of 
those sentenced that resolved their case through a plea agreement being 25%. 
5.3 Conclusion to Chapter 5 
There has been no research into why the guilty plea rate is at a low percentage for the 
ICTR or the ICTY in comparison with national levels.  It is clear that the practice has been 
permitted at the ICTR and there have been some sentence reductions as a result.  There may 
well have been discussions in relation to plea agreements between the OTP and the defence and 
they may have been unable to reach a suitable agreement, for example.  It may have been the 
OTP refused to bargain in relation to the crime of genocide in some cases or where the plea 
agreement would have the effect of the historical record being distorted.  The lower percentage 
of guilty pleas could have been because the accused knew that they were facing a lengthy prison 
sentence even if they did plead guilty and as such decided that the ‘reward’ they would get in 
sentence discount would not be sufficient to offset the possibility of acquittal after trial.  The 
accused persons may genuinely be innocent or believe that they are innocent.  They may have 
received legal advice not to plead guilty on the basis of an assessment by their defence team of 
the prosecution evidence against them.   
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The guilty pleas as a result of plea agreements at the ICTY have, overall, had a positive 
impact.  They have achieved more speedy and efficient justice, whilst the court still ensured that 
sentences reflected the moral gravity of the crimes committed, for example in the Kambanda 
case.  The Ruggui case demonstrated that the court felt that remorse, reconciliation and the 
saving of court time were factors that should be applauded.  However, the Bisengimana case is 
illustrative of the real difficulties that can occur in terms of the damage that can be done to 
public confidence in the international criminal legal system when charges as serious as genocide 
are dropped as part of a plea agreement.  This is the reason why plea bargaining in international 
forums must be treated cautiously and safeguards, for example the criterion in Rule 62bis and 
monitoring by the Trial Chamber, to ensure that too much discretion is not awarded to the 
prosecutor, must be implemented.  With the formation of a permanent international criminal 
court, it is necessary to consider whether the practice of plea bargaining is legally permissible 
at the International Criminal Court and if so, what safeguards should be in place to minimise 
the risk of controversy that the practice can bring.   
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CHAPTER 6: 
LOOKING TO THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL PLEA BARGAINING AND 
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 
6.1 The International Criminal Court 
The International Criminal Court (ICC) was enacted to deal with ‘unimaginable 
atrocities that deeply shock the conscience of humanity’ and has been tasked with the 
‘prevention of heinous crimes from interfering with the ‘peace security and well-being of the 
world’.285  The ICC was established by the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
which entered into force on 1 July 2002.  Unlike the ad hoc ICTY and ICTR, which have  
geographical and time limitations on their jurisdiction, the ICC has jurisdiction over persons 
accused of committing one or more of the crimes outlined in the Statute i.e. genocide, crimes 
against humanity, war crimes and aggression.286   
Unlike the ICTY and ICTR, who can overrule national systems in deciding to prosecute 
a suspect, the ICC is ‘complementary to national criminal jurisdictions’, 287  limited to 
prosecuting in circumstances where the state party is ‘unable’ or shows an ‘unwillingness’ to 
prosecute.288  A further distinction between the ad hoc tribunals and the ICC, used to appeal to 
states considering whether to sign up to the Rome Statute is the principle of ‘nullum crimen sine 
lege’ which has a literal meaning of ‘there is no crime without a law’.  To explain, the Rome 
Statute states that ‘[a] person shall not be criminally responsible under this Statute unless the 
conduct in question constitutes, at the time it takes place, a crime within the jurisdiction of the 
Court.’289  The Rome Statute therefore does not have retrospective effect.  The ICC consists of 
the Office of the Prosecutor, the Presidency, the Registry and the Divisions (Pre-Trial Division, 
Trial Division, and Appeals Division). 290   Prosecution of cases before the ICC is the 
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responsibility of the Prosecutor.  Like the ad hoc tribunals, the procedure at the ICC is a 
combination of common law and civil law systems. 291   
The ICC is currently investigating situations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
Uganda, the Central African Republic, Darfur, Sudan, Kenya, Libya, the Ivory Coast and 
Mali.292  The ICC have preliminary examinations ongoing in Afghanistan, Columbia, Nigeria, 
Georgia, Guinea, Honduras, Iraq, Ukraine and Palestine.293  To date there have been no guilty 
pleas at the ICC.  Very few cases have got to the stage where this would even be an option.  The 
court has had 23 cases in 9 situations brought before it.294  Given that so few cases at the ICC 
have reached the stage where plea bargaining would be an option it is beneficial to consider 
whether plea bargaining is a practice that would be legally permissible at the ICC. 
6.2 Is Plea Bargaining Permitted at the ICC? 
Article 65 of the Rome Statute, which will be considered further in section 6.4 below, 
governs proceedings on an admission of guilt.  Of particular relevance in considering whether 
plea bargaining is legally permissible at the ICC, Article 65(5) of the Rome Statute states that 
any ‘discussions between the prosecutor and the defence regarding modification of the charges, 
the admission of guilt or the penalty to be imposed shall not be binding on the Court’.295  It is 
clear therefore from Article 65 that plea bargaining between the prosecutor and the defence is 
not expressly permitted or prohibited by the Rome Statute.  However, the inability of the 
prosecutor to ensure a plea agreement is binding on the court could make the task of securing a 
plea agreement more difficult.  It is worth recalling here that defense counsel in the ICTY case 
of Dragan Nikolić felt that the plea agreement had not been honoured as a result of the Trial 
Chamber not following the sentence recommendation of the prosecutor and warned that this 
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‘will be noted by those whose duty it is to advise on the issue of making a Plea Agreement with 
the Prosecutor’.296   
It is noteworthy that there were still plea agreements reached subsequent to the Dragan 
Nikolić case.297  However it is always possible to speculate that, as a result of the unwillingness 
of the Trial Chamber to sentence in line with the recommendations of the Prosecutor, there may 
have been fewer pleas before the ICTY than otherwise would have been the case.  If the Trial 
Chamber were to set a precedent where they fail to honour plea agreements made by the 
prosecutor it is likely that the defence will not take the risk of entering into such agreements.  
This section has established that there is nothing legally to prohibit the prosecution and defence 
entering into plea agreements at the ICC.  The following section will consider whether plea 
agreements should be permitted at the ICC. 
6.3 Should Plea Bargaining be permitted at the ICC? 
The international Criminal Court and ad hoc tribunals discussed previously, for example, 
have to select who they prosecute.  The ad hoc tribunals are time limited and have to aim to 
execute their mandate within limited timescales.298  The reality is that their resources are limited 
and they have had to select the most senior level officials to prosecute.  This is an important 
reason for utilising the practice of plea bargaining to achieve an efficient outcome.  Although 
the ICC does not face the same time limitations as the ad hoc tribunals, the ICC also has resource 
limitations that have to be managed to strike the correct balance between efficiency and 
achieving justice.   
As of 30 October 2015, of the 23 cases brought before the ICC only 6 were at the trial 
stage and only 2 at the reparations stage.299  Despite the Rome Statute entering into force on 1 
July 2002, only 2 persons who have been brought before the court, Thomas Lubanga Dyilo and 
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Germain Katanga, have actually been sentenced for the crimes committed by them. 300  In 
Lubanga Dyilo’s case, the warrant for his arrest was first issued by the Trial Chamber on 10 
February 2006.301  He was initially sentenced on 10 July 2012 and, following an appeal, the 
verdict and sentence against him was confirmed by the appeals Chamber on 1 December 
2014.302  This is an astonishing 9 years for victims to wait for justice to be served.  In Katanga’s 
case, the prosecution first applied for the warrant for his arrest on 25 June 2007.303  He was 
sentenced on 23 May 2014, an incredible 7 years later.304   
The geography and the very serious nature of crimes that the ICC deal with mean that 
the investigations are large and widespread.  The reality is that the ICC is complementary to 
national systems and does not have the resources to investigate and prosecute every person who 
has committed every crime that has fallen under its jurisdiction.  It has previously been 
suggested that the maximum number of cases involving ‘mass atrocities’ that the ICC will be 
able to prosecute at any given time is only six.305  The resources of the ICC are not infinite and 
it is clear that the Office of the Prosecutor will have to be selective in what situations to 
investigate and who to prosecute.  The task of the prosecutor in having to select who and where 
to investigate, as a result of resource limitations, is a controversial practice in itself.  However, 
this is a task that is entrusted to the prosecutor by the Rome Statute.306  Undoubtedly, victims 
and witnesses of mass atrocities will feel cheated and that they have not received the full truth 
and justice that they require where there is any selective process in operation in the first instance. 
 The small number of cases that the ICC can deal with at a time taken with amount of 
time it has taken thus far for any justice to be served at the ICC is gravely concerning.  
Implementation of plea bargaining at the ICC with safeguards, whilst for the reasons outlined 
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in the chapter 3.1 is not the perfect solution, goes a long way to striking the balance between 
efficiency and justice at the ICC that is much required.   
Chapter 6.4 Safeguards, Concerns and Recommendations for the approach to be taken 
by the International Criminal Court to Plea Bargaining 
The ICC has a very difficult and multifunctional role whereby it must secure justice for 
the deceased and victims, find the truth and paint an accurate historical record whilst, at the 
same time, conduct and prosecute in a time efficient and effective manner, with limited 
resources.  This section will examine what safeguards already exist to ensure that credible plea 
agreements could be implemented and enforced and will recommend further safeguards to 
ensure proper implementation of the practice of plea bargaining. 
6.4.1 Safeguards in the Rome Statute of the ICC 
In terms of pursuing the truth the Rome Statute sets out safeguards to help ensure that 
the truth is discovered as far as possible in respect of the particular investigation.  The Prosecutor 
must ensure that the investigation is thorough, complete and examines ‘incriminating and 
exonerating circumstances equally.’307  In doing this, the Prosecutor is seeking to obtain the 
truth and their investigation should go as far as possible to achieving this.  The Prosecutor will 
then have a clear picture of what the evidence should be and this may assist in informing that 
on what plea agreement they could negotiate.   
Proceedings on an admission of guilt are also governed by the Trial Chamber under 
Article 65 of the Rome Statute as already outlined.  Where any accused makes an admission of 
guilt the Trial Chamber must ensure that he ‘understands the nature and consequences of the 
admission of guilt’.308  The admission must be ‘voluntarily made by the accused after sufficient 
consultation with defence counsel’.309  The Trial Chamber must also ensure that the ‘admission 
of guilt is supported by the facts of the case that are contained in: (i) The charges brought by the 
Prosecutor and admitted by the accused; (ii) Any materials presented by the Prosecutor which 
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supplement the charges and which the accused accepts; and (iii) Any other evidence, such as 
the testimony of witnesses, presented by the Prosecutor or the accused’.310   
The aforementioned safeguards set down by Article 65 ensure that there is a basis for 
the charges that the accused is pleading to, that the accused understands his actions in pleading 
guilty and what he is pleading to.  It is also important to note that he has the protection of having 
had the advice of his own legal representative prior to pleading guilty.  Article 65(5) specifically 
excludes the possibility that Plea Agreements are binding on the Trial Chamber and as a result 
ensures that the actions of the prosecutor are sufficiently monitored to ensure that the prosecutor 
does not abuse their power.  The charges will also have to have been confirmed by the Trial 
Chamber and there will have had to be sufficient evidence for doing so.311  This again ensures 
that the prosecutor does not bring any erroneous excess charges against the accused as a 
bargaining tool or a way of exerting undue pressure on the accused person to either negotiate 
over the charges or face more charges.  This also removes the possibility of the prosecutor being 
in a position to threaten extreme sentences should accused persons not enter a particular plea 
agreement. 312   Sentencing will still be in the hands of the court regardless of the 
recommendations of the prosecutor.  
The preamble of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) states that, 
‘during this century millions of children, women and men have been victims of unimaginable 
atrocities that deeply shock the conscience of humanity.’313  This emphasises the importance of 
the victims and it is fundamental that their views are at least taken into consideration by the 
prosecutor in determining an appropriate plea agreement.  Of particular note, Article 65(4) of 
the Rome Statute permits the inclusion of victims/witnesses in the process even where the 
accused has pled guilty.  Article 65(4) states that if ‘the Trial Chamber is of the opinion that a 
more complete presentation of the facts of the case is required in the interests of justice, in 
particular the interests of the victims, the Trial Chamber may: (a) Request the Prosecutor to 
present additional evidence, including the testimony of witnesses; or (b) Order that the trial be 
continued under the ordinary trial procedures provided by this Statute, in which case it shall 
                                                          
310 Article 65(1)(c) Rome Statute of the ICC 
311 Article 61(7) Rome Statute of the ICC 
312 See N. Padfield, Shining the torch on plea-bargaining, (2009) Cambridge Law Journal at p. 11 
313 Rome Statute of the ICC preamble, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90, this is in contrast to the Statutes of the 
ICTY and ICTR which fail to give the rights of victims and witnesses any kind of specific priority, or even real 
recognition.   
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consider the admission of guilt as not having been made and may remit the case to another Trial 
Chamber’.  Perhaps this is an indication of a modern attitude to acknowledging the importance 
of victims’ rights in the process by the drafters of the Rome Statute.  Article 65(4), on the one 
hand eliminates one of the main advantages of plea bargaining, namely that the victims and 
witnesses will not have to face the ordeal of having to give evidence.  On the other hand, it 
creates an opportunity for those who wish to have their day in court and face those who have 
wronged them.  These are matters that will be in the hands of the Trial Chamber following a 
guilty plea and it remains to be seen how the Trial Chamber will deal with Article 65(4).   
The aforementioned safeguards contained within the Rome Statute mean that the 
Prosecutor does not and should not have unfeigned discretion to do what they wish.  The ICC, 
akin to the ICTY and ICTR, in terms of the procedure used, is adversarial, like the criminal 
procedure in Scotland, England and the United States to begin with, but the courts also retain 
powers akin to the inquisitorial system as a safeguard.314  Schabas has stated that ‘[a]lthough 
much of the procedure of the Court is a hybrid of different judicial systems, it seems clear that 
there is a definite tilt towards the common law approach of an adversarial trial hearing.  However, 
the exact colouring that the Court may take will ultimately be determined by its judges.’315  The 
Trial Chamber, in exercising the aforementioned monitoring powers afforded to them by the 
Rome Statute, should however bear in mind that it the prosecutor who has full knowledge of the 
investigation and the evidence.  It would be wise of the Trial Chamber to ensure that they take 
into account any recommendations by the prosecutor and place sufficient reliance on them. 316 
6.4.2 Practical Concerns/Comments Associated with Plea Bargaining at the ICC 
The investigations of Office of the Prosecutor at the ICC have come under the spotlight 
in discussions on international forums.317  Part V of the Rome Statute governs the investigation 
and prosecution.  Article 53 of the Rome Statute deals with the initiation of an investigation.  
Article 53(1) states that: 
                                                          
314 For example see the Articles 58, 61 and 65 of the Rome Statute of the ICC  
315 W. A. Schabas, Supra note 123 at p. 143 
316 See R. Henman, Punishment and the Role of the Prosecutor in International Criminal Trials, 2008 Crim. L.F. 
395; See also K.A. Rodman, Is Peace in the interests of Justice?  The case for broad prosecutorial discretion at the 
International Criminal Court, 2009 L.J.I.L. 99 
317 D. Groome, No witness, no case: An Assessment of the Conduct and Quality of ICC Investigations, Penn State 
Journal of Law and International Affairs, (2014-2015) 3 Penn St. J.L. & Int'l Aff. 1 at p.1 
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‘The Prosecutor shall, having evaluated the information made available to him or her, 
initiate an investigation unless he or she determines that there is no reasonable basis to 
proceed under this Statute.  In deciding whether to initiate an investigation, the 
Prosecutor shall consider whether: (a) The information available to the Prosecutor 
provides a reasonable basis to believe that a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court 
has been or is being committed; (b) The case is or would be admissible under article 17; 
and (c) Taking into account the gravity of the crime and the interests of victims, there 
are nonetheless substantial reasons to believe that an investigation would not serve the 
interests of justice. If the Prosecutor determines that there is no reasonable basis to 
proceed and his or her determination is based solely on subparagraph (c) above, he or 
she shall inform the Pre-Trial Chamber.’ 
Article 53(2) outlines very similar circumstances under which the Prosecutor may not proceed 
further with a prosecution after the investigation stage.   Articles 53(1)(c) and 53(2)(c) appear 
to entrust the prosecutor with relatively wide discretion in respect of the criminal investigation 
and proceedings.  It is odd that the prosecutor is granted discretion in relation to whether to 
initiate investigations in the first instance, yet has no ability to bind the court in relation to a plea 
agreement that involves for example, dropping a small portion of the accused person’s conduct.  
However, any decision taken by the prosecutor under Article 53 is subject to review by the Pre-
Trial Chamber.318   
The OTP of the ICC has developed a practice whereby a reasonably short period of time 
is spent investigating cases before a warrant is issued. 319  This has had the result of cases still 
being in their investigative stage when proceedings are commenced.320  It must however be 
acknowledged that conducting an investigation into crimes against humanity is not a task on 
any small scale.  The resources required to be deployed to fully investigate these matters in very 
short time-scales would require to be immense and it is therefore clear why it is often the case 
that the investigation is still ongoing when proceedings commence.321  Groome has highlighted 
some of the additional difficulties that prosecutors in an international forum can face, for 
                                                          
318 Rome Statute of the ICC, Article 53(3)(b), 
319 D. Groome, supra note 317 at p. 7 
320 Ibid 
321 Ibid at pp. 7-9 
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example witnesses being located a significant distance from the investigators, the requirement 
to obtain the consent of the relevant authorities in order to interview those witnesses and the fact 
that the witnesses may have relocated.322  There is no doubt that prosecutors will feel under 
pressure to have persons suspected of heinous crimes brought before the court and no longer be 
at large to commit further crimes.  Once an investigation has been conducted, there will still 
generally be follow up work to be done once the evidence is considered as a whole in order for 
a case to be fully prepared for a trial.323 
The practical problem is however that if proceedings commence whilst the investigation 
is still only in the early stages, it will be difficult for the accused and their Counsel to fully weigh 
up and consider the evidence against them in order to determine whether they should be entering 
a plea agreement.  If the accused does not know what the evidence against him is and the strength 
of that evidence then their Counsel will be unable to make an informed decision in advising 
them on whether to plead guilty or not.  In addition, it is a requirement that the Pre-Trial 
Chamber must confirm the charges and in doing so they must be satisfied that there is sufficient 
evidence to believe that the accused person committed the crimes that they are charged with.324  
There is no mechanism in the Rome Statute where the accused person can plead guilty at the 
confirmation stage or before this stage.  The prosecutor will therefore, despite any early 
negotiations with the defence about a plea agreement, still have to prepare the case to a sufficient 
standard to ensure that the charges will be confirmed.  This is a time consuming task with little 
merit where there is early indication that the accused person wishes to plead guilty and there 
will be no trial that the evidence will require to be presented at. 
It is of real concern in the plight for securing efficient justice that Article 64(8)(a) of the 
Rome Statute states that ‘at the commencement of the trial’ the Trial Chamber will afford the 
accused ‘the opportunity to make an admission of guilt in accordance with article 65 or to plead 
not guilty.’325  Vasiliev has noted that ‘the ICC practice has varied, with some Trial Chambers 
(erroneously, in my view) soliciting a plea at the first status conference rather than when opening 
                                                          
322 Ibid. 
323 Ibid. 
324 Article 61, Rome Statute of the ICC, in particular Article 61(7) 
325 This concern has been highlighted by S. Vasiliev, Ongwen at the ICC and the Possible Guilty Plea: A Response 
to Alex Whiting, 15 February 2015, available on the website for the Centre for International Criminal Justice at 
http://cicj.org/2015/02/ongwen-at-the-icc-and-the-possible-guilty-plea-a-response-to-alex-whiting/ last accessed 3 
January 2016 
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the trial, an admission can under no circumstances be made prior to the confirmation of charges 
and committal of the person to trial.’326  Prior to the charges being confirmed, the accused does 
not have ‘formally defined and judicially certified charges’ and as such cannot plead guilty. 327  
This does not however prevent the prosecution and defence engaging in discussions about what 
the charges should be and what charges the accused person would be willing to plead guilty to.  
However, the prosecution face a real practical difficulty, where, if the accused can only enter 
his plea at the commencement of the trial then if that plea is not accepted by the Trial Chamber, 
the prosecutor is going to have to be in a position to start the trial.  As such they will have to 
have a fully prepared case, just in case.  This means, if the accused’s plea is accepted, a lot of 
wasted work in the OTP.   
These matters represents practical difficulties that could make the entering plea 
agreements at the ICC very difficult.  The following section details recommendations for a 
credible approach to plea bargaining at the ICC which would also eliminate some of the practical 
difficulties outlined. 
6.4.3 Recommendations for Best Practice approach to Plea Agreements at the ICC 
Trust is given to the prosecutor in the respect that they must determine what situations 
to investigate and prosecute in the first instance.  That same trust should be instilled in them in 
deciding the appropriate outcome in conducting plea negotiations.  The Prosecutor has the 
overwhelming responsibility of ensuring, when bringing to trial the crime of genocide, for 
example, that they prove this crime beyond reasonable doubt and ensure that they are able to 
prove the ‘specific intent’ for this crime.328  This is not an easy task and, if, for example, after 
the trial the accused is convicted of murder instead of genocide, a lot of court time and expense 
will have been consumed for the same outcome.  Deciding what pleas to negotiate is a risk 
assessment that the Prosecutor must be entrusted to conduct, particularly as there are already 
safeguards in the Rome Statute which have been discussed that ensure that plea bargaining is 
monitored by the Trial Chamber. 
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Whiting has argued that plea bargaining is a practice that should be welcomed at the 
ICC.  He has recommended that in order to ensure that plea agreements are given the recognition 
and credibility required by the judiciary it is necessary for the Office of the Prosecutor to 
implement a policy that will ensure confidence in the process and ‘predictability’.329  He has 
very persuasively argued that there should be ‘discretion’ for individual cases but also 
‘guidelines’ that apply in all cases.330  Whiting has proposed that the Policy should include, in 
sum, the following: 
1. Recognition that there are some cases where plea agreements will not be appropriate, 
for example because the perpetrator is too prominent a figure, blameworthy for their 
particular conduct or notorious;331 
2. That a plea agreement should encapsulate ‘the essential criminality of the accused 
and is supported by the facts’;332  
3. That the Office of the prosecutor should determine whether there are any particular 
charges that they would not drop where there is sufficient evidence to support the 
charge;333 
4. That the prosecutor has to make reasonable sentence recommendations with 
specified justifications that balance an ‘incentive to plead’ whilst maintaining 
credibility with the Trial Chamber that the sentence is truly reflective of the severity 
of the conduct;334 
5. That the Prosecutor should demand cooperation from the accused in the absence of 
any ‘compelling’ reasons for not seeking such cooperation and a significant sentence 
discount should only be granted in circumstances where the truth is offered;335 
6. That there should be ‘a procedure whereby the agreement is revoked, and the 
discount reconsidered, if the accused fails to adhere to an agreement to provide 
truthful information to the Court’;336   
                                                          
329 A. Whiting, Encouraging the Acceptance of Guilty Pleas at the ICC, 11 February 2015, Post Conflict Justice 
website at http://postconflictjustice.com/encouraging-the-acceptance-of-guilty-pleas-at-the-icc/  
330 Ibid. 
331 Ibid. 
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7. That there should be ‘a procedure of consulting with the victims and their 
representatives and other interested parties before reaching an agreement’, though 
their views would not be ‘binding’ on the prosecutor;337 
8. That the prosecutor should be ‘transparent’ and provide factors that were taken into 
consideration in reaching a plea agreement and any recommendations arising 
therefrom;338 
Recommendations one to four are welcome and sensible contributions to a credible plea 
agreement implementation policy and should be taken on board by policymakers at the ICC.  
Recommendation number one is in line with the approach taken by the ICTR in the Kambanda 
case where the Trial Chamber felt that nothing short of life Imprisonment would be sufficient 
for such a prominent figure.  This safeguards against the concerns that plea bargaining results 
in sentences that are not fully reflective of the moral gravity of the conduct.  In relation to 
recommendation number two, the case law of the ICTY and ICTY clearly illustrates that the 
Trial Chamber were far more comfortable in accepting plea agreements that dropped charges 
where the accused person was still pleading guilty to the entire factual picture and thereby 
ensuring that they are minimising any distortion to a historical record.  These recommendations 
are therefore in line with precedent set down by the ad hoc tribunals. 
Recommendation number three makes sense in theory however the wording of a policy 
that would bind the prosecution to never dropping a particular charge where evidence supports 
it would be difficult and undesirable without any exceptions.  The obvious charge that this would 
apply to is genocide, with genocide being the most serious of crimes and as experience at the 
ICTY and ICTR has shown, this is the charge that no one wants to plead to.  If the prosecutor 
were to impose a blanket ban on dropping genocide charges, this may be too restrictive to 
encourage plea agreements.  There could however be such a prohibition on dropping genocide 
charges except in circumstances where there the prosecutor has compelling reasons for doing 
so, for example.  Recommendation four would ensure that the prosecutor fully applies their 
mind to balancing the need to achieve a sentence that ensures justice is served whilst gives the 
accused person some kind of incentive to plead. 
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Recommendations five and six are more dangerous in that they fail to take into account 
that the ICC will be dealing with those responsible for the most serious of international crimes.  
It may be considered optimistic to take the accounts of the accused persons as credible sources, 
particularly where there is some form of gain for them.  This can be linked back to the argument 
that although a guilty plea may be an expression or remorse on the one hand, on the other it 
could be nothing more than a mechanism to obtain a more lenient sentence.  The ability to 
revoke an agreement is also of concern in that this could be off putting for those considering 
entering a plea agreement.  One of the benefits of them doing so is that they attain certainty in 
relation to what they will be convicted of.  In addition, it will not be legally permissible for a 
discount to be revoked, where for example, the accused recants their account after they have 
served their sentence, like in the case of Plavšić.  The demand for co-operation for some kind 
of reward, if implemented in a policy should be treated with extreme caution.  This may be seen 
as putting too much pressure on the innocent to plead if the reward offered for co-operation is 
significant.  It would be safer to leave reference to such matters out of any policy and consider 
them on a case by case basis in the terms of a plea agreement. 
Recommendations seven and eight should be implemented in a plea agreement 
implementation policy.  The views of the victims are important but they should not be 
determinative.  The prosecutor is the person who is legally qualified and does not have the same 
emotional interest in a case as witnesses and victims.  The prosecutor is therefore in a better 
position to be entrusted to make an informed decision on whether to enter into a plea agreement 
and what the terms of that plea agreement should be.  To ensure both public and judicial 
confidence in any plea bargaining system and prevent corruption it fundamental that the 
prosecutor is as transparent in their decision making as possible, with the qualification that they 
will be unable to divulge information in certain circumstances, for example where the safety of 
the public or evidence would be compromised.   
In addition to the above recommendations it is also recommended that the Rome 
Statute/ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence be reformed to allow for a guilty plea to be entered 
in advance of the Trial stage.  The mechanism for this could be a petition to the court for a 
hearing on a plea agreement and draft charges that have been prepared following discussions 
between the prosecutor and the defence.  This will allow for more efficient justice for victims 
whilst ensuring the best use is made of resources in the office of the prosecutor.  This will also 
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allow the prosecutor to focus their efforts on cases that are going to be trials where evidence is 
led.   
A consultation process involving prosecutors, defence counsel, the judiciary and legal 
academics that would involve contributions on what would amount to a credible plea 
implementation policy would be beneficial in order that views from all involved in the process 
can be taken into account.  To sum up, a well thought out plea agreement implementation policy 
that would address the concerns against plea bargaining in the international context as far as 
possible along with some legislative reforms to allow earlier pleas at the ICC would go a long 
way to achieving the necessary balance between efficiency and justice. 
6.5 Summary of Chapter 6 
The ICC has to do the best it can with the resources it has and as a result, although plea 
bargaining is not a perfect solution, the positives of the practice outweigh the negatives and it is 
a practice that can allow for the balancing of competing interests.  The ICC should adopt the 
practice of plea bargaining provided an appropriate assessment of the evidence and risk, taking 
into account the time and resource implications is conducted by the Prosecutor and the 
safeguards outlined in the Rome Statute adhered to. A balance has to be struck between 
retributive and restorative justice principles in terms of undertaking fact finding missions for 
victims in pursuit of the truth and the prosecution of criminals in an efficient and effective 
manner.  The aim of the court should be to balance the interests of those involved as well as 
possible and ensure there are as many correct convictions.  A correct balance requires to be 
struck as it is inevitable that the scale of these mass atrocities mean that it will, in reality, be 
impossible to prosecute every crime, particularly bearing in mind the selective nature of the 
Prosecutor’s role referred to previously and the maximum number of trials that the ICC can run 
at any time being estimated at 6.  Provided the correct safeguards and policies are imposed to 
ensure the plea bargaining process at the ICC is given credibility, this is a practice that should 
be welcomed. 
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION: PLEA BARGAINING IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
COURTS:  
DEALING WITH THE DEVIL . . . A NECESSARY EVIL 
It is acknowledged that the practice of plea bargaining is a controversial practice both in 
national and international criminal law.  There are arguments against the practice at the 
international level which also apply nationally, for example that plea bargaining puts too must 
pressure on accused persons to plead guilty even where they are innocent, that plea bargaining 
fails to recognise the gravity of the criminal conduct and that plea bargaining can distort the 
historical record that international criminal courts aim to achieve.  As this thesis has outlined, 
these arguments against plea bargaining do have credibility however they can be managed by 
those negotiating plea agreements doing so cautiously.  The judiciary monitoring the practice of 
plea agreements in international criminal courts should ensure that reasonable sentences are still 
imposed to reflect the conduct but also giving acknowledgement in the form of a reward for the 
plea.   
There is clearly a delicate balance that requires to be struck.  The issues are not 
straightforward and there is no perfect solution.  It is also part of the remit of the Trial Chamber 
to ensure that the historical record remains intact to some extent and to ensure that the prosecutor 
does not abuse their discretion in negotiating inappropriate plea agreements.  In any case, in the 
international criminal courts examined, plea agreements are not binding on the Trial Chamber 
and this is a safeguard to protect against the argument that plea bargaining affords too much 
power to the prosecutor.  
Realistically, as national systems have demonstrated, plea bargaining is a practice that 
can be used in order to achieve efficient justice whilst often enabling victims to see the accused 
person showing remorse for their actions, whilst sparing them from the trauma of having to give 
evidence.  As many of the judges in the ICTR and ICTY have indicated, guilty pleas can foster 
reconciliation in communities who have suffered significantly at the hands of the perpetrator. 
To date plea bargaining is not a practice that has been used by practitioners at the ICC.  
The case law of the ICTY and ICTR make clear that there is a place for the practice of plea 
102 
 
bargaining in international criminal law.  The practice has been used in these ad hoc tribunals 
and as a result more victims will have seen justice far more quickly than they would have done 
if there had to be a lengthy trial process.  This has also meant that less victims and witnesses 
will have had to go through the often dangerous and stressful process of giving evidence.  In 
any plea bargain, national or international, the prosecutor has a decision to make and must 
balance, often competing interests.  It is impossible that one court with limited resources and 
limited funding can prosecute everyone who is responsible for international crimes where their 
own states are unwilling or unable to do so.  The resources in the OTP of the ICC simply cannot 
stretch to investigating every situation that potentially falls within the jurisdiction of the ICC.  
The OTP must, however, make the best of the resources that they have. 
The nature of the Prosecutor’s role requires them to be selective in what situation and 
who to prosecute.  If all involved in the criminal justice plea bargaining process engage in the 
practice this will free up resources to ensure more cases are investigated and prosecuted.  This 
will lead to a wider scale historical record of international crimes worldwide.  The victims may 
never been happy with sentences imposed as it is often the case that nothing will compensate 
for their suffering.  However a conviction for serious crimes, such as crimes against humanity 
at all is better validation to them than the crime against them not being investigated or prosecuted 
at all, which may happen if the resources in the OTP are used up preparing and conducting 
lengthy and expensive trials.  There is also the risk that must be weighed up of victims going 
through the traumatic process of reliving the crime in evidence and then the accused person 
being acquitted.  It is a matter of balance and risk assessment. 
Plea bargaining in international criminal law is a practice that can achieve the correct 
balance between efficiency and justice.  However, as this thesis has discussed, it is a practice 
that comes with tensions and controversy, particularly when dealing with crimes as serious as 
the crimes that fall within the jurisdiction of international criminal courts.  The practice of plea 
bargaining should be implemented at the International Criminal Court provided the safeguards 
laid down in the Rome Statute of the ICC are adhered to, that the Trial Chamber oversee and 
monitor the prosecutor’s conduct in engaging in plea agreements and that the OTP develop, 
after wide consultation, a consistent credible policy that they will apply in cases where they seek 
to enter into a plea agreement with the defence.  Plea bargaining is a necessary evil in 
international criminal courts that should be conducted with caution. 
103 
 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Books 
 
Archbold J. Pleading and Evidence in Criminal Cases (1st Am. ed. 1824) 
 
Blumstein A.  Cohen J.  Martin S. and Tonry M. (eds.) (1983) Research on sentencing: The 
search for reform (Vols. 1-2) (National Academy Press, Washington, DC, 1983) 
 
Bohlander M. Plea-Bargaining before the ICTY, in Essays on ICTY Procedure and Evidence in 
Honour of Gabrielle Kirk McDonald (Richard May et al. eds., 001) 
 
Combs N.A. Guilty Pleas in International Criminal Law: Constructing a Restorative Justice 
Approach (Stanford Univ. Press 2007) 
 
Dershowitz A. The Best Defence (1982) 
 
Ewald U. ‘Large-Scale Victimisation and the Jurisprudence of the ICTY – Victimological 
Issues’, in Large-Scale Victimisation as a Potential Source of Terrorist Activities: Importance 
of Regaining Security in Post-Conflict Societies, ed. Uwe Ewald and Ksenija Turkovic 
(Netherlands: IOS Press, 2006)  
 
Findlay M. and Henham R. Transforming International Criminal Justice: retributive and 
restorative justice in the trial process (Cullompton: Willan Publishing, 2005) 
 
Lippke R. L. The Ethics of Plea Bargaining, 2011, Oxford  
Morris V. and Scharf M.P. An Insider’s Guide to the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia (1995), Hotei Publishing, 1st Edition 
Moody S. and Tombs J. Prosecution in the Public Interest (1982) 
Newman D. Conviction: The Determination of Guilt or Innocence Without Trial (1966) 
Schabas W.A. Genocide in International Law: The Crime of Crimes, Cambridge University 
Press 2000 
Schabas W. A. An Introduction to the International Criminal Court (Cambridge Univ. Press 2d 
ed. 2004)  
 
Schabas W.A. International Criminal Court (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2007), 
3rd ed. 
 
Schrag M. Public Hearing of the Prosecutor, 17-18 June 2001, taken from S. Pal, Issues and 
Controversies Surrounding the Use of Plea Bargaining in International Criminal Tribunals, 
March 2013  
 
Journals 
104 
 
 
Alschuler A.W. The Prosecutor’s Role in Plea Bargaining, The University of Chicago Law 
Review, (1968) Vol. 36, No. 1  
 
Alschuler A.W. The Defence Attorney’s Role in Plea Bargaining, (1975) 84 Yale L. 1179  
 
Alschuler A.W. Plea Bargaining and Its History, (1979) 79 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 19-24  
 
Alschuler A.W. Implementing the Criminal Defendant's Right to Trial: Alternatives to the Plea 
Bargaining System, (1983) 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 931  
 
Alschuler A.W. Straining at Gnats and Swallowing Camels: The Selective Morality of Professor 
Bibas, (2003) 88 Cornell L. Rev. 1412  
 
Bibas S. & Bierschbach R. A.  Integrating Remorse and Apology into Criminal Procedure, (2004) 
114 YALE L.J. 85, 89  
 
Blume J.H. & Helm R.K. The Unexonerated: Factually Innocent Defendants who Plead Guilty, 
(2014-2015) 100 Cornell L. Rev. 157  
 
Borgeas, Necessary Adherence to Model Rule 1.2(b): Attorneys do not Endorse the Acts or 
Views of Their Clients by Virtue of Representation, (2000) 13 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 761,771  
 
Brockman J. ‘An offer you can’t refuse: pleading guilty when innocent’ (2010) 56 Criminal 
Law Quarterly 116 
 
Cassell P.G. Mitchell P.G. and Edwards B.J. Crime Victims’ Rights During Criminal 
Investigations?  Applying the Crime Victims’ Rights Act before Criminal Charges are Filed 
(2014) 104 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 59  
 
Clark J.N.  Plea Bargaining at the ICTY: guilty pleas and reconciliation, (2009) E.J.I.L. 415  
 
R. Henman, Towards Restorative Sentencing in International Criminal Trials, Int. C.L.L. (2009), 
9(5), 809-832 
 
Combs N.A. Procuring Guilty Pleas for International Crimes: The Limited Influence of 
Sentence Discounts, (2006) 59 Vand. L. Rev. 69  
 
Cook J. A. Plea Bargaining at the Hague, 30 Yale J. Int'l L. 473 (2005) 
 
De Hemptinne J.  The Creation of Investigating Chambers at the ICC, 5 Journal of International 
Criminal Justice (2007) 402-418 
 
Dervan L.E. and Edkins V.A. The Innocent Defendant’s Dilemma: An innovative Empirical 
Study of Plea Bargaining’s Innocence Problem, 103 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 1 (2013) 
 
Etienne M. and Robbennault J.K. Apolgies and Plea Bargaining (2007- 2008) 91 Marq. L. Rev. 
295  
 
105 
 
Evans R. J. 'History, Memory, and the Law: The Historian as Expert Witness' 41/3 History and 
Theory (2002) 326-345 
 
Garbett C. The Legal Representation of the Civilian and Military Casualties of Contemporary 
Conflicts: Unlawful Victimisation, its Victims and their Visibility at the ICTY, The 
International Journal of Human Rights, Vol. 16, No. 7, October 2012, 1059–1077 
 
Garoupa N. and Stephen F.H. Why Plea-Bargaining fails to achieve results in so many criminal 
justice systems: a new framework for assessment Maastricht J. 2008, 15(3), 323-358 
 
Garrett B.L. Convicting the Innocent: Where Criminal Prosecutions Go Wrong (2011) 
 
Gazal-Ayal A. Tor, O. and Garcia, S.M. Fairness and the willingness to accept plea bargain 
offers, 2010, Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, 7(1), 97-116 
Groome D. No witness, no case: An Assessment of the Conduct and Quality of ICC 
Investigations, Penn State Journal of Law and International Affairs, 3 Penn St. J.L. & Int'l Aff. 
1 (2014-2015) 
Guidorizzi D.D. Should we really “Ban” Plea Bargaining?: The Core Concerns of Plea 
Bargaining’s Critics, (1998) 47 Emory L. J. 753  
Henham R. Punishment and Process in International Criminal Trials (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005) 
 
Henham R. The Ethics of Plea Bargaining in International Criminal Trials, Liverpool Law 
Review (2005), 26: 209-224 
 
Henman R. Punishment and the Role of the Prosecutor in International Criminal Trials, 2008 
Crim. L.F. 395.   
 
Hessick F.A. and Saujani R.M. Plea Bargaining and Convicting the Innocent: the Role of the 
Prosecutor, the Defense Counsel and the Judge (2001-2002) 16 BYU J. Pub. L. 189  
 
Heupel G. Comparing Confessions and Plea Bargains:  United States v Robertson and the 
Admissibility of a Defendants Incriminating Statements, (1980) 60 B.U. L. Rev. 368  
Hodzik R. Living the legacy of mass atrocities: victims’ perspectives on war crimes tribunals, 
2010 J.I.C.J. 114 
Jorgensen N.H.B. The Genocide Acquittal in the Sikirica Case Before the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the Coming of Age of the Guilty Plea, (2002), LJIL at 
406 
Kavanagh J. Plea Bargaining: The Prosecutor’s Perspective (1976-1977) 6 Police L.Q. 5  
Langbein, J. H. Land Without Plea Bargaining: How the Germans Do It, (1979) 78 Mich. L. 
Rev. 204, 204  
Leverick F.  Sentence Discounting for Guilty Pleas: A Question of Guidelines, Edinburgh Law 
Review, Vol. 16 at pp. 233-238  
106 
 
 
Leverick F. Sentence Discounting for Guilty Pleas: An Argument for Certainty Over 
Discretion (2014) Crim.L.R Issue 5 338  
 
McGonigle B.N. Two for the price of one: attempts by the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts 
in Cambodia to combine retributive and restorative Justice Principles, 2009 L.J.I.L. 127 
 
Manikis M. Recognising Victims’ Role and Rights During Plea Bargaining: A Fair Deal for 
Victims of Crime, (2011-2012) 58 Crim. L.Q. 411  
O’Hear M.M. Plea Bargaining and Victims: From Consultation to Guidelines (2007-2008) 91 
Marq. L. Rev. 323  
Padfield N. Shining the torch on plea-bargaining, 2009 Cambridge Law Journal, 11 
Paterson N. Silencing Victims in International Criminal Courts: Neglecting a Solemn Obligation,  
(2003) 4 Geo. J. Int'l Aff. 95  
 
R. Pati, The ICC and the case of Sudan’s Omar Al Bashir: Is Plea Bargaining a Valid Option? 
(2008-2009) 15 U. C. Davis J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 265 
 
Petrig A. Negotiated Justice and the Goals of International Criminal Tribunals, (2008) 8 Chi.-
Kent J. Int’l & Comp. L. 15 
 
Pizzi W. Overcoming Logistical and Structural Barriers to Fair Trials at International Tribunals, 
2 International Commentary on Evidence (2006), Issue 1, Article 4  
 
Podgor E. White Collar Innocence: Irrelevant in the High Stakes Risk Game (2010), 85 Chicago 
Kent Law Review 77 
 
Radosavljevic D. Restorative Justice under the ICC Penalty Regime, 2008 L.P.I.C.T. 7(2), 235-
255 
 
Rauxloh R.E. Negotiated History: The Historical Record in International Criminal Law and Plea 
Bargaining (2010) ICLR 10 737-770 
  
Rauxloh R.E. Plea Bargaining – A necessary tool for the International Criminal Court 
Prosecutor, 94 Judicature 178 2010-2011  
 
Reinganum, J.F. Plea Bargaining and Prosecutorial Discretion, The American Economic 
Review,Vol. 78, No. 4 (Sep., 1988), pp. 713-728  
Rodman K.A. Is Peace in the interests of Justice?  The case for broad prosecutorial discretion at 
the International Criminal Court, 2009 L.J.I.L. 99 
 
Scharf M. P. Trading Justice for Efficiency, Plea-Bargaining and International Tribunals, 2 J. 
Int’l Crim. Just. 1070 (2004) 
 
Scott R. E. and Stunz W. J.  Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 Yale L.J. 1909 (1992) 
107 
 
Schulhofer S. J. Plea Bargaining as Disaster, 101 YALE L.J. 1979 (1992) 
Tieger and Shin, Plea Agreements in the ICTY: Purpose, Effects and Propriety, 3 J Int’l Criminal 
Justice (2005) 671 
 
Vamos N. Please don’t call it ‘Plea Bargaining’, 2009, CLR, 617  
Young M. In Defence of Plea Bargaining’s Possible Morality,(2014) 40 Ohio N.U. L. Rev. 251 
2013- 
 
Zegveld L. Victims' Reparations Claims and International Criminal Courts: Incompatible 
Values? (2010)8 J. Int'l Crim. Just. 79  
 
Miscellaneous Resources and Websites 
 
CPS Code for Crown Prosecutors in England and Wales 
https://www.cps.gov.uk/publications/code_for_crown_prosecutors/ 
 
Crown Prosecution Service  
http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/a_to_c/costs/annex_1_-_scales_of_cost/ 
 
Bureau of Justice Statistics, Felony Defendants in Large U.S. Counties, 1992, 29 
COPFS website  
http://www.copfs.gov.uk/images/Documents/Statistics/Statistics%20on%20Case%20Processin
g%20Last%205%20Years%202010-15.pdf  
 
Innocence Project (www.innocenceproject.org)  
Kebo (2003, February, 24-28). Regional report: Plavsic sentence divides Bosnia. Institute of 
War and Peace Reporting's Tribunal Update, 302 
http://www.upi.com/Top_News/2009/01/27/Jailed-Plavsic-recants-Hague-
confession/68351233070199/  
 
Rwanda Unhappy with Ruggui Sentence, Hirondelle News Agency 
http://www.hirondellenews.com/ictr-rwanda/372-trials-ended/ruggiu-georges/17498-en-en-
rwanda-unhappy-with-ruggiu-sentence65496549 
 
Scottish Executive, Costs, Sentencing Profiles and the Scottish Criminal Justice System (2005) 
http://www.gov.scot/Resource/Doc/69582/0017111.pdf 
See Sentencing Guidelines Council, Reduction in Sentence for a Guilty Plea: Definitive 
Guideline (2007) (the Definitive Guideline)  
https://www.sentencingcouncil.org.uk/wp-
content/uploads/Reduction_in_Sentence_for_a_Guilty_Plea_-Revised_20071.pdf 
 
Thomas, C. Are Juries Fair?, Ministry of Justice Research Series 1/10, February 2010 
https://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/publications/research-and-analysis/moj-research/are-
juries-fair-research.pdf  
United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda http://www.unictr.org/en/genocide 
108 
 
   
U.S. Representative Mrs Albright statement 25 May 1993 UN SCOR, 4 8 h session, 3217" 
meeting UN Doc. S/PV3217 
 
S. Vasiliev, Ongwen at the ICC and the Possible Guilty Plea: A Response to Alex Whiting, 15 
February 2015, available on the website for the Centre for International Criminal Justice at 
http://cicj.org/2015/02/ongwen-at-the-icc-and-the-possible-guilty-plea-a-response-to-alex-
whiting/  
 
Website of the ICTY at http://www.icty.org/sections/TheCases/GuiltyPleas 
 
Website of the ICTR at http://www.unictr.org/en/tribunal 
 
Website of the International Criminal Court at  
http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/Pages/default.aspx 
 
Whiting A. Encouraging the Acceptance of Guilty Pleas at the ICC, 11 February 2015, Post 
Conflict Justice website at http://postconflictjustice.com/encouraging-the-acceptance-of-
guilty-pleas-at-the-icc/  
 
Cases 
 
Domestic cases 
 
Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 at 363 (1978) 
 
Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 at 748 (1970)  
 
Commonwealth v. Battis, 1 Mass. 95 (1804) 
 
Gemmell v HM Advocate [2011] HCJAC 129 
 
Murray v HM Advocate [2013] HCJAC 3 
 
North Carolina v Alford 400 U.S. 25 (1970) 
 
Parker v North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790, 90 S.Ct. 1458, 25 L.Ed.2d 785 (1970)  
 
United States v. Dixon 1 D.C. (1 Cranch) 414 (1807) 
 
Rex v Warrickshall (1783) 
 
Santabello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971) 
 
Spence v HM Advocate [2007] HCJAC 64: 2008 JC 174 
 
Wight v. Rindskopf, 43 Wis. 344 at 357 (1877) 
 
In re Winship, 397 US 358 (1970) 
109 
 
 
International Cases  
 
Prosecutor v Akayesu Case No. ICTR 96-4-T 
 
Prosecutor v Milan Babic Case No. IT-03-72-S 
 
Prosecutor v Paul Bisengimana Case No. ICTR 00-60-T 
 
Prosecutor v Erdemovic Case No. IT-96-22-Tbis, IT-96-22-A 
 
Prosecutor v Jelisic Case No. IT-95-10-PT 
 
Prosecutor v. Kambanda Case No. ICTR-97-23-S 
 
Prosecutor v Germain Katanga ICC-01/04-01/07  
 
Prosecutor v Kayishema & Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR 95-1-T 
 
Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo ICC-01/04-01/06  
 
Prosecutor v Slobodan Milosevic case no. IT-02-54 
 
Prosecutor v Dragan Nikolic, Case No. IT-94-2-S, 
 
Prosecutor v. Momir Nikolić, Case No. IT-02-60/1-S 
 
Prosecutor v Dragan Obrenovic Case No. IT-02-60/2-S 
 
Prosecutor v Plavsic Case No IT-00-30&40/1-S 
 
Prosecutor v Georges Ruggui Case No ICTR-97-32-I 
 
Prosecutor v. Rutaganira Case No. ICTR-95-1C-I 
 
Prosecutor v Serushago, Case No. ICTR-98-37 
 
Prosecutor v Sikirica, Dosen and Kolundzija Case No. IT-95-8 
 
Prosecutor v Todorovic Case No IT-95-9-S  
 
Legislation 
 
European Convention on Human Rights 
 
Coroners and Justice Act 2009 
 
Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 
 
110 
 
Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious 
Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the former 
Yugoslavia since 1991 
 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence, International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons 
Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the 
Territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991 
 
Statute of The International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for 
Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the 
Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations 
Committed in the Territory of Neighbouring States, between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 
1994 
 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence, International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons 
Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law 
Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens responsible for Genocide and 
Other Such Violations Committed in the Territory of Neighbouring States, between 1 January 
1994 and 31 December 1994  U.N. Doc. ITR/3/REV.1 (1995) 
 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Court 
 
 
 
  
111 
 
112 
 
 
